• 1 : : A ® ') 



m As a 





LIBRAR 



OFC 



CONGRESS. 



. Sli'elf ....L.:l 



y 



UNITED STATES OF AMERICA. 






/ 



GRANT 



AS A 



SOLDIER. 



BY 



AUGUSTUS W. ALEXANDER, 



OF THE ST. LOUIS BAR. 




ST. LOUIS: 
PUBLISHED BY THE AUTHOR. 

1887. 



Entered according to Act of Congress in the year 1887, by 

AUGUSTUS W. ALEXANDER, 
In the Office of the Librarian of Congress, at Washington. 



Press of Nlcon- Jones Printing Co., 

210-212 Pine Street, St. Louis, Mo. 



PREFACE. 



No elaborate and reliable estimate of Gen. Grant 
as a military leader has yet appeared. Eulogy is 
not history. A multitude of books of annals, by 
men on both sides of the late war, have been written 
and we may now conclude that all essential facts 
are before us. The trick of ascribing to Gen. 
Grant the merit of suppressing the rebellion merely 
because he was the official head of the Federal army, 
though good for campaign purposes, has ceased to 
be useful. There is now no party reason why any 
citizen should not desire to learn the truth. 

I have prefixed an Essay on The Military Art. If 
the views there expressed are true, it is time that 
the young men of the country should hold military 
talent and military character at a proper value. 

The language employed in tracing Gen. Grant's 
career may seem occasionally to have the warmth 
of partisanship. This appearance is due largely to 
the fact that, according to my conceptions of truth, 
I have to employ the language of condemnation. 

(3) 



4 PREFACE. 

Condemnation must sometimes have a look of par- 
tisan harshness. For the facts related I must not 
be blamed. I did not make them. Undertaking the 
task of relating them, I must aim to relate them 
truly. 

As this little book is meant to be history and not 
mere annals, not bald narrative of facts and detailed 
descriptions of battles, no maps of battles are 
given. 

If an author's prepossessions are worth being 
stated, I may say that in 1860 I was of the Repub- 
lican party and supported Mr. Lincoln at the hust- 
ings and was afterward an ardent Union man. 

A. W. A. 

St. Louis, February, 1887. 



GRANT AS A SOLDIER. 



THE MILITARY ART 



The reign of brute force is inferior in rank to the 
reign of intellect. Yet in barbarous and semi- 
barbarous times the reign of brute force is and must 
be dominant. In barbarous and semi-barbarous 
times every difference becomes a quarrel, and between 
parties of regnant rank every quarrel brings war. 
In such times the one road to distinction is by suc- 
cess in war. And every quality that specially fits a 
man for war is held in esteem. The Komans were 
a warlike, a conquering people. Hence they 
esteemed valor above all else. The Latin word 
virtus, meaning primarily manliness, had for its first 
meaning among the Romans, valor, on the idea that 
valor is the highest quality of a man's character, the 
great virtue. 

It is among savage nations that we see the true 
nature of war and the qualities of him who achieves 
distinction. Muscle and prowess in arms bring con- 

(5) 



6 GRANT AS A SOLDIER. 

sideration just as they do with the non-intellectual 
classes in civilized peoples. Note the cases of Goliath 
and Samson. In one savage tribe a man was forbid- 
den to marry till he owned the skull of a slain enemy. 
The possession of several such skulls gave him rank 
among the nobility. Such is the nobility of sav- 
agery, of a warlike people. Where savagery prevails, 
there is the reign of brute force ; there high intel- 
lectual or moral worth, unconnected with physical 
prowess, is held for naught ; there the warrior is the 
great man and on]y through war lies the road to 
distinction. Brute force and intellect are in antag- 
onism and the military profession is appropriately 
and of necessity the most unbookish and most iinin- 
tellectual of the professions. It is only by courtesy 
that it can be called a profession. 

Great mind is not needed and in fact cannot be 
used in its practice. Some tasks require the might- 
iest intellect. He who would discover the deepest 
truths and the most occult relations of facts and 
would thence, by impregnable logic, deduce other 
deepest truths and other occult relations of facts, 
needs the endowment of Kant, of Newton, of Spen- 
cer. In the midst of his course of lectures Fichte 
talked the language of a philosopher when he began 
a lecture by saying : " We have now reached a point, 
gentlemen, where we are prepared to make God." 
But the mind required, in Fichte's sense, to make 
God, is not needed and cannot be fully used in 



THE MILITARY ART. 7 

shoeing a horse. The strength of a giant is no bet- 
ter than that of a school girl for darning a sock. 
To order Smith forward at Donelson needed no in- 
tellectual greatness. 

Ignorance in the military profession is almost a 
necessity. In some at least of the other professions 
study is a necessity. The young lawyer, though 
having few cases, has cases enough. On a single case 
he studies, with laborious care, a whole book, per- 
haps more than one book. He may spend weeks of 
toilsome reading in preparing to draft one instru- 
ment of writing. Thus two or three years of his 
earlier professional life are passed. But even after 
he has become a learned lawyer and throughout his 
professional career he may spend days in investigat- 
ing the books on a single case or a single opinion. 
The editor must read daily to keep abreast of the 
times, to keep himself acquainted with new ques- 
tions, new facts, new theories. The physician who 
neglects new developments in science soon becomes 
incapable. The professor, if he would achieve 
eminence, must burn the midnight oil. In short, 
intellectual wealth of whatever sort can be got only 
by patient, long continued intellectual toil. The 
professional duties of these classes exact study. 
With the military profession it is not so. The 
cadet at graduation from West Point, made second 
Lieutenant, is perhaps sent to some military post. 
A few weeks serve to acquaint with his brother 



8 GRANT AS A SOLDIER. 

officers, with his montonous routine of daily duties 
and with the mode of filling blanks. After that, 
apart from his hour of routine duty, irksome 
because always the same, he with his brother officers 
have an unceasing .vaFiety of intellectual toil, that 
is to say, yesterday it was cards, whisky and cigars ; 
but to-day it is whisky, cards and cigars, and to- 
morrow it will be cigars, whisky and cards. By 
courtesy this may be called a profession, but it is a 
profession in which there can be no intellectual 
growth. 

We have considered the profession of arms only 
in time of peace. In war it is still worse. In time 
of peace there is no requirement of study, no in- 
centive to study, and hence, as a rule, no study. 
But there is at least leisure and quiet for study. In 
war even these are wanting. In war the camp is 
the home of excitement, of idleness, except when 
on duty, and of dissipation. No officer has com- 
posure of mind or opportunity for much severe 
reading. On the march the case is still worse. A 
profession whose duties necessitate the study of 
books will produce occasionally a great intellect. 
But a profession which does not necessitate such 
study, which in fact discourages and almost forbids 
such study, must furnish starved and stunted minds. 
When Gen. Winfield Scott visited Europe, his posi- 
tion as head of the United States Army procured 
him attention from distinguished military officers. 



THE MILITARY ART. 9 

The Marshals of Napoleon, whose fame filled the 
world, he found to be, with one exception, men of 
only average mind, uninformed and common. 

Among ancient peoples of considerable advance- 
ment in the dubious sort of civilization then preva- 
lent, men who displayed intellect in vocations really 
intellectual, still sought military fame. Hannibal, a 
man of commanding intellect and inheriting civic dis- 
tinction, led the Carthaginian army in the battle of 
Trebia, Thrasymenus and Cannae. Julius Caesar, a 
politician as able as he was knavish and as a historic 
writer hardly surpassed, was also one of the first 
military leaders of the world. Nor was the case 
different in Greece. Solon, the law-giver, was a 
soldier ; Pericles, the first Athenian statesman, and 
Themistocles, but for his trickery probably the sec- 
ond, were soldiers. Thucidides, Xenophon and 
Polybius, now known only as historians, were sol- 
diers. Epaminondas, in command of the Boeotian 
army gained the decisive victory of Leuctra, and 
also by his wisdom in statesmanship, aided by the 
influence acquired by his purity of life, brought 
Thebes to rank among the first States in Greece. 

There was, probably, one decisive reason for the 
intellectual ability which marked military leaders in 
those days in the fact that military discipline was 
then feeble and it followed that, except in the 
case of a hereditary king, born with absolute 
authority, like Xerxes and Alexander, only a 



10 GRANT AS A SOLDIER. 

man of commanding intellect could get, and having 
got, continue to hold, military leadership. Under our 
rigorous modern discipline and methods it is other- 
wise. By appointment a Pope, a Burnside, a 
Hooker, may get command of fifty thousand men 
and may hold the command until, for the disasters 
and slaughters his follies have caused, he is removed, 
not by an uprising of his soldiers, but by another ap- 
pointment. In ancient times to be skillful in war 
meant not merely ability to issue orders, an art in 
which the weakest general is usually most proficient. 
It meant infinitely more. It meant ability to gain, and 
then to maintain, leadership among men. It in- 
volved capacity to lead in civil as well as military 
life, that is, it involved intellectual ability. Hence 
men of strong intellect and of ambition, devoted 
themselves in time of peace to intellectual pursuits 
and thus became intellectually great. Then seeing 
that through war lay the shortest road to fame, they 
adopted war as soon as occasion offered and won 
leadership. In all-conquering Rome, sending her 
legions now to the Ganges and now to the Thames, 
and applauding valor ns par excellence the virtue, it 
was natural that men of learning and intellect should 
seek fame by the quickest route. 

During the Middle Ages, and to the sixteenth 
century, if we except the vocation of the priest- 
hood and that of the medicine man, two vocations 
often united, war afforded the only field of intellec- 



THE MILITARY ART. 11 

tual activity. Hence the absorbing desire for war, 
and hence its constancy. During brief intervals of 
peace the fooleries of chivalry were in vogue. But 
as ignorance gave way to enlightenment, other 
modes of emploj^ment, other avenues to distinction, 
were found, more quiet, more intellectual and more 
dignified than devastating farms, burning towns 
and butchering men. Commerce, navigation, me- 
chanic arts, letters, philosophy and the learned pro- 
fessions sprang up. In fact, war lost its charms. 
Its perils, its distractions, its temptations, its vices, 
the toils and exposures and sufferings of the march, 
the demoralization of the camp, — these ceased to 
be attractive. Then it came to pass that the man 
of affluence sent his brightest son to the bar and his 
dullest to the church or to the army The profes- 
sion of arms lost its luster. It now ranks below all 
the others, and has ceased to be an intellectual pro- 
fession. It can be called a profession only by 
courtesy. During the past fifty years nearly every 
profession has added to the world's stock of ideas. 
The profession of arms has contributed not one 
thought. It has contributed narratives in abun- 
dance, but not one thought. In the prosecution of 
war, to be sure, new applications of ideas and new 
observations have been made in engineering and in 
surgery, but these were contributions of the en- 
gineering and medical professions. A profession 



12 GRANT AS A SOLDIER. 

which is barred from books cannot possess intellec- 
tual greatness. 

In a vocation so completely practical it is clear 
that a technical education can have but little value, 
and that experience must be the great instructor. 
Accordingly we rind that few of our best generals 
were technically educated. The ablest general of 
modern times, Frederick the Great, had no techni- 
cal education. Marlborough, probably the next 
best, had almost no education at all. Napoleon had 
none to speak of. He entered Brienne a boy of ten, 
and entered the army at sixteen. The mathematics 
of his day was quite limited, but especially its 
principles and demonstrations were too abstruse and 
obscure to be within the comprehension of a juvenile 
mind. Of Napoleon's marshals Massena, the best, 
was illiterate ; Ney and Murat were not much 
better. Bliicher, the Prussian general, was illiter- 
ate. Undeniably education, of whatever sort is of 
value to any man, whatever his vocation. But we 
speak now not of a general education, but of an 
education technically and exclusively military, as we 
might speak of a medical or legal education. 

Of the education given at West Point and other 
military schools but a very small fraction is military. 
Davies' algebra is not more military when taught at 
West Point Academy than when taught at any other 
academy in America. The study of French is not 



THE MILITARY ART. 13 

more military there than at a female seminary. 
Engineering is taught there, but is also taught at a 
thousand other schools. Besides, though engineer- 
ing may be of special advantage, just as a knowledge 
of meteorology might be and undoubtedly would be 
of advantage, yet a knowledge of engineering 
does not make a good general, nor does a man need 
to be an engineer in order to be a good general. A 
general leaves engineering to his chief engineer just 
as he leaves hospital management to his medbal 
director. Nearly all the studies taught at West 
Point are taught elsewhere. Hence, though they 
are education, they are no more to be reckoned as 
military than as legal or medical education. 

The few things which constitute education strictly 
military could be learned in not many months, and 
besides are, for the most part, of a character that 
cannot be taught from a professor's chair, and can 
be learned only by experience. The first branch in 
the military curriculum is called logistics, which has 
to do with the details of supplying and moving an 
army. Obviously logistics is mere business. Like 
any other sort of business, it is to be learned only 
by doing it. The gray-haired professor himself, if 
put into the field to manage the logistics of an army, 
would be lost. But a sprightly commission mer- 
chant's clerk will excel, I do not say all the cadets 
that will be graduated next year, but ninety-nine out 
of a hundred of army officers. Logistics cannot be 



14 GRANT AS A SOLDIER. 

taught from the professor's chair, and it may be 
added, ought to be stricken from the curriculum. 

Tactics comes next. Tactics is of two sorts, ele- 
mentary tactics and grand tactics. Elementary 
tactics, the evolutions taught to the private soldier, 
though useful, is so simple that it may be learned in 
a few weeks by the commonest mind. Any system 
not thus simple would be unfit for the low grade of 
intellect sometimes found anions: men who are ffood 
private soldiers. To learn the military drill is next 
to nothing. The dancing master's art is of much 
higher rank. The drill master teaches evolution 
merely ; the dancing master teaches evolution, but 
in addition he teaches grace. His art is coupled 
with refinement and involves the poetry of motion. 
How far apart the heels must be and at what angle 
the feet must be placed at the command " attention," 
how to execute the command " shoulder arms," 
" about face," " by the left flank, march," — to learn 
all this does not invigorate the mind. Though of 
essential value to a company officer, a mere general 
knowledge of elementary tactics is sufficient for any 
officer above the rank of colonel. There was not a 
corporal at Leuthen who was not superior to Fred- 
erick as a drill master. Elementary tactics can be 
either learned or taught by the commonest mind ; it 
is a purely muscular, that is, a totally unintellectual 
art; it can be learned in camp or elsewhere in a 
few weeks under a sergeant's instruction and it 



THE MILITARY ART. 15 

is hence deceptive to apply to it the word educa- 
tion. 

Grand tactics, the placing and maneuvering a 
large body of men in presence of the enemy, requires 
something of skill, yet from its character it is 
manifest that not much can be taught in the recita- 
tion room. The placing and maneuvering of an 
army on the battlefield depends on the topography of 
the battlefield and on the placing and maneuvering 
of the opposing army.. Relative strength of the 
armies and advantages of position determine eveiy- 
thing. Melas at Marengo could not cross the inter- 
vening creek because of the steepness of its banks 
and hence had to send a heavy detachment up the 
creek for a crossing. He crossed and drove back 
the French. Marlborough at Blenheim was able 
with some difficulty to cross the intervening creek 
and attack Tallard's center. For such cases what 
good can the instruction of the recitation room do? 
Nay, of what need is such instruction? Did Melas 
at Marengo need to be told by a professor that steep 
banks obstruct? Would any education have ren- 
dered the illiterate Marlborough more able to de- 
cide that his troops can cross the little creek and 
attack the enemy's center? The topography of a 
battle field is a big fact and no two battlefields are 
alike, and no professor of grand tactics can antici- 
pate the topography of a field. The hill, the ravine, 
the forest, the hedge, the swamp, the group of hay- 



16 GRANT AS A SOLDIER. 

stacks, the forest on fire, the pond, the house, the 
village, the river or creek, the impassable gully, 
these are as much military facts as the brigades and 
batteries of the enemy, and not seldom decide bat- 
tles. But for Hougomont, Wellington would have 
lost Waterloo. But for those deceptive fish ponds 
at Prague, Frederick would have annihilated his 
foe. It was the impassable Plauen chasm at Dres- 
den that enabled Napoleon to mass on Sckwartzen- 
berg's left, unable on account of the chasm to be 
reinforced, and to destroy it and then to gain a vic- 
tory. Who could control the fire in the woods at 
the Wilderness? Joe Johnston's position at Kene- 
saw Mountain and Bragg' s position at Missionary 
Kidge made the attacks on them by Sherman and 
Grant respectively such as history must condemn. 
From the nature of the case it is evident that the 
most learned lectures of the professor's room can 
not communicate skill in grand tactics. 

It is further to be remarked that much of the 
discretion and skill displayed on a battlefield rests 
not with the commanding general, but with offi- 
cers of a lower and, perhaps, much lower grade. 
It belongs probably not to a corps commander, 
nor even a division commander, nor yet a brigade 
commander, but to a colonel to see and seize lucky 
defenses, an embankment, a group of farm build- 
ings, an excavation for concealment, the flank 
afforded by a swamp or deep creek, a prominence 



THE MILITARY ART. 17 

for artillery. More than one battle has been gained 
by a brigadier-general. Kellerman won Marengo. 
It was Grouchy 's skill that for hours withstood 
Benningsen at Friedland. The general command- 
ing is usually too remote to be able to know with 
particularity the topography of the battlefield. 
Between him and the most of his army there are 
probably hills and forests and villages. How could 
Napoleon observe his entire line at Wagram, about 
seven miles long, or at Liitzen, involving several 
villages? How could Grant observe his line at the 
Wilderness through an impenetrable forest? Even 
if Grant during the battle of Fort Donelson had 
been at his post of duty, he could have witnessed in 
that hilly and wooded region no part of the engage- 
ment. His duty would have been simply to send 
aid to McClernand who fought the battle and to 
order Smith and Wallace to attack early in the 
forenoon. In fact, a good commanding general 
makes few orders. He chiefly leaves to the corps 
commander to manage his corps, who chiefly leaves 
to the division commander to manage his division, 
who chiefly leaves to the brigade commander to man- 
age his brigade, who chiefly leaves to the regimental 
commander to manage his regiment. The best 
commanding general is least given to intermeddling. 
From the foregoing it appears first, that a command- 
ing general needs not much besides good sen<e, sec- 
ondly, that most of the skill to be exercised in seeing 



18 GRANT AS A SOLDIER. 

and seizing advantages must belong to subordinates, 
and thirdly, that from its nature grand tactics can 
not be taught to any mind however mature, but 
especially cannot be taught to boys. Military 
genius is a phrase belonging only to rhetoricians. 

The same is true of strategy, the maneuvering of 
an army not in presence of the enemy or in Jomini's 
phrase, " fighting a war on the map." The rules of 
strategy are few and simple. But this, too, is one 
of the cases in which, coming to practice, rules are 
well nigh valueless. The strategy of no two wars 
can be alike. How could Napoleon's strategy of 
the Spanish campaign resemble that of the 
Russian campaign? Nay, take wars waged in 
the same territory and their strategy may 
differ essentially. The strategy of Napoleon's 
first Italian campaign is totally unlike that of the 
Marengo campaign. That of the Austrian cam- 
paign, which began with the capture of Ulm, is 
totally unlike that which ended with Wagram. 
That of the Prussian campaign, which began with 
Jena, is unlike that which ended at Leipsic. In 
strategy, as in grand tactics, every good general 
adjusts his movements to those of his adversary, 
and there is no general who does not make mistakes 
and thus justify an opposing strategy which, but 
for the mistake, would be bad. Frederick the Great, 
an uncommonly good strategist, made mistakes. 
Napoleon's strategy was often wretched. In his 



THE MILITARY ART. 19 

Marengo campaign, though in some respects admi- 
rable, it was in some respects bad ; and but for two 
accidents, neither of which could be foreseen, must 
have been fatally bad. His last Prussian campaign 
was miserably bad. With one splendid exception, 
his campaign in France in 1814 was in part only 
tolerable and in part bad. His Russian campaign 
was a blunder from beginning to end. He left 
nearly a continent of hostile countries in his rear. 
True, they were diplomatic friends, but sometimes 
diplomatic friendship is nothing. He who pledges 
you friendship with your knife at his throat may 
experience a change of heart when he finds his 
knife at your throat. Blucher's retreat to Wavre 
from his defeat at Ligny was a blunder. It 
is a strategic rule, because a rule of good sense, 
that a defeated general should retreat upon his 
re-enforcements, if he has them. Thus he gains 
additional strength. Now, Wellington and Blii- 
cher were re- enforcements each of the other. 
Blticher retreated northward upon Wavre and thus 
imperiled Wellington. Indeed, but for the accident 
of a heavy rain on Saturday, which Bliicher could 
not have foreseen, causing a delay on Sunday of 
six hours in delivering battle, Napoleon would have 
destroyed Wellington, at Waterloo, before Blucher's 
arrival. But if Bliicher after Ligny had retreated, 
not northward upon Wavre but westward, a distance 
of hardly more than five miles, upon Wellington 



20 GRANT AS A SOLDIER. 

as his re-enforcement, the two armies would have 
been at once united and Napoleon's plan of fighting 
them separately been balked. From all these illus- 
trations of strategy it is clear that a professor can 
lay down no rigid rules of guidance. It is even 
true that the rules which control one general may 
be inapplicable to his adversary. For example, a 
general invading the enemy's country must exercise 
a vigilance of which his adversary is relieved. The 
inhabitants, friendly to his adversary, will make 
haste to convey to the invaded the movements of 
the invader, but will carefully conceal or perhaps 
misrepresent to their enemies the movements of 
their friends. The invading general, too, must take 
care to keep his army compact and prepared every 
hour for an attack. He must daily reconnoitre and 
adopt other appropriate methods to prevent surprise. 
It was to an amazing neglect of these precautions 
that Grant owed his defeat at Shiloh. The season 
of the year, too, is sometimes to be considered. A 
march that could properly be undertaken in summer 
or fall may be made impracticable in late winter bv 
mud and swollen streams. Napoleon had thousands 
of men disabled by his foolish march from Dresden 
to Diiben. Again, the question of the health of 
the army is vitally important. Many a military 
enterprise has failed through disregard of it. 
Grant's persistence, notwithstanding successive 
failures, in his amphibious siege of Vicksbur°-, 



THE MILITARY ART. 2t 

while he was daily filling the Mississippi levees with 
the bodies of his dead soldiers, must be condemned. 
Armies are not created to be buried needlessly. 
From the foregoing view of the subject of strategy 
it is apparent that its rules are so manifestly dic- 
tated by good sense, and are of snch sort that he who 
is capable of being a general, need not have heard 
them taught from a professor's chair, and that he who 
is incapable will not be profited by such teaching. 
At any rate, when we consider the character, the 
multitude, and the infinite complications of the 
questions involved ill strategy, such as the friend- 
liness or unfriendliness of other governments, differ- 
ences in climate, bases of supplies, capacity of the 
invaded country to subsist an "army, salubrity, the 
hot hate or the lukewarmness, or possibly the sym- 
pathy of the invaded people, the season of the year, 
the topography of the country, and the condition 
of its roads, the morale of each army and the ability 
and temperament of the opposing general, whether 
venturesome like Blucher and Hood, or cautious 
like Wellington and McClellan, it is clear that we 
are dealing with topics not only insusceptible of 
being taught by a professor, but quite too big for 
the immature minds of school boys. 

In a school grand tactics and strategy can be taught 
only by general rules. But in the first place, general 
rules on those subjects cannot be comprehended 
by a boy, and in the second place, in the case of boy 



22 GRANT AS A SOLDIER. 

or man, if he stops with general rules, thej become 
valueless. To make general rules valuable, the 
student must proceed at once to the study of ex- 
tensive treatises in which these rules are elaborated 
aud then to histories of military campaigns, where the 
rules are applied. When for example, he has famil- 
iarized himself with Ziethen's skillful retreat the day 
before Ligny and of Grouchy' s masterly rescue of 
his army from Wavre the day after Waterloo, he 
begins to understand how to handle an army in re- 
treat. If Grant had acquainted himself with 
Napoleon's management after Jena and elsewhere, 
and of Bliicher's management after Waterloo, he 
would have pursued the enemy the second day of 
Shiloh, and would thus, in some sense, have atoned 
for his defeat the first day, would have made the 
final result yield something instead of nothing. By 
such reading and not otherwise, can a man become 
a military critic. But even such reading, even 
capacity as a military critic, will not fit him for 
command. For that duty only actual experience 
in campaign and in battle will suffice. The mere 
critic will often encounter questions, chiefly of the 
lower grade, on which he declines to form an opin- 
ion. The higher questions of vegetable growth, 
the professor of botany understands better than the 
gardener; but on some questions he defers to the 
gardener. It is amusing to observe the affectation 
of modesty, thinly veiling an oracular dogmatism, 



THE MILITARY ART. 23 

with which generals who have not read a military 
book in twenty years justify or condemn a military 
act. It is often more amusing to observe the pro- 
found satisfaction with which ninety-nine men out 
of a hundred, accept such dictum as decisive — men 
who, if a gardener should presumptuously under- 
take to talk above his spade, to talk botanical 
science, would say: " Let the cobbler stick to his 
last." Jomini was both critic and field marshal. 
Probably Von Moltke is. The War of the Re- 
bellion presented few critics and even not many 
field marshals. But unless the field marshal is 
also a critic he must not claim to have a military 
education. We conclude then, that mathemat- 
ics, French, Spanish, etc., though good as parts 
of a general education, are in no sense parts 
of a mere military education, that of those things 
which might be held to constitute a military ed- 
ucation, elementary tactics belongs to a camp or 
school of instruction, and is too trivial and too 
muscular to be considered under the name educa- 
tion, that logistics cannot be taught at school, and 
that grand tactics and strategy are to be learned 
chiefly by experience in campaigns and by general 
military reading and are of such complexity of char- 
acter that it is a waste of time to teach them to 
boys. 

There are, how r ever, two advantages in having re- 
ceived a so-called military education. First, there 



24 GRANT AS A 80LDIER. 

will be in a military institution a military esprit du 
corps. A boy remaining there a few years will be 
apt to become imbued with the military spirit. 
Afterward, when he comes to engage in war, he will 
instinctively avoid certain unmilitary acts which a 
volunteer officer in his zealous rage might commit. 
For example, he will disdain to maltreat prisoners 
of war ; he will disdain to poison wells and the like. 
Yet this rule has had conspicuous and discreditable 
exceptions. During the late war West Pointers took 
a savage delight in destroying private property, in 
burning towns, and in causing wanton misery to 
non-combatants. Grant cruelly forbade an exchange 
of prisoners and humanity wept at his cruelty. 

Another advantage is that the public and the 
army, forgetting that their West Point commander 
dropped military studies when he left the Academy 
ten or twenty years before, and has forgotten every- 
thing, insist on believing, first, that as an Academy 
boy he learned everything about war, and, secondly, 
that he remembers all he then learned. Now, this 
belief, however absurd, is a big fact. Under a re- 
publican form of government public opinion is a 
power. Tne support it gives to a general is im- 
mensely valuable. Again, the soldiers have special 
confidence in a West Pointer. The confidence of 
an army in a general, whether misplaced or not, is 
also a big fact. A loss of confidence brings de- 
moralization. But soldiers will make toilsome 



THE MILITARY ART. 25 

marches and endure exposures cheerfully and will 
fight fiercely under a leader whom, for however un- 
sound a reason, they regard with favor. 

But there are some peculiarities connected with 
the relation between the so-called military educa- 
tion and the military art which deserve notice. 
When a young lawyer has just graduated, the 
best that an old and intelligent lawyer will say 
of him is, not that he knows the science of law, but 
that he knows such an amount of that science as 
will enable him to find the law of any case presented 
to him. The practice of his profession involves 
study of the law of each case that he gets. Note 
well that with him the practice of his profession 
consists in daily acquiring more of the learning of 
his profession and daily applying that learning. 
With the young lieutenant it is different. I speak 
now only of West Point graduates whose scholar- 
ship was poor, not of those whose scholarship was 
excellent and who are usually put at once into the 
profession of engineering. Even if the lieutenant 
at a military post practices elementary tactics it is 
a thing of which he cannot learn more. Of the 
only real learning in his profession, grand tactics 
and strategy, he has no opportunity in time of 
peace to apply it. Hence, unlike the young lawyer, 
he is not daily gaining ground in his profession by 
a deeper ascertainment of its principles and a daily 
application of them. Instead of daily applying in 



26 GRANT AS A SOLDIER. 

practice the principles of grand tactics and strat- 
egy, and by special reading on each question, daily 
increasing his professional learning in the practice 
of his profession, he has, in post duty, no more 
occasion for such application of principles and for 
such reading than if he were a jail guard. Here 
then is a wide difference between what would be 
called the practice of the profession of arms and the 
practice of any other profession. The latter implies 
constant professional gain ; the former does not. 

Again, this non-practice of the profession of 
arms not only means no professional gain, it 
means constant professional loss. Such is the in- 
firmity of the memory that whatever there is no 
occasion to remember is soon forgotten. Of col- 
lege graduates how many not engaged in teaching 
are able, ten years after graduation, to inflect the 
Latin verb eo or the Greek verb erchomai, or to ex- 
pound and handle logarithms? The young law 
graduate, engaging in mercantile pursuits, will have 
forgotten everything of law in ten years. If we 
consider Gen. Grant's low class rank we may safely 
say, first, that the day he graduated he could not 
pass a creditable examination in the studies of his 
course, for he had never comprehended them ; but, 
secondly, that ten years afterward he could not ex- 
tract the cube root of an algebraic quantity nor dis- 
tinguish a sine from a cosecant. Of what value then 
was his so-called militarv education in 1861? Of 



THE MILITARY ART. 27 

the little of grand tactics and strategy that he knew 
when he left West Point he had forgotton all. He 
may have had military skill ; but he did not have it 
by reason of his education. 

Yet again, he who engages in mercantile or kindred 
pursuits is, in his daily business, prosecuting a sort 
of education. True, it is an education of lower rank 
than that afforded by the practice of a profession, 
but it is valuable. In fact, in some respects, minor 
respects, it is more valuable than that afforded 
by professional practice. It necessitates a practi- 
cal knowledge of men and things. It necessi- 
tates a constant vigilance, a constant wariness, 
a constant shrewdness, a constant being on the 
a lert — in short, a constant exercise of qualities not 
exercised at all just prior to Shiloh. The practical 
judgment of the business man is being constantly 
exercised and cultivated. Selfishness stimulates 
him to a proper balancing of caution and daring. 
The world's great polytechnic is a good school. 
From this school the military officer in peace is ex- 
cluded. He needs not be watchful for another 
bargain ; he needs not invent modes of attracting 
trade ; he needs not look up a man to buy a batch 
of stock or a piece of real estate, to loan money or 
borrow money ; he needs not think ; he needs not be 
wary ; he needs not venture nor avoid venturing ; he 
needs not calculate the future of markets and the 
probabilities of success and risks of failure. He 



28 GRANT AS A SOLDIEti. 

discharges daily his hour of routine duty in filling 
blanks and other irksome work, and then, unless he 
is found drunk on duty, his salary is sure for life, 
and he will surely be prompted as older officers die. 
Inferior. to other modes of professional life in culti- 
vating mind and character, the military profession 
is also inferior to non-professional life. As a school 
to enrich and invigorate mind and develop character 
it is about equal to the business of a toll-gate 
keeper. 

Though learning is necessary to make a military 
critic and is valuable to the field commander, his- 
tory shows and reflection shows it is not a necessity 
to the latter. Any man of plain, good sense, who 
has had experience in handling troops and fighting 
battles could see as well as Gen. Joe Johnston 
that Kenesaw Mountain was impregnable, as well 
as Fitz John Porter that Malvern Hill was impreg- 
nable, as well as Hancock that Cemetery Ridge was 
strong, as well as Napoleon that to send Ney upon 
Wittgenstein's right flank at Bautzen would insure 
his defeat. Any man of plain, good sense can see 
that the effective occupancy of that cross-roads will 
bar the enemy's march by any of the roads ; that a 
battery on yon hill will drive the enemy from the 
plain in front ; that a company may lie concealed in 
a sand pit, as at Waterloo, and play havoc with the 
advancing foe ; that, as Stonewall Jackson saw at 
the second Bull Run, the railroad cut will make an 



THE MILITARY ART. 29 

admirable defense ; that a whole regiment can find 
protection behind those farm buildings and hay 
stacks ; that if Floyd at Donelson massed on 
Grant's right it involved a thinning of his own 
right. It is manifest, first, that these things need 
not be taught by a professor, secondly, that in 
deaiing with them there is no room for great in- 
tellect, and thirdly, that the seeing and using them 
belongs, in four cases out of five, to an officer of 
subordinate rank. 

More than ninety per cent of war is mere business. 
True, it is military business and hence has its pecu- 
liarities. But that is true of every sort of busi- 
ness. The management of a dry goods store, the man- 
agement of a real estate office, and the business 
management of a daily newspaper are unlike each 
other. But any man fit for business can learn 
either. And such a man can learn the business of 
war. It is less the intellectual than the moral qual- 
ities of the mind that determine fitness for military 
command. A good amount of courage and of firm- 
ness are needful. Especially there must be a proper 
balancing of qualities, as severity with clemency, 
caution with daring. The general needs above all 
a fair amount of that uncommon kind of sense 
called common sense. Though it must be admitted 
that during the war generals without it were placed 
in high rank. 

On no subject has rhetoric played such mischiev- 



30 GBANT AS A SOLDIER. 

ous tricks as on battles and military mind. As to 
battles the experience and testimony of a million of 
soldiers scattered through the country at the close 
of the war has done much to substitute prose for 
poetry. The behavior and utterances of hundreds 
who during the war bore the title of general have 
proved that neither learning nor intellect are neces- 
sary to military success. A battlefield is a very 
matter-of-fact affair. The stronger army, other 
things being equal, ought to prevail, for after all 
it is the soldiers who win victories. " God is on the 
side of the strong battalions." In a battle soldiers 
run rapidly across a field or plunge through a muddy 
branch, or scramble across a gully, or creep through 
a thicket, or dodge behind trees, or run swiftly 
up hills in face of a battery, the colonel, or even 
captain, often having more vital discretion than 
is possible to a higher officer. A battle is the 
severest of prose. Yet rhetoric has done its best 
to mystify, to invest it with romance, to repre- 
sent it as a thing which only a superhuman mind is 
competent to direct and to impute its success to the 
transcendent genius, — genius is the word, — of the 
great commander. The false views of military tal- 
ent which rhetoric delights to give are ludicrous. 
If a farmer, whose team becomes frightened, sud- 
denly sees and instantly adopts a mode by which he 
checks it, if a real estate agent attempting to sell 
a house, discovers in a man seeking to purchase, a 



THE MILITARY ART. 31 

prejudice, or preference, or lack of information on 
some point, and by prompt adroitness succeeds in 
driving a bargain, nobody sees any genius in the 
farmer who prevents a runaway, or in the agent who 
makes the trade. But if Napoleon at Ligny, 
observing by the hour, sees that Bliicher's center is 
weak and that his reserves are exhausted and there- 
upon moves the Old Guard against it and breaks the 
line, a fact not requiring a tithe of the quickness of 
farmer or agent, and only the merest good sense, 
rhetoric begins to talk about " the quick eye of 
genius." At Waterloo, Bliicher's cannon thunder- 
ing in Napoleon's rear, about fifteen minutes after 
Nev's last repulse and when his force was flying in 
tumultuous confusion and terror, Wellington, a man 
of only fair capacity, saw that a general advance 
could not fail of success. In fact, Sir John Col- 
borne had already been pushing forward for fully 
ten minutes. There was not a lieutenant in Well- 
ington's army who could not see that a general ad- 
vance was obviously the one thing to be done. Yet 
rhetoric says, " With one of those lofty inspirations 
of genius which belong only to mighty intellects," 
etc. So we read of Napoleon's " marble cheek," 
ik marble brow," " his eye blazes with genius," 
" the fire of genius flashes from his eye," and soon 
usque ad nauseam. A general, by superior numbers, 
has been pressing the enemy back until it becomes 
clear that by advancing the corps on his extreme 



32 GRANT AS A SOLDIER. 

left he will threaten the road in the enemy's rear, 
and thus compel his retreat. Rhetoric says grand- 
iloquently: "Then the genius of the great com- 
mander blazed forth. Seizing the masses on his 
left in his Titanic grasp he hurled them with the re- 
sistless might of a giant against the lately insolent 
but now cowering foe, and victory was won." A 
plain man, content to talk sense, would say : " Tak- 
ing the cigar from his mouth, the general ordered 
his left corps to advance and in less than an hour 
the enemy finding his way of retreat threatened, be- 
gan to retire. " It is safe to say that in no depart- 
mant of human activity has rhetoric been so per- 
verse as in describing the military talent. Many 
battles have been lost by the commander's incom- 
petency ; but few have been won by the command- 
er's skill. 

The military character is not an enviable one- 
Character is shaped by circumstances. The circum- 
stances surrounding a military officer are unfavor- 
able. His position is an artificial one, that is, it is 
created and controlled by artificial laws. Under 
these laws he is subject to arbitrary authority, and 
in turn exercises arbitrary authority. Often com- 
pelled to accept commands harsh in character, and 
delivered with asperity of manner, he unconsciously 
learns to take revenge upon his subordinates for his 
own humiliation. Military life is a bad school for 
the formation of character and manners. Not a few 



TPIE MILITARY ART. 33 

military officers think it fine to curse a subordinate. 
An officer learns, too, that a superior can assign 
duties to a favorite that are easy and without peril, 
and to one not a favorite, duties disagreeable and 
dangerous. It is not in human nature that syco- 
phancy should not arise. But a vocation that invites 
sycophancy is bad for character. During the war 
we saw exhibitions of favoritism and of spleen that 
were disgraceful. In more than one instance we saw 
appointments and promotions not deserved. In 
more than one instance we saw officers of demon- 
strated skill, uncommon skill, absolutely driven 
from their profession without a hearing by the arbi- 
trary caprice of a superior. Notably was this true 
in the cases of McClernand and Warren. It is as 
if a physician and surgeon who had attained high 
reputation in his profession should be, without a 
hearing, effectively prevented from practicing his 
profession by the will of one man. Whether such 
arbitrary authority is or is not necessary in the mil- 
itary service, is not now the question. Even as- 
suming that it is, it remains true that to be subject 
to such authority must have a bad effect on character 
and to be invested with such authority must have a 
worse effect. 

It may be answered that in civic life, too, there 
must be authority and obedience. But a moment's 
reflection will show that the cases differ essentially. 
The commission merchant is the superior of his ship- 



34 GRANT AS A SOLDIER. 

ping clerk as the colonel of the captain. But there 
the analogy between the cases ends. The clerk can 
quit service whenever his superior's treatment be- 
comes unendurable. The captain cannot. Again, 
the clerk, quitting, loses employment but he can 
get employment of another firm. But the United 
States is the only firm employing captains- To 
quit that firm is to quit his profession and* begin life 
anew. Yet again, the colonel knows that he will not 
lose his captain. At any rate he would be imme- 
diately supplied with another captain. But the 
merchant may be unwilling to lose this clerk, who 
now understands perfectly the employer's business 
Still further, if the merchant use language too harsh, 
the clerk, — such is the boldness in civic life, — may 
make on the spot a retort not quite welcome. The 
captain can take no such liberty, Hence, the mer- 
chant, though giving commands, yet takes good 
care to employ the language and tone of a gentle- 
man. The colonel gives command according to his 
character. Occasionally a man who during the war 
held military rank and learned the military style, is 
elevated to civil rank. By his offensive pomp of 
authority he displays what among civilians is ac- 
counted a lack of good breeding. 

The morals which the practice of the military 
art produces deserve to be noticed. War brings 
demoralization. Camp life brings dissipation. To 
be cut off from the genial and refining influences of 



THE MILITARY ART. 35 

domestic life, from the society of ladies, from so 
cial commerce with neighbors and friends, rarely 
fails to produce looseness. During a campaign, 
occupation and use by sheer force, of private prop- 
erty, and sometimes its destruction, are often neces- 
sities. Hence there springs in the military mind a 
less delicate respect for private rights. A general 
orders a town to be burned or a region of country 
to be devastated without compunction, without 
shame. Arresting and detaining citizens, compel- 
ling them, with pistols at their heads, to be guides, — 
such acts tend to make military minds less tender of 
personal rights and to induce them to assert that 
maxim of barbarism, " Inter anna leges silent ." 
On the march the commissary department supplies 
the army with fresh beef and pork and officers affect 
ignorance. The general finds his table supplied 
with poultry and a full demijohn. He asks no 
questions, but compliments Sam, the colored man, 
as a purveyor. The large discretion which must in 
fairness be left to military officers in providing 
against necessary waste, loss, destruction and cap- 
ture of government property, no allowance being 
made as against pillage, invites to corruption. The 
haste occasionally incident to a campaign affords op- 
portunity to secrete. Close reckoning and critical 
inspection are often impracticable, sometimes im- 
possible. With such opportunities and temptations, 
thieves steal, and men who would not be thieves 



36 GRANT AS A SOLDIER. 

look away and afterwards accept gifts from the 
thieves. Considering human infirmity, it is too much 
to expect nice morals from the military profession. 
It is but a step from the vices and crimes just 
named to falsehood. At the end of a battle a 
general rarely gives a full statement of his strength 
or of his casualties, but always overstates those of 
his enemy. If he is successful in a triflino- s kir- 
mish he reports it as a battle. If he attacks a place, 
is whipped and driven off in hot haste, he reports 
that he made preparation without motive ; went 
there by a sort of accident, and it was his previ- 
ous purpose to quit it immediately. If he has a 
battle and is beaten, and the enemy defiantly awaits 
attack, while he makes haste to get away, he re- 
ports a victory. If the enemy plants himself in his 
road and baffles his further march, causing a retreat 
and complete deflection, his report ingeniously gives 
a false impression. If the enemy after defeat, 
retires in perfect order, and in fact without pursuit, 
he declares it " routed." Such are specimens of 
military veracity. The faithful military historian 
is constantly embarrassed by this foible of generals 
and especially hesitates to give definite numbers. 
Nothing is more certain than that a suppression of 
the truth is sometimes as immoral as an assertion of 
falsehood, or, in learned phrase, there may be no 
choice between suppressio veri and expressio falsi, 
for the suppression of a fact in a narrative may 



THE MILITARY ART. 37 

deceive as effectively as an affirmative falsehood. 
But to the average military mind suppressio veri 
seems to be thought innocent. There are few 
military reports that can safely be believed. 
It is a delightful duty to add that some military 
officers do persist in keeping themselves clean. He 
who meets and triumphs over temptations greater 
and more frequent than those which the ordinary 
citizen encounters has a schooling which makes 
him the completest specimen of a gentleman. 

There is no vocation in which skill is so little 
likely to get its just recognition as in the profession 
of arms. First, there is no vocation in which acci- 
dent plays such freaks. A sudden rise in the Danube 
causing a destruction of the bridge- and thus cutting 
off French reinforcements, caused Napoleon's de- 
feat at Aspern. The torrent of rain was the chief 
cause of McDonald's defeat by Blucher at Katzbach. 
The furious rain of Saturday afternoon inducing 
Napoleon to delay his attack Sunday morning till 
half past eleven o'clock, giving time for Blucher's 
arrival, caused the defeat of Waterloo. Panic, too, 
is a military accident. Why a sentiment springing 
from a slight cause, nay, sometimes from no real 
cause, shall suddenly spread with the speed of light- 
ning and convert a brave army into a mob of crazed 
cowards is inexplicable. It is an accident which no 
skill of the general can foresee or prevent. Yet it 
has decided many battles. At Marengo Napoleon 



38 GRANT AS A SOLDIER. 

had been beaten and driven back hour after hour 
and mile after mile when Desaix's division arrived 
and poured into the enemy's line a volley At the 
same time and not by Napoleon's order, Keller- 
man, seizing the auspicious moment, dashed upon 
the Austrian flanks from among the grape vines, 
produced a panic and changed defeat into victory. 
At Kunersdorf, Frederick the Great thought he had 
won a victory, but about sundown a panic seized his 
troops and in sixty minutes they were scattered and 
for the time ceased to be an army. The incom- 
petency of an opposing general may also be reckoned 
an accident? Accident wins victory and brings 
defeat. But when the result may be largely due to 
something else than skill, the best skill may fail and 
the poorest may succeed. Hence success cannot 
be a test of ability. It may be added that some- 
times a blunder of a general is neutralized by a 
blunder of his adversary, sometimes too the weaker 
general makes the fewer blunders. In that ludicrous 
Comedy of Errors, the four days' Waterloo cam- 
paign, Bliicher, the weakest of the three generals, 
made the fewest blunders, and Napoleon, perhaps the 
ablest of the three, made the most. 

Another reason why, in the military profession, 
skill is so little likely to get its reward is the im- 
possibility of unrestrained competition. Of two or 
more lawyers or carpenters in the same locality each 
succeeds according to his demonstrated merit. In 



THE MILITARY ART. 39 

the military profession it is not so. In the same 
hard-fought battle, Smith, who commanded a regi- 
ment, was not a competitor of Jones, who com- 
manded the army. However gallantly Smith may 
have led his troops, however vigilant in perceiving 
the movements of the enemy in his front, however 
prompt to seize good positions, though he may get 
credit for the management of a regiment, yet the 
credit of the victory goes to Jones. Nobody com- 
peted with Jones. It follows that though fifty other 
officers may have shown in the action equal ability, 
their ability is not to be considered in comparison 
with Jones'. From this peculiarity in the military 
service even the world at large cannot have the 
means of estimating the comparative merits of 
officers. 

It is further to be remarked that high position is 
often got solely through personal friendship or 
political maneuvering. Buxhovden, through whose 
drunkenness chiefly the Russians lost Austerlitz, 
owed his military rank to a lucky marriage. In 
our own army a Pope, a Rosecrans, a Burnside, a 
Hooker got high rank. For these reasons skill 
fails of its proper reward. The world can estimate 
the carpenter or lawyer ; it cannot estimate the 
soldier. Hence, to one it may render praise equally 
due to a hundred others. It must be added that the 
praise rendered to a successful general is always 
extravagant and irrational. 



40 GRANT AS A SOLDIER. 

We conclude, then, that whatever the merit of 
the military character in ancient times, and after- 
wards in mediaeval times, to-day the profession of 
arms is the lowest among the professions ; that mili- 
tary education goes for little ; that the profession as 
a rule are ignorant ; that the art is one requiring 
neither learning nor genius; that while the military 
intellect is of the average sort only, military charac- 
ter and manners, formed under factitious and un- 
favorable circumstances, are not to be commended ; 
that it is impossible rightly to estimate military 
merit, and that the customary laudations are absurd. 



BELMONT 



It is my purpose to consider Gen. Ulysses S. Grant 
merely as a military leader. Hence, this book will 
contain no personal biography and no reference to 
his career subsequent to the close of the war. Nor 
is it worth while to trace his military career prior to 
his assumption of command of a military district. 
September 4, 1861, he established his headquarters 
at Cairo, 111., in command of the District of South- 
east Missouri, embracing all the district in Missouri 
south of St. Louis, together with Southern Illinois. 
His first act worthy of notice was the battle of 
Belmont. 

Gen. Leonidas Polk, in command of a strong 
Confederate force, occupied Columbus, Ky., which 
is situated on a high bluff on the east bank of the 
Mississippi, and was well fortified. Grant had at 
least 20,000 men under his command. November 6 
he gathered upon transport boats upward of 3,000 
men, with suflicient artillery and two companies of 
cavalry, and sailed down the river toward Colum- 
bus, landing at a place called Hunter's Landing, 
just out of range of Polk's batteries, and on 

(41) 



42 GRANT AS A SOLDIER. 

the west bank. All that region is low and flat. 
Save a few cleared fields the land between 
Hunter's Landing and Belmont is heavily tim- 
bered and entirely level, with the exception of an 
occasional slough, at that time dry. Belmont 
consists of three shabby houses. It was occupied 
by a Confederate regiment under Col. Tappan and 
was surrounded by a heavy abatis, that is, trees 
felled in the direction from which an enemy would 
approach and with limbs pointed by the ax so as to 
embarrass the advance of an attacking party. Polk, 
seeing that Tappan was to be attacked, sent across 
re-enforcements under Gen. Pillow. Grant was stil 
superior and drove the enemy before him. Thel 
low stage of the river made, under the bank, a nar- 
row strip of its bed along the bank, bare and dry. 
Here Pillow's force took refuge. Here they were 
cooped and Grant ought at once to have headed 
them at such end of their line and captured every 
man. But he did not. The field being cleared, 
Grant's forces gave themselves up to an abandon of 
joy. They broke ranks. They rummaged Tap- 
pan's camp. They hurrahed. They sang songs. 
Officers harangued. They were not an army, but 
an armed mob. But Grant was opposed by a capa- 
ble adversary. From his elevated position at Col- 
umbus Polk began to throw a plunging artillery fire. 
The Federal hilarity was checked. Soon a strong 
Confederate force was sent across and landed be- 



BELMONT. 



43 



tween Belmont and Hunter's Landing, thus inter- 
cepting the Federal retreat to the boats. Pillow's and 
Tappan's forces joined them. The demoralization of 
Grant's army was so complete that at first he was un- 
able to restore order. He set fire to Tappan's camp 
and was then able to get his troops into line and 
immediately set out for his boats. He encountered 
the enemy and a bloody but indecisive combat oc- 
curred. At last Grant's command, in confusion, suc- 
ceeded in boarding their boats, pursued by the enemy 
and fired upon until they were out of reach, badly 
beaten and with a loss in killed, wounded and miss- 
ing of about 550. The battle of Belmont illustrates 
the Comedy of War. Grant with upward of 3,000 
infantry and artillery and cavalry, had taken a 
steamboat excursion, had fought a battle with an 
outlying detachment of the enemy and beaten it, 
had three or four hours of jollification in sight of 
the enemy's main army, been whipped and scam- 
pered off with the enemy's bullets whistling through 
his ranks. 

" The king of France with forty thousand men 
Marched up the hill and then — marched down again." 

The Southern people were elated beyond what 
the insignificant character of the affair justified. 
Davis made it the subject of a jubilant notice. The 
Northern people were correspondingly depressed. 
In this affair Gen. John A. McClernand first comes 



44 GRANT AS A SOLDIER. 

into military notice. He commanded a brigade and 
fought with judgment and valor, having had three 
horses shot under him. When a young man 
McClernand had entered the legal profession. By 
steady devotion to business and to the study of the 
books he came to rank among the best lawyers in 
Illinois. At the outbreak of the rebellion he re- 
signed his place in Congress, where he had been 
sent as a Democrat, entered the volunteer service, 
and was made brigadier-general. His strong mind 
was disciplined by the study of books, and it is 
hardly to be doubted that he found pleasure as 
well as duty in mastering the principles of the mil- 
itary art by patient study of military writers. 
Ambition, combined with patriotism, stimulated 
him to learn the profession of arms as he had learned 
the profession of law, and his daily connection with 
practical war facilitated the study of the books. 

REFLECTIONS. 

This affair defies military criticism. It was so 
ludicrous and its outcome so disastrous that Grant 
in his Personal Memoirs taxes his ingenuity to jus- 
tify it, though with less skill than the case demands. 

1. The first question is, what was the purpose of 
the steamboat excursion? Grant himself seems 
to say that there was no purpose, that it was a mere 
whim. He says : "I had no orders which contem- 



BELMONT. 45 

plated an attack by the National troops, nor did I 
intend anything of the hind when I started out." 

2. The failure to make immediate capture of the 
Confederate force caged under the bank and to be 
had for the mere taking, was a blunder hardly to be 
excused in a second lieutenant. 
* 3. Grant says that the Belmont battle disabled 
Polk from sending a force against Oglesby, who 
was somewhere on the St. Francis river. By what 
canon of military criticism he is able to assert that 
his own defeat disabled Polk, I am unable to say. 

4. When he asserts that, " I had no orders which 
contemplated an attack by the National troops, nor 
did I intend anything of the kind when I started 
out," that is, that he gathered an army of above 
3,000 men, with artillery and cavalry and provis- 
ions, placed them on boats and started off without 
a purpose, he must not wonder if the assertion is 
not believed. They who think him dull, will after 
all place some limit to his dullness. 

5. Grant says that at 2 a. m. of the 7th he re- 
received intelligence on which he " speedily re- 
solved to attack Belmont, break up the camp and 
return." He forgets that there is evidence over his 
own signature which flatly contradicts the state- 
ment, evidence in fact proving that before 2 a. m. 
of the 7th he had determined not only to capture 
Belmont but even to fix his headquarters there. 
Col. Richard J. Oglesbv, in command of a force, 



46 GRANT AS A SOLDIER. 

was somewhere in Southeast Missouri in the region 
of the St. Francis river, more than fifty miles 
west of Belmont. Col. Wallace was in command at 
Bird's Point, Mo. Grant wished to send an order to 
Oglesby, and hence sent it first to Wallace, direct- 
ing him to forward it to Oglesby " by a messenger if 
practicable," seeming to suppose either that Wallace 
might know Oglesby' s exact whereabouts or at least 
could find him. But the sending the dispatch to 
Wallace, the forwarding by Wallace by a small mili- 
tary force, or even" by a messenger if practicable," 
to Oglesby wherever he might be found in a woody, 
swampy and sparsely settled country, with few and 
tortuous roads, the march of Oglesby' s column 
through such a country to New Madrid and the com- 
municating from the nearest point of the march 
from which there is a road, to Grant at Belmont — 
all this would consume probably from five to eight 
days. It will be noted that the dispatch was sent 
from Cairo. It speaks for itself. 

Cairo, Nov. 6, 1861. 
Col. R. J. Oglesby, Commanding Expedition : 

On receipt of this, turn your column towards 
New Madrid. When you arrive at the nearest point 
to Columbus, from which there is a road to that 
place, communicate with me at Belmont. 

U. S. Grant, 

Brigadier General. 



BELMONT. 47 

Grant should not have attempted to justify his 
Belmont folly. In doing so, he has made his case 
infinitely worse. He asserts that he got ready an 
army and set off without a purpose, an assertion 
which, in the first place, nobody will accept as true, 
and secondly, if it were accepted as true, it would 
convict him of even greater stupidity than that of 
attacking Belmont, as far as there is a greater and 
less in absolute stupidity. Besides he makes it pos- 
sible to convict him, by his own dispatch, of a flat 
untruth. 



FORT HENRY. 



The Confederates held as their northern line of 
defense Columbus, Ky.. on the Mississippi, Fort 
Henry, on the Tennessee, Fort Donelson, on the 
Cumberland, and further East, Bowling Green and 
Mill Spring. The Tennessee furnished good navi- 
gation as far as Muscle Shoals, in Alabama, and 
the Cumberland as far as Nashville. The capture 
of these forts would not only break the Confederate 
line, but would open a gateway to the cotton States 
by furnishing cheap and rapid transportation for 
troops and supplies. In January, in aid of a move- 
ment which resulted in the Federal victory of Mill 
Spring, Halleck ordered a reconnoissance of the 
Tennessee by Flag-officer Foote and Gen. C. F. 
Smith. These officers approached Fort Henry near 
enough to inspect its strength and approaches and 
to become satisfied that it could be easily captured, 
and they so reported to Halleck. Accordingly, 
February 1, Halleck ordered Grant to move against 
Fort Henry, and the expedition, attended by the 
gunboats, started on the 2d. McClernand, in com- 
mand of perhaps eight or nine thousand troops in 
(48) 



FORT HENRY. 



49 



transport boats convoyed by gunboats, was sent 
in advance. When these were landed far enough 
beloAV — that is, north of the fort, to be out 
of. range of its cannon, the transports returned 
to Paducah for the remainder of the 17,000 con- 
stituting Grant's command. On the 5th Grant 
returned with the remaining troops under command 
of C. F. Smith. Grant issued orders for an advance 
on the fort to begin at 11 a. m. on the 6th. The 
garrison of the Fort was less than 3,000, Gen. 
Lloyd Tilghman in command. Seeing that resist- 
ance against so overwhelming a force of army and 
gunboats was hopeless, Tilghman promptly sent his 
little army over to Fort Donelson, eleven miles dis- 
tant. Himself and sixty cannoneers remained in 
the fort, to gain time, by a show of defense, for the 
escape of his army. Another fort called Fort 
Heiman had been constructed on the opposite side 
of the river from Henry. At 11 a. m. Foote with 
the gunboats set out to attack. At the same time 
Grant started C. F. Smith with a brigade to get into 
the rear of Fort Heiman. McClernand with the re- 
mainder of the army was to occupy the two roads 
leading from Fort Henry to Fort Donelson and 
Dover. Foote had urged Grant to start McCler- 
nand's troops earlier. Smith found Heiman unoc- 
cupied. Foote captured Fort Henry after a brief 
artillery resistance from Tilghman and his sixty 
cannoneers, and without any aid whatever from the 

4 



50 GRANT AS A SOLDIER. 

army. Meanwhile Tilghman's army effected its 
escape and reached Fort Donelson without molesta- 
tion. 

REFLECTIONS. 

1. A general should seek to strike his enemy in 
detail, but especially he should not permit a con- 
centration when he can prevent it. Grant com- 
mitted error in not adopting Foote's suggestion. 
Having landed his force, and thus apprised the 
enemy of the intended attack, he should then have 
pushed the beleaguerment. He should have started 
McClernand at dawn to occupy the Donelson and 
Dover roads. Thus, first, the capture of the fort, 
instead of being fruitless, would have yielded him 
nearly 3,000 prisoners ; and, secondly, the enemy's 
force at Donelson would have been less by exactly 
that number. 

2. The move upon Fort Henry must be reckoned 
a failure. Foote is entitled to no credit, since 
there was no real defense. Grant must be censured 
for having needlessly allowed the army to escape. 



FORT DONELSON 



February 12th, Grant started across the country 
to Fort Donelson. The transport boats and gun- 
boats descended the Tennessee to ascend the Cum- 
berland. 

Fort Donelson was a strong position. The fort 
proper was built on high ground overlooking the 
river. Going up the river in a southerly direction, 
about a quarter of a mile before you reach the fort 
on your right you come to Hickman's creek, which 
at that time of copious rains was overflowing with 
back water. This creek completely guarded the fort 
from the north. For the most part the ground to 
the west and south of the fort was high, some of it 
perhaps a hundred feet above the level of the river. 
It was much broken. The petty village of Dover 
is situated nearly two miles south of the fort and be- 
tween them there was another creek. At Hickman's 
creek, and about two miles west of the river there 
began a line of Confederate earthworks or rifle pits 
running in an irregular direction, to meet the exi- 
gencies of a very broken surface, for two miles or so 
in a southerly direction, and then bending to the 

(51) 



52 GRANT AS A SOLDIER. 

river so as to strike it about half a mile above, that 
is, south of Dover. Outside of this rifle pit was a 
wide abatis to embarrass the approach of au attacking 
force. Grant reached Fort Donelsou with 15,000 
men February 12th. The enemy's force was pro- 
bably 17,000, though military men are so unreliable 
in certain classes of statement, that the careful his- 
torian must not be condemned for indulging often 
in conjecture where the reader thinks he has a right 
to something definite. Next day there was much 
cannonading and on Grant's right some sharp lighting, 
attended with some destruction of life. On the morn- 
ing of the 14th, Fla<r Officer Foote, with his fleet 
of gunboats, arrived, as also transports bringing re- 
enforcements, which raised Grant's force to 27,000 
or more. Grant then established his line. McCler- 
nand's right rested on the river, or rather on a ravine 
running out from the river westwardly. Gen. Lew 
Wallace's Division joined its right to McClernand's 
left and curved northwardly to C. F. Smith's right. 
Smith's left rested on Hickman's creek. The line 
of battle was about three miles long. Though the 
Confederates were strongly intrenched, yet in some 
respects their condition was unfortunate. Gen. John 
B. Floyd was in command. It was charged that in 
1860, while Secretary of War in the Federal Cabinet, 
he had used his authority treacherously in aid of 
the contemplated rebellion. As a consequence he 
knew that he was intensely hated and despised by 



FORT DONELSON. 53 

the Northern people and in the contingency of his 
falling into the hands of an infuriated Federal 
soldiery, his reckoning might be summary. More- 
over, he seemed to have little capacity as a soldier. 
His second was Gen. Gideon J. Pillow, pretentious, 
querulous and shallow. From such leadership little 
was to be expected. And the most moderate ability 
would have been sufficient to cope with them. In 
the afternoon of the 14th Foote attacked. He was 
repulsed and himself wounded. The fleet fell back 
far enough to be out of danger. During the even- 
ing the Confederate leaders Floyd, Pillow and Buck- 
ner held a consultation. They decided that they 
could not defend against such odds. The question 
then was of losing both fort and army or of aban- 
doning the fort and saving the army. They decided 
to mass on Grant's extreme right (McClernand), 
and if possible cut their way out and escape. The 
around was covered with sleet and snow or frozen 
snow which of itself afforded a sort of light which 
facilitated the work of the Confederate soldiers in 
fill'mo- their haversacks and cartridge boxes and in 
being transferred to the Confederate left. This 
force was placed under Pillow's immediate com- 
mand. About 5 a. m. next morning, Pillow at- 
tacked McClernand with fury. 

At this point in the history of the battle an em- 
barrassing question arises. Grant says that " on 
the morning of the 15th, before it was yet broad 



54 GRANT AS A SOLDIER. 

day, a messenger from Flag Officer Foote handed 
me a note, expressing a desire to see me on the flag 
ship," that " I had no idea that there would be any 
engagement on land unless I brought it on myself," 
that he accordingly sent orders to his three division 
generals to do nothing without further directions 
from him, and that he then went to see Foote in his 
gunboat. Some of these statements are certainly 
singular, and as we have seen what freaks his 
memory committed in his account of the battle of 
Belmont we may wonder whether he has not again 
forgotten. Only the night before Foote had the 
whole of a long winter evening for consultation. 
Again, his fleet where then anchored was in no more 
danger than if anchored at Cairo, so that Foote had 
no occasion for haste. As a matter of fact he re- 
mained the next day. It looks then like a mixture 
of folly and impertinence for him to send a message 
through the darkness of the woods and in the bitter- 
ness of that sleety and snowy night to arouse Grant 
at dawn without occasion. Again, why did Grant 
face the biting blasts, cross the back water 
of Hickman's creek, and ride three miles or 
more to join Foote, and all without occasion? As 
he expected no fighting till he himself brought it on, 
there was no haste on his side. What fact was 
there then, nay, what conceivable fact can there 
have been to justify Foote in sending at such an 
hour, and in such weather, a request quite imperti- 



FORT DONELSON. 



55 



nent or to justify Grant in responding to a 
request so remarkable, — a request that would 
be proper only if Foote was dying, or some sud- 
den and serious fact had sprung up forbidding 
delay. Taking into view the circumstances that 
Foote had neither occasion nor disposition for baste, 
and as a fact made no haste, that Grant neither ex- 
pected nor intended battle for the time, supposing 
the matter of bringing on battle to be in his discre- 
tion, that there cannot have been any reason either 
for Foote sending at such an hour so cruel a request, 
or for Grant's compliance, we may be pardoned for 
wonderino- whether this is not another case of bad 
memory. Yet it is true, first, that Grant did, at 
some hour in the morning, go to Foote's gunboat 
and remain there nearly all day, and, secondly, that 
before o-oin^he issued orders to his division generals 
restraining action. 

Grant's headquarters were in the house of a Mrs. 
Crisp, near Hickman's creek and a mile or so in 
front of the Confederate line. Floyd attacked at 
5 a. m., nearly two hours and a half before sunrise, 
his object being, if possible, to get some advantage 
from a surprise. McClernand found himself at- 
tacked by an overwhelming force. He resisted 
stubbornly. But it was evident that the enemy had 
massed upon him and he was driven back. About 
8 o'clock he called on Wallace for aid, but Wal- 
lace was restrained by Grant's order. He sent forth- 



56 GRANT AS A SOLDIER. 

with to Grant's headquarters for leave to help 
McClernand. Grant was absent and had left no 
authority to any one else. Seeing McClernand' s 
peril, Wallace determined to take the bit in his 
mouth, and in spite of Grant's order to aid McCler- 
nand. He accordingly lent him Cruft's brigade. 
But with nearly the whole Confederate army against 
him, McClernand is still outnumbered. The battle 
rages furiouslv. Pillow's overwhelming hosts push 
on. McClernand is gradually but steadily forced 
back — back up the river, but at the same time 
back from the river, for Pillow is aiming to cut a 
way out. McClernand is driven back so far 
from the river that Wallace's right is engaged No 
restraining order forbids to resist attack. Hence 
Pillow's opposition is increased. 

Grant's continued absence was a terrible mistake. 
Hours before Pillow's success had been so great as 
to engage Wallace's right, that is to say, as early as 
8 o'clock, the commander should have been on the 
ground. There was a golden opportunity. At 8 
o'clock, in fact much earlier, it was certain that 
Floyd had massed against McClernand. But this 
meant that the remainder of his line was weakened. 
Smith and Wallace's left should at that hour have 
been pushed forward upon Buckner, whose thin line 
would have easily been brushed away. Then Smith 
and Wallace should have been wheeled around upon 
Pillow's right flank and rear. No troops in the 



FORT DONELSON. 



57 



world will fight with an attacking enemy in rear. 
The result would have been that by 11 o'clock or at 
furthest by noon, 17,000 men, two miles from the 
fort, hemmed in against the river by 27,000, would 
have been bagged, Floyd, Forrest and all. But 
the army was without a head. Grant was at that 
time as completely absent from the battle of Fort 
Donelson as if he had been in Boston. McClernand 
had no authority to command Smith and Smith was 
bound to inaction by an express order from Grant. 
If the Federal army can be said to have had a com- 
mander at all, it was McClernand, for from 5 o'clock 
till after noon McClernand was in sole command of 
the battle, and from the time when by Pillow's con- 
tinuous success, Wallace's right became engaged, 
Wallace and McClernand commanded each his own 
troops, but without having a common superior. As 
a rule an army in battle should have but one head. 
But McClernand and Wallace seem to have co-oper- 
ated. In this case the head did not need any supe- 
rior skill. Any officer in the army could have seen 
at 8 o'clock that the enemy had massed upon Mc- 
Clernand, that hence his line in front of Smith and 
Wallace was weak, and that hence and manifestly 
the one thing to be done, was to push Smith and 
Wallace straight upon his line, then wheel upon 
Pillow's rear and end the battle. But the head, in- 
stead of ordering the move, had by order forbidden 
any move. 



58 



GRANT AS A SOLDIER. 



After McClernand had been driven back from the 
river and Wallace's right had become emmo-ed, the 
enemy was encouraged and the Federal troops cor- 
respondingly depressed. Pillow's men pressed on. 
The fury of the combat increased, for McClernand' s 
affairs were going badly and McClernand was a 
fierce fighter. On both sides the men fought 
bravely. The hill tops were crowned with cannon, 
whose roar proved that the artillery on both sides 
was well served. The country was rugged and the 
hill sides were covered with trees and undergrowth. 
To storm batteries, rushing up steep slopes and 
through tangled brushwood and in face of cannon 
and musketry is toilsome. The night before, stormy 
and bitter, had been trying to the troops. The 
ground was covered with frozen snow, the blast had 
been piercing and the men had suffered. Hence, 
they were not in the best fi^htin^ trim. Wa°-ino- 
battle, especially waging battle on so difficult a field, 
is laborious. Steadily from 5 a. m. until probably 3 
p. m. or later, for the hour cannot be stated with 
certainty, the combatants had fought fiercely and 
constantly and they became tired. There was a lull. 

At this point Floyd blundered fatally. He had 
planned to cut his way out. He had succeeded. 
He had been able to throw probably 15,000 men 
against 10,000. Through Grant's absence he had 
succeeded in cutting his way. The Federal troops, 
in addition to being tired, were also in some confu- 



FORT DONELSON. 



59 



sion. Continually driven back for ten hours by 
overpowering numbers, they had lost heart, while 
success had inspirited the Confederates. At 3 p. 
m. or later, when the lull began, Floyd, without an 
instant's delay, should have placed a line of troops 
in front of McClernand and Wallace as a screen, and 
then with all speed have pushed the rest of his 
command out between the Federal army and the 
river, trusting to fate, the momentary fatigue and 
demoralization of the Federal force and the lack of 
a commander to order pursuit, for a final safe deliv- 
erance. But Floyd hesitated and was lost. 

It was during the lull that Grant came upon the 
field. In 1 Personal Memoirs, 30(5, in connection 
with the fact of his return from Foote's gunboat 
to the battlefield, he says : " I saw the men stand- 
ing in knots, talking in the most excited manner. 
The enemy had come out in full force to cut his way 
out and make his escape. McClernand's division 
had to bear the brunt of the attack from this com- 
bined force." Badeau says: " There was no pur- 
suit and the battle was merely lulled not ended. 
A few minutes of observation and inquiry, enabled 
Grant to decide, for the condition of affairs was 
simple and the proper course of action obvious. 
Turning to Col. J. D. Webster of his staff, he said 
(see 1 Per. Mem. 306 et seq.): " Some of our men 
are pretty badly demoralized, but the enemy 
must be more so for he has attempted to force 



60 GRANT AS A SOLDIER. 

his way out but has fallen back. The one who 
attacks first now will be victorious and the 
enemy will have to be in a hurry to get ahead 
of me." "I determined to make the assault 
at once on our left." As before stated this is ex 
actlv what ought to have been done seveu or eight 
hours before, when McClernand called for help, that 
is, when it first could have been known by the Fed- 
eral commander that the enemy had massed upon 
McClernand. " It was clear to my mind that the 
enemy had started to march out with his entire force 
except a few pickets, and if our attack could be 
made on the left before the enemy could redistrib- 
ute his force along the line, we would find but little 
opposition, except from the intervening abatis." 
" We rode rapidly to Smith's quarters when I ex- 
plained the situation to him and directed him to 
charge the enemy's works, saying at the same time 
he would find but a very thin line to contend with. 
The general was off in an incredibly short time." 
Smith carried Buckner's rifie pits with no consider- 
able resistance, but the approach of night forbade 
further action. Then the fort was doomed. Sim- 
ultaneously with Smith's advance, McClernand and 
Wallace were ordered forward. Having had a rest, 
their troops pushed on with alacrity, drove Pillow 
back to his works, and by keeping him engaged, pre- 
vented his re-enforcing Buckner. Badeau, the friend 
and eulogist of Grant, and who wrote under Grant's 



FORT DONELSON. 61 

inspiration, says (1 Bacleau, 47) : " Half an hour 
more of daylight would have sufficed to carry the 
fort. Grant perceived this, and declared that the 
rebels were fighting only for darkness." During 
the night the Confederate leaders decided to sur- 
render. Floyd behaved as became him ; he aban- 
doned the brave men who had fought under him and 
skulked away under cover of night, having the addi- 
tional meanness to take with him his own brigade. 
Floyd turned over the command to Pillow, who 
turned it over to Buckner. Forrest, with his cav- 
alry, also escaped during the night ; but Forrest 
deserves no censure as, unlike Floyd, he owed no 
obligation to the army. Next morning Buckner 
surrendered, though in querulous and unbecoming 
terms. He complained that Grant refused condi- 
tions, and characterized the refusal as " ungenerous 
and unchivalrous." It was not a case for generos- 
ity or chivalry. Buckner was in Grant's power and 
they were antagonists in war. Grant would have 
been false to duty if he had granted conditions. 
More than 14,000 prisoners were captured. 

There is a dispute as to the hour of the day at 
which Grant went to the gunboat, and the hour at 
which he returned to the battlefield. Pillow attacked 
about two hours before sunrise. As no reason 
existed or has ever been declared to exist why Grant 
should start out in a fierce wintry night to visit 
Foote, we must conclude that he did not go before 



$% GRANT AS A .SOLDIER. 

sunrise. If so, the battle had been raging two 
hours before he mounted his horse. How lono- 
did he need to stay with Foote? He had no more 
authority to command Foote than Foote had to 
command him. The relation of Foote and Grant 
was that of voluntary co-operation, nothing more. 
Besides, he had no request to make of Foote and 
made no request. Not being a naval officer Grant 
could not consult with Foote in a professional sense. 
It is clear that Grant did not mean to open fight 
that day, for he spent most of the day on the gun- 
boat. Any matter of mere necessary business that 
Grant may have had with Foote could have been 
done in ten minutes. If Grant started to the ffun- 
boat " before it was yet broad day," that is, about 
7 a. m., he could have been back by 8. If he 
started at the time he names, he started about two 
hours after nearly the whole Confederate army had 
attacked McClernand, and as he stepped into his 
stirrups his ears were greeted with the rattle of 
25,000 muskets and the boom of cannon from every 
hilltop, and he smoked his cigar in the gunboat from 
sunrise to after 3 p. m., while his army, without a 
head, was being hour after hour driven back. 
Badeau himself states that Grant did not return till 
9. But to say that from 7 till 9 they were engaged 
in necessary consultation is a sheer and impudent 
absurdity. A tax that is outrageous credulity 
resents. Besides, absence from 7 till 9, while battle 



FORT DONELSON. 



63 



is raging, is as un military, as unpardonable, as gross 
and criminal neglect of duty, as absence from 7 till 
3 p. m. The question is, why did Grant go to the 
gunboat after Pillow's attack? Again, what was he 
doino- during all the time he was there? It is 
admitted by himself that he was on the gunboat till 
the lull in fighting, excepting the time consumed in 
galloping from the gunboat to the field. I repeat 
the question, what was he doing all this time at the 
o-unboat. I am unable to find evidence and hence 
leave the question unanswered. 

The next question is, at what hour did Grant reach 
the battlefield? Badeau says at 9 a. m. A court- 
martial would not care to hear further testimony. 
If the head of an army quits his post of duty and, 
his army being heavily attacked, remains absent 
during two hours of battle, any court-martial would 
be ready to decide the case. 

But is it true that he returned at 9? Let us see. 
In considering his account of Belmont, and his state- 
ment that he left Cairo without orders to attack 
anywhere and did not " intend anything of the 
kind," that afterward he " speedily resolved," to 
attack Belmont " break up the camp and return," 
we found his memory at fault and that he had in 
fact determined on the 6th not only to attack Bel- 
mont but actually to fix his headquarters there. 
Possibly the statement of Badeau, assuming it to 
have been dictated by Grant, may need modification. 



64 GRANT AS A SOLDIER. 

At what hour did Grant reach the battlefield of 
Donelson? It is certain that he arrived during the 
lull, that is, when there was a cessation in fighting. 
Badeau says: " There was no pursuit and the battle 
was merely lulled not ended . " In Personal Memoirs, 
305, Grant says : " Just as I landed (from the gun- 
boat), I met Captain Hillyer of my staff, white with 
fear, not for his personal safety but for the safety 
of the National troops He said the enemy had 
come out of his lines in full force and attacked and 
scattered McClernand's division which was in full 
retreat." " I saw everything favorable for us along 
the left and center. When I came to the right, ap- 
pearances were different. * * * The division 
broke and a portion fled, but most of them, as they 
were not pursued, only fell back out of the range 
of the enemy." "I saw the men standing in 
knots, talking in a most excited manner," etc. By 
his own statement then, as also by Badeau' s, Grant 
reached the battlefield during the lull. The inquiry 
is as to the hour of the lull. In fixing the hour of 
a fact occurring in battle witnesses are apt to differ. 
The excitement, the tumult, the peril, the succession 
and yet continuing succession of noteworthy facts, 
at what hour this hill was stormed, at what hour 
that bayonet charge was made, at what hour such an 
officer fell, at what hour a certain battery was cap- 
tured, at what hour the flank was attacked, — it is 
impossible, in such a condition of things, to note 



FOTCT DONELSON. 65 

and afterward it is impossible to remember the ex- 
act time at which a particular fact occured. 

Gen. Lew Wallace in his report says: "About 
3 o'clock Gen. Grant rode up the hill and 
ordered an advance and attack on the enemy's left, 
while Gen. Smith attacked on the right." Col. 
Cruft thinks it was later. In his report he says, 
" At about 4 p. m. an order was received from Gen. 
Wallace to co-operate with Col. Smith's brigade in 
carrying the enemy's works." Maj. Frederic Arn, 
commanding a regiment in Cruft' s brigade, agrees 
with Cruft. In his report he says : " The regiment 
was kept in this position till about 4 p. m." This 
testimony seems to indicate that it was probably 
about 4 p. m. when Grant reached the battle ground 
and o-ave the order mentioned by Wallace. 

But there is another sort of evidence more reliable 
than the recollection of witnesses, namely, the sub- 
sequent course of the battle. Grant, on reaching the 
field and observing the look of things, said to Col. 
Webster, " The enemy will have to be in a hurry if 
he gets ahead of me." This indicates a purpose to 
move quickly. " I determined to make the assault 
at once on our left." " If our attack could be made 
on the left before the enemy could redistribute his 
forces along the line, we should find but little oppo- 
sition, except from the intervening abatis." Grant 
sees that the one thing now needed is swiftness in 
action. "I directed Col. Webster to ride with me 



66 GRANT AS A SOLDIER. 

and call out to the men as we passed, ' Fill your 
cartridge boxes quick, and get into line,' the enemy 
is trying to escape and he must not be permitted to 
do so. This acted like a charm." " We rode rap- 
idly to Smith's quarters, when I explained to him 
the situation and directed him to charge the enemy's 
works in his front with his whole division, saying 
at the same time that he would find nothing but a 
very thin line to contend with. The general was off 
in an incredibly short time, going in advance him- 
self to keep his men from firing while they were 
working through the abatis intervening between 
them and the enemy. The outer line of rifle pits 
was soon passed and the night of the 15th, Gen. 
Smith with much of his division bivouacked within 
the lines of the enemy." We have heretofore seen, 
both from Badeau and from Grant, that Smith's 
progress was arrested by darkness ; that in another 
half hour the fort would be captured ; that Grant 
declared that the rebels (McClernand and Wal- 
lace were resisted), were fighting only for dark- 
ness. At that time the sun set about 5 : 36 p. m. 
As Smith " was off in an incredibly short time" 
and as his force had only the intervening abatis to 
overcome and went on without firing, and as they 
merely reached, and not all of them even reached 
the enemy's works till darkness set in, it becomes 
certain, from Grant's own statements, that he must 
have reached the battle ground later than 4 o'clock. 



FORT DONELSOK. 67 

To sum up : In a desperate battle, begun at 5 a. m., 
Grant, without any specific assignable reason and 
first issuing a disabling order, takes refuge in a 
gunboat and there remains while his ear is deafened 
by the roar of artillery till about 4 p. m. Why did 
he go to the gunboat? How was he engaged while 
there ? 

The American people, with their usual folly, for- 
got to inquire into facts and Grant was hailed as the 
conqueror at Fort Donelson. He was at once pro- 
moted. Who else was promoted? Everybody sees 
that McClernand was practically in command. 
Grant himself says, " he bore the brunt of the bat- 
tle." Rather, he fought the battle. For his suc- 
cess clearly he deserved promotion. Who else did? 
Certainly not Smith, for he was inactive (not cul- 
pably), till an hour or less before dark and then 
simply moved forward. Unlike McClernand's his 
task required no particle of military skill, no ad- 
vancing and withdrawing, and flanking, no selecting 
and seizing strong positions, no ambushes and feints 
and charges. His task was merely to order his line 
forward through the abatis when Grant directed and 
this for probably less than an hour. Any lieuten- 
ant could have done the same. What then did Smith 
do? Almost nothing. What did McClernand do? 
Almost everything. But Smith was promoted. Why? 
He was from West Point. McClernand was not 
promoted. Why? He was merely a good com- 



G8 GRANT AS A SOLDIER. 

mander. Both HalLeck and Grant recommended 
Smith's promotion. Neither recommended Mc- 
Clernand's. 

REFLECTIONS. 

Comments on the facts in the course of the narra- 
tive have been such as almost to preclude reflections. 

1. Even if the fact had not proved it so, it was 
error in Grant to conclude that there would be no 
fio-hting till he brought it on. In presence of a 
hostile army, a general must always be expecting 
an attack. 

2. It was error in Grant not to make an attack 
himself on the 15th. His force was overwhelm- 
ingly superior. The weather was bitter, and 
troops inexperienced in campaigning cannot endure 
such exposure if they see it to be needless without 
losing morale. From Grant's conduct it is certain 
that he did not intend to attack before the 16th at any 
rate. But on the 16th, after another night of suf- 
fering, his troops would have fought with less spirit. 

3. In the whole enterprise of capturing Fort 
Donelson, it is impossible to find any movement 
in which Grant displayed mind. 

4. The credit of capturing Fort Donelson does 
not belong to Grant at all. It belongs to McCler- 
nand. To Grant belongs only discredit. 

5. For his conduct in quitting his headquarters 
for the gunboat and absenting himself till after 4 p. 
m. he should have been sent before a court-martial. 



FORWARD. 



March 1st, Halleck ordered Grant to move his 
army up the Tennessee river. On the 2d Halleck 
received an anonymous letter stating that Grant had 
got on a spree, left his command and gone to Nash- 
ville. Now, Grant had no right to quit his com- 
mand without leave, and in the ordinary condition 
of his mind, he knew that as well as anybody. 
Besides, he had no military business at Nashville, 

If, however, it was true that he was on a drunk his 
conduct is explained. Was this anonymous letter 
entitled to credence? At first blush the generous 
mind is disposed to condemn such letters as emanat- 
ing from cowardice. In civil life as a rule they do. 
But it is the duty of the historian to make proper 
discriminations. Grant, like every commander of 
an army, had almost despotic power over his army. 
Any subordinate, a staff officer, for example, if he 
saw that Grant's drunkenness was imperiling public 
interests, may, however brave and manly, have been 
impelled by a sense of patriotic duty, and even with- 
out personal hostility to Grant, to adopt some 
measure to check Grant's waywardness and have 

(69) 



70 GRANT AS A SOLDIER. 

thought an anonymous letter, which would effect his 
purpose without imperiling his position, the proper 
means. Gentlemen prefer to hold in honorable con- 
fidence the enjoyments of convivial hours. The 
author of the letter may have known confidentially, 
what the public cannot now know, and what, on 
account of this honorable confidence, he might have 
feared his inability to prove, the secret of Grant's 
abandonment of his army and departure to Nash- 
ville. If Grant was neglecting his duties and even 
had quitted his army because drunk, and as he 
had been through life fond of the bottle, the writer 
may have thought that a solemn duty to the great 
cause required that his present conduct be made 
known to his superior. An anonymous letter writ- 
ten under such circumstances and from such motives 
may speak the truth. 

Hal leek telegraphed the facts to McClellan at 
Washington. McClellan, in answer, said that such 
conduct could not be allowed and authorized Grant's 
arrest. Grant was suspended from command. He 
denied, asserted and explained, and on the 13th 
Halleck having well aired his official dignity, sent 
him a complimentary dispatch. In reply Grant 
says that he had thought it would be impossible for 
him to serve longer without a court of inquiry. 
" Your telegram of yesterday, however, places such 
a different phase upon my position that I will again 
assume command and give every effort to the sue- 



FORWARD. 71 

cess of our cause. Under the worst circumstances 
I would do the same." Not to speak of the phrase 
"placing a different phase upon my position," the 
reader is puzzled to know the meaning of " under 
the worst circumstances I would do the same." 
But Grant's early proficiency in study was such that 
the lessons he studied, never understood, were soon 
forgotten and he was not of a bookish turn. If 
when he first "thought it would be impossible to 
serve longer without a court of inquiry," he had 
demanded such a court, he would have shown a 
readiness to meet the charges of " drunk on duty," 
and " abandoning his post of duty without leave," 
and '« abandoning his army during battle," that 
would now be gratifying to the public. Such a 
court would have destroyed forever all unpatriotic 
suspicions respecting the gunboat, and Grant would 
naturally have been delighted at such an investi- 
gation. 

Halleck had put Smith in command of the force 
that was to ascend the Tennessee, giving him 
authority to select the landing place and fix the 
camp. Smith executed the trust with wisdom. He 
selected Pittsburg Landing and on March 15th this 
place was occupied by Federal troops. They had 
been transported on steamboats, convoyed by gun- 
boats, which in procession stretched for miles along 
the river. A portion of the force was left at Sav- 
annah, a little town nine miles by river below, that 



72 GRANT AS A SOLDIER. 

is, north of Pittsburg Landing on the east bank. 
Early in March Gen. Smith had received a hurt to 
his leg which necessitated his turning over the com- 
mand at Pittsburg to Gen. William Tecumseh 
Sherman and himself retired to Savannah, where, 
on April 25th, he died. Sherman has since said 
that but for Smith's misfortune, he would have 
commanded at Shiloh and Grant would have "dis- 
appeared to history." Meanwhile, Halleck, having 
displayed his authority splendidly, as a peacock dis- 
plays his tail, restored Grant fully to his command 
and Grant reached Savannah and relieved Smith 
March 17th. For some reason, which can not have 
been a good one, he kept his headquarters at Sav- 
annah. 

Meanwhile the Confederates are not idle. Cor- 
inth, twenty-three miles southwest of Pittsburgh, 
was a railroad center, and to the South the chief 
strategic point in that region. In the Confederate 
view it must be held at all hazards. In the Federal 
view it must be captured at all hazards. Both Gen. 
Albert Sydney Johnston and Gen. G. T. Beaure- 
gard were placed there to inspire confidence among 
Southern people, and to encourage volunteering. 
Troops poured in by thousands, brave, ardent and 
resolute, but badly armed and raw. In both these 
respects they were inferior to the Federal troops. 
The number that fought at Shiloh was probably 40,- 
000. Grant supposed it to be greater. On Satur- 



FORWARD. 73 

day, April 5th, the day before the battle, he 
dispatched to Hal leek, " the number of the enemy 
at Corinth and within supporting distance cannot be 
far from 80,000 men." In a letter written next 
day, during the battle, he says : " The rebels are esti- 
mated at over 100,000." Notwithstanding this sup- 
posed immense superiority in the enemy's strength, 
Grant was confident that he would not be attacked. 
On the 5th, the day before the battle, and while 
Johnston was actually on the march, and within a few 
miles of him, he dispatched to Halleck : " I have 
scarcely the faintest idea of an attack (general one) 
being made upon us, but will be prepared should 
such a thing take place." Though assuming com- 
mand on the 17th ult., he had not then made, and 
during that day, the 5th, did not make or order one 
particle of preparation. In one day he could have 
thrown up earthworks and in that hilly and heavily 
wooded reo-ion, have constructed formidable abatis. 
But especially he could have placed his troops in 
something like line of battle. Not the slightest prep- 
aration was made. For years after the battle of 
Shiloh, it was understood by the public that the Fed- 
eral troops were in fact so camped that they could 
be promptly called into line of battle. At last, 
however, we have the truth. Sherman had been 
charged with the duty of placing the different bodies 
of troops. He had accordingly caused a map of 
the immediate region to be made showing, among 



74 GRANT AS A SOLDIER. 

other things, exactly the locality of the different 
bodies of soldiers. On the arrival of Gen. D. C. 
Buell, Sherman gave him this map to aid him in 
directing his force in battle. In a magazine article 
on the battle of Shiloh Buell -has published a fac 
simile of that map. From this it appears that troops 
were encamped without the slightest regard to 
attack and to a line of battle, one division being 
nearly a mile in rear of another, one division being 
divided, a part at one place and another part per- 
haps five* miles distant, Wallace's division being 
miles distant from the main army and hence liable 
to be swooped down upon by a superior force and 
captured. The stupidity of placing troops thus 
when in a hostile country and in presence of the 
enemy, an enemy, as Grant telegraphed to Halleck, 
of more than double of what he declares to have been 
his own strength, may be charged to Sherman ; but it 
is especially to be charged to Grant who was Sher- 
man's superior. Even as late as Saturday, 5th, Grant 
ordered that Buell' s army encamp at a point on the 
Tennessee, south of Lick Creek. He directed 
McPherson, his engineer, to go to the place and 
select the spot. .Thus the irregularity would have 
been increased and by Grant's own order. In short, 
it is amazing that any man of average mind, whether 
with military education or not, and whether even 
with military experience or not, should have scat- 
tered and disposed an army so wretchedly. 



FORWARD. 75 

March 11th, President Lincoln issued an order of 
which an effect was to place Gen. Don C. Buell in 
Gen. Halleck's military department. Thereupon 
Halleck immediately ordered him with his command 
of 20,000 to report to Grant. For convenience of 
march Buell separated his army, putting Gen. Will- 
iam Nelson in advance. Friday, April 4th, Grant 
wrote to Nelson not to hurry as the vessels neces- 
sary to convey his command from Savannah to Pitts- 
burgh were busy. If this suggestion had not been 
disregarded what would have been Grant's fate? 
And why should not Nelson march direct to Pitts- 
burgh, as he in fact did? 

Grant's conduct was amazing. He seems to have 
been utterly unconscious of his situation. For more 
than two weeks he had been in personal command. 
He seems not to have reflected that he was in the 
enemy's country, and in the military sense, in pres- 
ence of an enemy which he supposed to be vastly 
his superior. He makes no particle of effort at 
strengthening his position. He had seen abatis 
at Belmont and at Donelson, and knew its efficacy 
in obstructing the advance of an attacking force. 
He constructs no abatis. He ought to have known 
that his situation required that he keep his army 
compact and in all respects ready to receive attack. 
Yet he keeps his army scattered and provides by 
express order for further scattering. He ought 
to have scoured the country daily with reconnoiter- 



76 GRANT AS A SOLDIER. 

ing parties. He almost totally neglects reconnoiter- 
ing. In fact he seems fairly to have courted 
surprise. It is safe to say that no average business 
man, after one year's military experience in high 
command, would have made such an uninterrupted 
series of blunders. 



SHILOH. 



Johnston, 40,000 strong, was at and near Corinth. 
Grant's army numbered, according to his estimate, 
38,000 effectives. Sherman fixes the number at 
43,000. Such are the estimates of military men. 
It was probably between 50,000 and 55,000. Pitts- 
burg Landing is a hamlet of three or four huts on 
the left or west bank of the Tennessee river, whose 
course here is due north. From the west, Lick creek 
and Snake creek empty into it, Snake creek being 
the more northerly of the two. About a mile west 
of the mouth of Snake creek, Owl creek, running 
from a southerly direction, empties into Snake 
creek. Owl and Snake creeks are about parallel 
with Lick creek and about three miles distant. All 
these creeks have, in rainy weather, narrow swampy 
valleys, and they afforded protection to Grant's 
flanks. There were also smaller creeks running 
irregularly as tributaries to each of these three 
creeks, and affecting the battle ground not so much 
by the water they contained as by the hills on each 
side, some of which were steep and .heavily covered 
by underbrush. The battle ground lay between 

(77) 



78 GRANT AS A SOLDIER. 

Lick and Owl creek. Apart from its valleys it is 
perhaps a hundred feet above the level of the Ten- 
nessee, nearly all of it well covered with timber. The 
hamlet called Pittsburg Landing was in a narrow, low 
bottom at the foot of a bluff. Shiloh was the name 
of a Methodist log meeting house two and a half 
miles west of the river. 

In selecting this ground Smith had shown wis- 
dom. For defense the position was formidable. 
Sherman says: " The position was naturally 
strong. But even as we were on the 6th of April 
you might search the world over and not find a 
more advantageous field of battle." Sherman's 
command extended from Owl creek to Shiloh. 
Prentiss' command far in the rear of Sherman's line 
and with a gap between of half a mile to a mile 
extended to Lick creek. About three quarters 
of a mile to the rear of Sherman lay McClernand. 
Near the river and in rear of McClernand, were Gen. 
W. H. L. Wallace and Gen. Stephen A. Hurlbut. 
Away up south, near the mouth of Lick creek, quite 
isolated from the army and perhaps three miles from 
the body of Sherman's troops, lay one of his bri- 
gades under Stewart. About eight miles down the 
Tennessee, that is north of Pittsburg, at Crump's 
Landing, lay a part of Gen. Lew Wallace's division 
of 7,500 ; about two miles west of Crump's Landing 
was another part and about five miles west w T as the 
remainder. Instead of being kept, while in a hos- 



SHILOH. 79 

tile country and in the presence of the enemy, 
compact and encamped in line of battle, they were 
systematically scattered. For nineteen days Grant 
had been approving it, and on the nineteenth day, the 
day before attack, he himself had ordered a further 
scattering. 

Johnston, in command of the Confederate army, 
knew thatBuell was advancing to Grant and wished 
to attack before his arrival. On Thursday, April 
3d, he issued orders for a general advance on Fri- 
day morning. Owing to detentions we are not con- 
cerned in inquiring into the attack could not be made 
on the 5th as intended. It is safe to say that but for 
these detentions, Grant's army would have been anni- 
hilated. Yet no preparation was made. Though a 
force estimated by Grant at 80,000 was at the moment 
marching, and most of them then near at hand, to at- 
tack his army, estimated by him at 38,000, no abatis 
was ordered, no shovelful of earth was displaced, 
no log breastwork formed, no advantage whatever 
was attempted to be taken of this strong position, no 
order was given to McClernand to move forward and 
fill the gap between Sherman and Prentiss, no order 
was given to Stewart to leave his safe valley retreat 
and join Sherman, no order was given to Wallace to 
quit Crump's Landing and be able to fight, no order 
was o-iven to W. H. L. Wallace and Hurlbut to get 
into line of battle, no reconnoissance of any value 
was made, in short, not a single act of preparation 



80 GRANT AS A SOLDIER. 

was made to redeem the pledge Grant made to Hal- 
leck that he would "be prepared" for an attack. 
On the night of April 5th, apart from the receipt of 
re-enforcements, Grant was in exactly the same con- 
dition as on the 17th ult., when he assumed per- 
sonal command, even to the extent of continuing the 
amazing blunder of sleeping at Savannah. 

A. foolish practice was allowed to the pickets, on 
being relieved in the morning, to fire off their guns. 
Accustomed to this morning round of shots the 
Federal army would not, of course, take alarm at 
musket shots, though they came from an enemy. 
Saturday night, April 5th, 1862, Johnson's troops 
were deployed in line of battle a mile and a half 
west of Shiloh. The supposed 80,000 at dawn were 
up and stealthily advancing while the Federal com- 
mander was asleep at Savannah. At five o'clock and 
fourteen minutes in the morning of the 6th firing 
began. The Federal army, interpreting it to be the 
ordinary picket shots, took no alarm. Never was 
surprise more complete. Officers and privates were 
shot in their tents. Breakfasts were found half 
eaten. Federal troops, sometimes in spite of 
their officers and sometimes led by them, in con- 
sternation at finding themselves apparently over- 
whelmed, fled back to the river in multitudes. 
Grant, who says the battle began at 8 a. m., heard 
the firing at Savannah and proceeded to Pittsburg 
by boat, stopping on the way at Crump's to see 



SHILOH. 81 

Wallace. Grant says (1 Pers. Mem. 336) that he 
reached the front, which was two and a half miles 
west of the river, at 10 a. m. Yet Gen. D. C. Buell 
says that at 1 p. m. on the 6th he first met Grant on 
the steamboat which lay at Pittsburg, and was pro- 
tected against cannon balls by the lofty bluffs, and 
he clearly intimates the opinion, from evidence then 
before him, that Grant left the boat at that hour for 
the first time. The Federal troops were steadily 
driven back. About the middle of the after- 
noon, fishtino: like a tio-er, Prentiss was flanked, 
surrounded and captured, for Grant's left was 
specially pressed. Prentiss met misfortune only 
because he fought better than others and the army 
was so ill commanded that his flanks were not 
protected: At about 2:30 Johnston was mortally 
wounded. A bullet struck him in the back of his 
rio-ht thisfh about three inches above the knee joint 
and severed the artery. The simplest surgery, if a 
surgeon had been at hand, would have saved his 
life. He bled to death in about fifteen minutes. 
Beauregard succeeded to the command. The Con- 
federates steadily advanced. Grant's left, now 
weakened by Prentiss' capture, was pressed back 
and yet back, until, quite detached from Lick creek, 
it now rested on the Tennessee, not many rods south 
of Pittsburg:. His right was still far out from the 
river and flanked by Owl creek. His line then, in- 
stead of lying north and south as in the morning, 
6 



82 GRANT AS A SOLDIER. 

lay in the evening northwest and southeast. The 
Confederate plan had been to keep Grant's right 
constantly engaged so that it would be unwilling to 
spare troops to other parts of the line, and then 
to throw its strength chiefly on the left and drive 
the Federal army back upon Snake creek. This un- 
even distribution of Johnston's force was a maneu- 
ver, but there is nothing to show that Grant perceived 
the maneuver or that it affected his management. 
The maneuver has succeeded. Grant's left is driven 
back quite to the river. The shot begin to fall and 
to do some slight execution at Pittsburg. Grant's 
peril is imminent. At this time Ammen's brigade 
of Buell's advance reaches Pittsburg and pushes 
rapidly to the field on Grant's extreme left. The 
Confederates are partially checked by a ravine run- 
ning out from the river between them and Grant's 
left. Col. Webster of Grant's staff, posts a battery 
on the bluff near Pittsburg. The gunboats, too, 
open fire. But Grant's troops are dispirited by 
being driven back all day long. The Confederates 
are correspondingly inspirited. A little longer and 
Grant's army will be driven back upon Owl and 
Snake creeks and bagged. At this critical moment, 
from some unaccountable whim, Beauregard ordered 
a cessation of hosttlities. Grant was saved. He 
could not save himself; Beauregard saved him. 
During the night Buell's army arrived. This 
double army was too much for Beauregard. Early 



SHILOH. 83 

Monday morning the battle was resumed. But 
Beauregard soon had reason to repent his ill-timed 
order of the previous evening. He was driven 
back fighting to the point at which the engagement 
began on Sunday, and then he ordered a retreat. 
The strange fact is that he was not pursued. With 
Buell's aid Grant had ceased to be the vanquished 
and had become the victor, yet he did not get, nor 
make the slightest attempt to get, any of the fruits 
of victory. On the contrary, he allowed his en- 
emy, at that hour not only his inferior, but whip- 
ped, to retire as quietly as from a holiday parade. 

Sherman got immense credit (and probably still 
has it) from the fact that, unlike the left, the right, 
which he commanded, was not driven back to the 
river. It is thought that this fact demonstrates his 
superiority to the other division commanders. In 
truth it demonstrates nothing. It was Johnston's 
plan not to drive back Grant's right but to mass on 
his left and turn it and force his line back upon Owl 
creek so as to cut off escape by the river. Thurs- 
day, April 3d, Johnston distributed among his di- 
vision generals an order containing, among other 
things the following: — 

" II. In the approaching battle every effort will 
be made to turn the left flank of the enemy," 
etc. 

Grant issued a congratulatory order in which he 
declared that his troops had " maintained their po- 



84 GRANT AS A SOLDIER. 

sition, repulsed and routed," the enemy. Grant 
surely knew what it is to " maintain a position " 
and what it is for an enemy to be " routed." What 
must be the embarrassment of the historian when 
such is military veracity? 

REFLECTIONS. 

1. A general commanding an army in a hostile 
country and confronting any hostile force, espec- 
ially a large hostile force, but above all, a supposed 
superior hostile force, has many duties that are 
peculiar to such a situation. All these peculiar 
duties Grant neglected. 

2. On assuming command March 17th, he should 
have remained with his army. The reason he gives 
for prolonging his stay at Savannah, namely, that 
he might be there to meet Buell on his arrival, had 
better not have been stated. 

3. He should have forbidden the tiring of guns in 
the morning by relieved pickets. While his com- 
mand was at Cairo, the practice would not have been 
objectionable. But in presence of the enemy it 
made complete surprise more complete. Nor is 
this matter of picket firing in the morning trivial 
and unworthy of a historian's notice. On the con- 
trary, it is important, 

4. The scattered condition of the troops prevented 
for perhaps hours, in fact, as to Lew. Wallace a 



SHILOH. 85 

whole day, the formation of a complete line of bat- 
tle. Such irregularities demoralize troops, and 
occasion flight. But as some troops are seen 
running others join in the flight. Demoralization 
is contagious. Sherman says, " at least 10,000 
ran away." This was due to Grant's mismanage- 
ment. With proper reconnoisance he would have 
known the day before of the contemplated attack 
and instead of not having " the faintest idea," he 
would have had his army in line of battle and been 
prepared. 

5. The question of surprise it is idle to discuss. 
Grant does no credit to his intellect in denying 
surprise. His lack of candor at times excites 
disgust. We see it in his explanation of his 
Belmont folly. We see it in his explanation of his 
visit to the gunboat at Donelson. On the question 
of surprise at Shiloh, the fact is so indisputable that 
that Grant insults public intelligence by disputing 
it. The truth is, he ought in his own interest to 
plead surprise affirmatively. If he insists that 
his army on the morning of April 6th was, in his 
judgment, prepared for battle, he proves himself 
the most wretchedly incapable commander that ever 
wore a sword, and proves moreover that when on 
the 5th he dispatched to Halleck that he had not 
" the faintest idea of an attack " he told a falsehood. 
Grant has a weakness for vindicating himself and 
the reasons he gives are not always credible to his 



Si] GRANT AS A SOLDIER. 

invention, — as when he justifies his continued stay 
at Savannah by saying that he remained there to 
meet Buell on his arrival. A reason without either 
sense or candor, sickens. 

6. A critical study of this battle fails to show a 
single instance in which the commanding general's 
mind was impressed upon the battle either in plan- 
ning it or during its progress. 



UNDER A CLOUD. 



After Shiloh Grant was assailed fiercely. It was 
charged that he was incompetent. It was charged 
that he was drunk. But at the north patriotism was 
at white heat. As a result of the battle Beauregard 
had finally been repelled. This was enough. Pa- 
triotism insisted on taking the brightest view. Public 
folly refused to inquire narrowly and accepted 
gladly and boastfully the result. Grant was a hero. 

Maj.-Gen. Henry Wager Halleck was not content. 
He saw the glory that attended victory, and saw too 
how cheaply it was got. He determined to shelve 
Grant and become the hero. Halleck was weak- 
minded, jealous, officious, touchy on the question of 
his official importance, profoundly convinced that 
West Point made great commanders, that a West 
Pointer though so remote from his military studies 
that he had forgotten everything, though so dull in 
his studies that he never in fact had really under- 
stood anything, was still, merely because a West 
Pointer, a strategist and tactician, while a civilian 
with strong and well-disciplined intellect, instructed 
in mature life by a critical study of the military art, 

(87) " 



88 GRANT AS A SOLDIER. 

and instructed too by experience, could not pos- 
sibly have military skill. He knew that if on a 
battlefield a civilian was sole commander and com- 
manded successfully, yet because be was a mere 
civilian, he was without merit, while a West Pointer, 
who did next to nothing deserved promotion. 
Moreover, Halleck knew that his own merit was im- 
mense for he was not only a West Pointer, but he 
had actually written a book on the military art. 
True, the book was worthless, but still it was a book. 

" A book's a book although there's nothing in't." 

The administration and the people were looking 
for a military chieftain. Halleck had written a book , 
and hence Halleck was the man. 

On assuming personal command at- Pittsburg, 
April 9th, Halleck started forthwith after the army 
that had been beaten only two days before, and was 
only twenty miles distant. He collected additional 
forces from all parts of his department, and soon 
had upward of 120,000 men. With such a force he 
could have crushed Beauregard. Though the enemy 
lay perfectly still at Corinth, Halleck, in exactly one 
calendar month, advanced nearly fifteen miles. If 
b3' this laughable deliberation he had wound ana- 
conda-like around Beauregard's army and captured 
it we might say that West Point wisdom gave 
compensation. But what makes the laughable de- 
liberation more laughable is, that the moment it 



UNDER A CLOUD. 89 

suited Beauregard's convenience he took his entire 
army and every dollar's worth of military property 
and retired. 

Soon after assuming personal command at Pitts- 
burg Halleck displayed his petty jealousy. Though 
Grant's reputation from the capture of Donelson 
was undeserved, yet that, in connection with the fact 
that the enemy was finally driven back at Shiloh, 
made him a much-known man. That a subordinate 
should be more gazetted than himself was more than 
Halleck could bear. He dared not relieve Grant. 
He accordingly adopted the cowardly expedient of 
reorganizing his armv in such a way as to leave 
Grant nominally second in command, but in fact 
having no command. He was still on paper in 
command of the military district of West Tennessee. 
Yet such is the despotism of military rule that Hal- 
leck sent orders direct to the corps commanders of 
that district, and even ordered movements of the 
corps without Grant's knowledge. 

Halleck' s demonstrated unfitness for his position 
induced the administration to find a higher position 
for the man who had been at West Point and had 
written a book. Unable to command successfully 
one army he was ordered to Washington to command 
all the armies. Still unfriendly to Grant his military 
eye saw evidences of genius in one Col. Robert 
Allen. He offered him the command of the army. 
It was declined. On Halleck's departure Grant suc- 
ceeded in command, with headquarters at Corinth. 



ON THE DEFENSIVE. 



For some months Grant's success was none of the 
best. One cause of failure was that he was a pool- 
judge of human nature, or else allowed himself to 
gratify personal friendship at public expense. One 
Col. Mason, in command of an Ohio regiment at the 
battle of Shiloh, ran at the first shot with his whole 
command. Ashamed, afterward, of his conduct, he 
asked Grant for an important trust. Now, it is true 
that a single act of cowardice does not prove a man 
a coward. Frederick the Great and Murat are 
signal proofs to the contrary. But when an officer 
has shown himself conspicuously unreliable, he must 
expect to pass probation before receiving high trust. 
Yet Grant gave Mason charge of the posts of 
Clarksville and Fort Donelson, an independent 
command. He surrendered both shamefully. Col. 
Murphy, of a Wisconsin regiment, was placed in 
command of the post of Iuka, where large army 
stores were collected. Being attacked, he aban- 
doned his post shamefully. Rosecrans was enraged 
and wished him sent before a court-martial, but 
Grant put him in command at Holly Springs, another 
(90.) 



ON THE DEFENSIVE. 91 

depot of supplies. Again he abandoned his post 
shamefully. If, before giving them important and 
independent commands, he had had affirmative know- 
ledge that they were brave and trustworthy, he 
should not be blamed for the loss of Chirks vi lie, 
Donelson and Holly Springs ; but he had affirmative 
knowledge to the contrary. It would be tedious 
and not according to the plan of this little book to 
give a detailed account of the numerous petty disas- 
ters which befell under Grant's command. It is 
certain that affairs went badly. But only the more 
important facts can be noticed. 

September 9th Grant telegraphed to Halleck : "I 
don't believe that a force can be brought against us 
at present that cannot be successfully resisted." 
On the 14th, five days afterward, Gen. Sterling 
Price seized Iuka, aFederal depot of supplies, which 
lay twenty-one miles east of Corinth. Price's enter- 
prise was daring. His army ought to have been 
captured bodily. Gen. William S. Rosecrans, with 
about 9,000 men, was south of Corinth. Gen. E. 
O. C. Ord, with about the same number, moved 
eastward on the Memphis & Charleston Railroad 
from Corinth to Burnsville, a railroad town seven 
miles west of Iuka. Each of these Federal armies 
was about equal to Price's. Observe now Price's 
peril. To the north and east of Iuka were the 
Tennessee river and Bear creek, both of them of 
sufficient size to be barriers against the march of an 



92 GRANT AS A SOLDIER. 

army. If Price, leaving Tuka, should march toward 
either of those streams, Rosecrans and Ord pursu- 
ing, his capture was inevitable. There remained to 
him a road to the northwest, one to the southwest, 
and one to the south, the two last being not far 
apart. By one of these three roads Price must 
escape," if he is to escape at all. Ord was directed 
to quit the railroad at Burnsville, move northward 
till he struck the road leading from Iuka to the 
northwest, and follow that road as far toward Iuka 
as practicable. Rosecrans was to occupy the two 
southerly roads and advance toward Iuka. Grant 
took his station at Burnsville, that is, with neither 
army. When Ord, on the northwest road, had 
reached a point near Iuka, Grant sent him an order 
that the instant he heard Rosecrans' cannon he 
was to push on. to Iuka and attack wherever he 
might find the enemy. Exactly at this point Grant 
made a great and fatal mistake. As soon as he had 
directed that the sound of Rosecrans' cannon was 
to be Ord's order to advance and n'ofht he had no 
further occasion to be at Burnsville, an intermediate 
point, and hence should immediately have joined 
Rosecrans and assumed personal command. Grant's 
diffidence of his skill as a field commander was in 
this instance ill-timed. The upshot of the matter 
was that in the afternoon of the 19th Price attacked 
and repulsed Rosecrans' advance, two miles south- 
west of Iuka, and during the succeeding night by 



ON. THE DEFENSIVE. 93 

the southerly road, which Rosecrans had neglected 
to occupy, quietly retired, laden with booty. In 
the forenoon of the 20th Grant entered Iuka to 
find that Price's army, instead of being captured 
by him as it ought to have been, had beaten half 
his army, captured all his stores and escaped be- 
yond successful pursuit. Grant's management was 
bad. 

It was now Van Dorn's turn. He lay south, of 
Corinth, Price's army having been united with his. 
Grant had removed his headquarters September 
23d to Jackson, iess than forty miles north of 
Corinth, and connected with it directly by the Mo- 
bile and Ohio Railroad. Van Dorn began move- 
ments which threatened Corinth. That town was 
strongly fortified. " By the 1st of October," says 
Grant, " it was fully apparent that Corinth was to 
be attacked with great force and determination." 
Grant placed Rosecrans there with about 20,000 
men. Less than two hours' ride would have taken 
Grant himself to Corinth and thither, after giving 
necessary orders, he ought to have gone forthwith 
on the 1st. This was the more necessary because 
Rosecrans, only a few days before at Iuka had 
blundered miserably and had even disobeyed orders. 
But Grant seems to have been slow to acquire con- 
fidence in himself as a field commander. The diffi- 
dence which kept him on the gunboat at Donelson 
and at Burnsville during the battle of Iuka, 



94 GRANT AS A SOLDIER. 

detained him at a distance of less than two hours' 
ride from Corinth, where the strongest reasons 
demanded his presence. Ord with 4,000 men was 
ordered from Bolivar to Corinth. Van Dorn had 
been informed that on the northwest of Corinth 
the fortification was insufficient. Accordingly 
October 2d, Van Dorn with a force, that Rose- 
crans fixes at 38,000, approached Corinth from that 
direction. On the 3d, Rosecrans having, under a 
previous order from Grant, gone out from his de- 
fenses proper to some remoter defenses that Halleck 
had constructed, and attacked Van Dorn, there was 
a severe battle. Rosecrans then retired behind his 
nearer fortifications. Early in the morning of the 
4th, battle was resumed by Van Dorn 'and was 
waged fiercely. Charge after charge was made by 
the Confederates. Never was greater valor dis- 
played. The contest was sanguinary. A little after 
noon, his loss having been frightful, Van Dorn gave up 
the attempt and forthwith began a retreat in haste. 
Orel's force had not time, after receipt of Grant's 
order, to reach Corinth, though pushing forward with 
all haste. About ten miles from Corinth, at a 
bridge spanning the Hatchie river, Van Dorn 
in retreat encountered Ord with 4,000 men on 
the opposite side of the river. Van Dorn's ad- 
vance met a bloody repulse and rushed back in panic, 
a fact showing the extent of demoralization. Find- 
ing it impossible to cross the river in face of Ord, 



ON THE DEFENSIVE. 95 

Van Dorn was obliged to make a detour of six 
miles up the river to another crossing. Prior to the 
battle Grant had ordered Rosecrans, in case he 
should win a victory, to pursue instantly. But 
Rosecrans, shallow, pretentious, and vaporous, 
found it all he could do during the afternoon, to 
assure his troops that they had beaten the enemy. 
If Grant had been at Corinth as he could, and hence 
should have been, he could have started in hot pur- 
suit of the vanquished foe. 

Van Dorn had encountered Ord early in the morn- 
ing of the 5th, who, as we have seen, drove his ad- 
vance back in panic and compelled a retreat and 
detour. If Grant had been in Van Dorn's rear 
nothing could have prevented the capture of the 
Confederate army. On the morning of the 5th, 
Rosecrans began pursuit. He took the wrong road 
and went eight miles out of his way. The bridge at 
which Van Dorn crossed the Hatchie after his re- 
pulse by Ord was at Crum's mill. It was very long 
and narrow, being hi fact a bridge not only acros s 
the river, but also across a morass bordering the 
river and impassable by troops. If Grant had been 
at Corinth and had pursued hotly and by any ac- 
cident had missed catching Van Dorn between two 
fires on the morning of the 5th, here was another 
chance. At this long and narrow defile his capture 
would have been sure. But Grant was not at 
Corinth and Rosecrans reached one end of Crum's 



96 GRANT AS A SOLDIER. 

mill bridge just as Van Dorn's rear was passing 
from the other end. Van Dorn escaped capture 
because Grant was not at his post of duty. 

Now was the time to capture Vicksburg. All mil- 
itary minds knew the strategic value of that place. 
It was defenseless. The two Confederate armies, 
that under Price and that under Van Dorn, had 
combined, had been badly beaten, and were retreat- 
ing in hot haste and much demoralized. A beaten, 
retreating and demoralized army is diminished every 
hour by straggling, while a victorious and pursuing 
army loses almost none. If Grant had been at Co- 
rinth to pursue Van Dorn, he could have destroyed 
or captured him and could then have pushed on 
and, without firing a shot, have occupied Vicksburg. 
Though Van Dorn had managed to escape, his 
army was in no condition to fight. Vicksburg still 
invited Federal occupancy. Rosecrans, having got 
as far south as Jonesboro, applied to Grant for leave 
to push on to Vicksburg. Since his bout with Hal- 
leck after Donelson, and his being shelved by Hal- 
leck after Shiloh, and Halleck' s elevation to 
command at Washington, Grant had found it pru- 
dent to be obsequious. Accordingly when Rosecrans 
asked leave to advance to Vicksburg, Grant tele- 
graphed to Halleck for advice. Halleck instantly 
answered submitting the question to Grant's discre- 
tion, but recommending pursuit. Grant refused. 
It is impossible to conceive any valid reason for 



ON THE DEFENSIVE. 97 

Grant's refusal. He knew that Vicksburg could be 
occupied. Is it possible that he was unwilling that 
the credit of capturing that important point should 
belong to his subordinate and toyed with the public 
interests for the sake of increasing his own fame? 
The error necessitated the long amphibious siege of 
Vicksburg at a cost of millions of dollars and thou- 
sands of lives. 



ON TO VICKSBURG 



October 26 Grant wrote to Halleck : " With small 
re-enforcements I think I would be able to move 
down the Mississippi Central Kailroad and cause the 
evacuation of Vicksburg." The question at once 
arises why he could not, eighteen days before, 
with more safety and assurance, on the heels of a 
beaten and demoralized foe, and when Vicksburg 
was practically defenseless, have " caused the evac- 
uation." In November the movement began. It is 
to be inferred that he had received the " small re- 
enforcements." November 8 he informed Sherman 
that he estimated the rebel force at 30,000, and he 
was " strong enough to handle that number without 
gloves." In command of the Confederate army 
Van Dorn had been superseded by Lieut. -Gen. J. C. 
Pemberton, a feeble and pompous commander, who 
had fortified strongly on the south side of the Talla- 
hatchie at the railroad crossing. Grant had hardly 
commenced the march when a new trouble arose. 
Gen. McClernand, partly through the superior 
strength of his intellect, disciplined by years of pro- 
fessional study as a lawyer, and hence accustomed 
(98) 



ON TO VICKSBURG. 99 

to investigate and to prosecute a train of reasoning, 
and partly through his military experience, beginning 
with the silly affair at Belmont, in which he at least 
acquitted himself handsomely, going through the 
battle of Donelson, in which he chiefly was com- 
manding general, and afterward at Shiloh, in which 
he handled his troops with skill and fought with 
valor, had conceived a plan for opening the Missis- 
sippi. He went to Washington and laid his plan 
before the President, by whom it was considered 
carefully and finally approved and McClernand was 
directed to submit it to Halleck. Here Halleck was 
all himself. He assumed an oracular hauteur be- 
coming a man who had been at West Point and had 
written a book. He who had yet to command in 
battle and who in invasive warfare marched an army 
nearly fifteen miles in thirty days, intimated to 
McClernand that he was too busy to consider such 
schemes, and, if he had time, lacked inclination. 
But occasionally Lincoln, as the phrase was, " put his 
foot down/' Both residing in Springfield, 111., and 
practicing law together, Lincoln knew McClernand's 
intellect and knew that he had the ability to under- 
stand the profession of arms as he did the profession 
of law ; that he would make himself master of what- 
ever he undertook. Moreover, McClernand's cogent 
reasonings convinced Lincoln . He accordingly, over- 
ruling Halleck, instructed the Secretary of War to 
make an order authorizing McClernand to organize 



100 GRANT AS A SOLDIER. 

an expedition to open the Mississippi, and the Pres- 
ident made an indorsement on the order in his own 
handwriting containing these words : " I add that I 
feel a deep interest in the success of the expedition." 
Here was an express recognition of McClernand's 
river expedition. Like all military expeditions it 
needed to be concealed from the enemy, and hence 
from the public, that is, it needed to be kept secret. 
But it gradually leaked out. Grant saw accounts of 
it in the newspapers. Probably, too, Secretary 
Stanton told Halleck tmd Halleck told Grant — for 
Halleck would not be overridden with impunity in 
favor of anybody, but especially not in favor of a 
civilian. Grant was undoubtedly worried. He saw 
a rival for military fame. Now, it must be said in 
favor of Grant that he was not naturally a vain man. 
Ignorant of books, few men took a more common- 
sense view of things. He doubtless reflected that 
Belmont was a laughable failure, that he had blun- 
dered at Fort Henry, that his conduct at Donelson 
could not be nicely inquired into, that his defeat at 
Shiloh was the result of his incapacity, and his ulti- 
mate victory there not to be credited to him, that 
his absence from the field at Iuka and the disaster 
there could not be remarked upon, and that his ab- 
sence from Corinth, though within two hours' ride, 
and though he had the 1st, the 2d and most of 
the 3d in which to go, was not to be com- 
mended. He doubtless concluded, and with much 



ON TO VICKSBURG. 101 

good sense that if a man of strong and well-disci- 
plined intellect, and superior military experience 
and learning should undertake the job of opening the 
Mississippi and should succeed, he, Grant, would be 
overshadowed and might, in Sherman's language, 
" disappear to history." He accordingly began to 
prepare against such a contingency. Though at start- 
ing on his expedition " to cause the evacuation of 
Vicksburg," he professed to have sufficient force, 
yet on the 9th he telegraphed to Halleck, " re-en- 
forcements are arriving slowly." He is evidently 
worried as to what disposition will be made of troops 
then on the Mississippi. Sherman was at Memphis 
with a considerable force. To remove these from 
the river might disable McClernand. On the 10th 
Grant asks Halleck " am I to have Sherman subject 
to my orders or is [are] he and his force reserved 
for some special service?" Here, then, is the 
secret of his uneasiness. He is haunted by the 
prospect of some " special service." From this 
time on it would seem that Grant allowed himself 
without cause to hate McClernand. Having been 
informed that Sherman was subject to his order, he 
appears to have thought it a good move, in the 
way of stopping any river expedition, to withdraw 
his forces from the river to himself on the line of 
the Mississippi Central Railroad. Accordingly, being 
at Holly Springs, he, on the 14th, orders Sherman, 
being at Memphis, " to move with two divisions, 



102 GRANT AS A SOLDIER. 

and if possible with three divisions, to Oxford or 
Tallahatchie as soon as possible." By the 30th 
Sherman had joined Grant with three divisions, for 
Sherman, Grant and Halleck sympathized in the pur- 
pose to maintain the supremacy of West Point, and 
to that end Sherman was willing to strip Memphis 
and other military posts on the Mississippi of Fed- 
eral troops. 

On the 26th Grant had expressed the opinion that 
" with small re-enforcements" he could cause the 
evacuation of Vicksburg. Tiie re-enforcements 
being furnished he started. Along the line further 
re-enforcements overtook him slowly. At last three 
divisions (there were but three divisions at Fort 
Donelson in all) arrive under command of his favor- 
ite lieutenant. But as, on the 26th, he required 
only " small re-enforcements," it cannot be that 
he ordered to himself from the Mississippi a whole 
army because he needed it. What then was his 
motive, what can have been his motive in stripping 
the posts on the Mississippi of troops? But one 
motive is conceivable, namely, to disable and foil 
McClernand. 

The plan Grant is now carrying out for capturing 
Vicksburg is right. Along the route of the Mis- 
sissippi Central was the only safe and hence only 
proper route for attacking that stronghold. A route 
essentially different, could afford success only by 
some chance and a route that can be right only 



ON TO VICKSBURG. 103 

by chance no good general will adopt. When he 
reached the Tallahatchie, November 29th, Grant 
sent a body of cavalry a few miles up the river to 
cross with the purpose to attack in flank. Pember- 
ton abandoned his fortifications and retreated. 
Though all had thus far gone well Grant continued 
to grow nervous. Though he had received the 
" small re-enforcements" and Sherman's army in 
addition, he seems more than willing to stop. At 
last he decided. He submits the question to Hal- 
leck. December 3d he telegraphs Halleck : «« How 
far south would you like me to go? Would it not 
be well to hold the enemy south of the Yallabusha 
and move with a force from Helena and Memphis on 
Vicksburg? With my present force it would 
not be prudent to go beyond Grenada and attempt 
to hold present line of communication." This is 
a petition for leave to abandon the expedition. At 
a superficial glance, Grant shows a fickleness not in 
harmony with his general conduct. He says to Hal- 
leck that, with small re-enforcements, we will take 
Vicksburg by the M. C. R. R. He then tells 
Sherman he is " able bo handle the enemy with- a 
out gloves." A few days later he changes his 
mind and orders Sherman to join him, " if possible, 
with three divisions," and this, notwithstanding 
the fact that his march had been uninterruptedly 
prosperous. Sherman joins him. Sherman and 
he were, as military companions, intimate, " two 



104 GRANT AS A SOLDIER. 

souls with but a single thought." If Sherman 
thought him dull, he did not say so. They two 
took counsel on the situation. They were in sym- 
pathy. The civilian, McClernand, had been ener- 
getic. It looked as if he would soon be ready for 
work. Something must be done, and done at once. 
The plan is changed. The expedition, though an 
army has just been added to Grant's sufficient force, 
must be abandoned. December 3, Grant asks leave 
to abandon it. Not fickleness, but " bull-dog ten- 
acity " was Grant's characteristic. Yet, though he 
had got re-enforcements in abundance, though 
Halleck had supported him to the full, though Pem- 
berton had fallen back without firing a shot, Grant 
shows a strange and increasing nervousness, and at 
last abandons the expedition. 

But what does he do next? On the 5th he tele- 
graphs to Halleck this significant dispatch : " If 
the Helena troops were at my command^ I think it 
would be practicable to send Sherman to take them 
and the Memphis forces south of the mouth of the 
Yazoo river, and thus secure Vicksburg and the 
State of Mississippi." This, then, is what the Mis- 
sissippi Central expedition resulted in — a river ex- 
pedition under Slier man. McClernand' s river 
expedition, Halleck, Grant and Sherman combining, 
is to be headed off. 

Grant's First Attempt to capture Vicksburg is a 
Failure. 



ON TO VICKSBURG. 105 



SECOND ATTEMPT. 



Grant is resolved to checkmate McClernand. But 
to do so he must be quick. On December 7th he 
asked Halleck, " Do you want me to command the 
expedition (the one he had proposed to Halleck in 
his dispatch of the 5th) or shall I send Sherman?" 
This looks as if he desired the timely removal of a 
doubt, the timely committal of Halleck in respect to 
McClernand. Halleck gave him plenary authority, 
for Halleck, too, hated the civilian. Grant instantly 
ordered Sherman to take one of his divisions and 
proceed forthwith to Memphis to organize the expe- 
dition in conjunction with Flag Officer Porter. As 
McClernand was liable to reach Memphis at any 
time, Sherman was dispatched to Memphis the same 
day that Grant made the order. The order con- 
tained the following language: " I will hold the 
forces here in readiness to co-operate with you in 
such manner as the movements of the enemy may 
make necessary." This shows that Grant's further 
stay on the M. C. R. R. and further duty were to be 
merely auxiliary to Sherman. It ought to be added 
that Grant expected to aid Sherman, that is, to re- 
main where he was and not retreat, for on the 14th 
he wrote Sherman, still at Memphis, " it would be 
well if you could have two or three small boats 
suitable for navigating the Yazoo. It may become 



106 GRANT AS A SOLDIER. 

necessary for me to look to that base for supplies 
before we get through." In spite of Grant's haste, 
McCIernand, zealous and energetic, had got ready. 
On the 18th Grant was notified from Washington 
that McCIernand would have " immediate command 
of the river expedition under your (Grant's) direc- 
tion." The fact that McCIernand had Lincoln's 
confidence made it prudent in Grant to pay him 
proper courtesy. He immediately wrote to McCIer- 
nand at Springfield, 111., a becoming letter. 

On December 20th, Van Dorn, leading a body of 
cavalry, dashed in upon Holly Springs, which Grant 
had made a secondary base of supplies, then com- 
manded by Col. Murphy, of Iuka notoriety, and 
captured it. The Confederates, after the fashion 
of military veracity, estimated the stores at 
$4,000,000. The next day, Grant began to retreat 
to the north bank of the Tallahatchie and asked 
Halleck for leave to send a considerable portion of 
his command to Memphis and to join the river ex- 
pedition in person. The secret is now clear. The 
West Point combination, Halleck, Grant and 
Sherman will succeed. The promptness with which 
Grant began his retreat and simultaneously asked 
leave to make a reduction of his army and to join 
the river expedition in person are noteworthy facts. 
He had learned shortly after Donelson that Halleck 
was a martinet whom a subordinate could manage 
like a child, by tickling his vanity and making 



ON TO VICKSBURG. 107 

ostentation of submissiveness. That game Grant 
had played handsomely. Moreover, for the object 
in view, to checkmate McClernand, Halleck was 
predisposed. Throughout the war, as a rule, 
West Pointers fraternized, constituted a Mutual 
Admiration Society, regarded civilian generals with 
supercilious disdain, and with an affectation of lofty 
magnanimity, joined in frowning them down. 
Halleck, too, had snubbed McClernand, and hence, 
hated him and knew right well that McClernand 
would not tickle his vanity and make display of 
humility. Hence, Halleck and Grant were in sym- 
pathy in crowding down McClernand. Residing 
at Washington and being general-in-chief, it was 
easy for Halleck to get from the office of the Secre- 
tary of War a copy of the order giving McClernand 
immediate command of the river expedition and to 
furnish it to Grant. The expedition would be of 
necessity within the territorial limits of Grant's 
department. Hence, though McClernand would un- 
doubtedly rank Sherman, it was not so clear that in 
Grant's department he would rank Grant. At any 
rate, the department commander and the general- 
in-chief combined, had a good fighting chance 
against the civilian. On the 18th Grant was 
advised from Washington that McClernand was 
about ready. Something must be done and done 
quickly. Though Grant had decided in his own 
mind, as early as December 3d, to abandon the 



108 GRANT AS A SOLDIER. 

M. C. R. R. expedition, yet on ordering Sherman to 
attack by the river at the mouth of the Yazoo, he had 
pledged the co-operation of his army and had even 
said, " it may become necessary to look to that base 
for supplies." Accordingly, three days after 
notice from Washington that McClernand was 
about ready, he makes another essential change 
of plan. He will reduce his army, will quit his 
army, will order a retreat of his army into 
Northern Mississippi. Not only does he thus 
violate his pledge to Sherman of co-operation, 
but he endangers Sherman's army. Suppose that 
Sherman, instead of halting two days at Milli- 
ken's Bend, had pushed on and had effected a sur- 
prise at the mouth of the Yazoo, and, landing 
without opposition, had advanced into the interior 
in quest of Grant. Suppose that Pemberton had 
gathered together all his strength and had pounced 
upon him in overwhelming numbers, Sherman 
might have been destroyed. The truth is, Grant's 
repeated and rapid and fundamental changes of 
plan are inexplicable on any other idea than that 
from December 3d he had ceased to fight the Con- 
federates in order to fight McClernand. In his 
order to strip the Mississippi river of troops 
by calling Sherman, " with three divisions, if pos- 
sible," to himself; then, after two or three days of 
companionship with Sherman, sending him back to 
Memphis in haste to organize a river expedition, 



ON TO VICKSBURG. 109 

with a pledge to co-operate; then his abandonment 
of the M. C. R. R. expedition; and, finally, his 
retreat to Northern Mississippi that he might go in 
person to Memphis, Halleck swiftly approving 
every proposed change, — such fickleness proves 
a disturbing cause outside of military exigencies 
more powerful than military exigencies. The trio 
of West Pointers were resolved to destroy McCler- 
nand at whatever cost to public interests. 

It is commonly understood that the capture of 
Holly Springs induced Grant's purpose to retreat. 
Let us see. He knew, and for days and months had 
known, the agricultural resources of that extremely 
fertile region. Immediately after Shiloh he had 
resolved to forage on the country. In his " Life 
of Grant," Gen. Badeau, a eulogistic biographer 
and a member of Grant's staff, after describing 
the battle of Shiloh, says: "From this time, 
therefore, Grant gave up the idea of saving the 
property of the South ; the South had made 
the war avowedly one of the people, and the 
people, being a party to it, must suffer until 
the people as well as the soldiers were conquered. 
Henceforth he gave his subordinates orders to 
live upon the resources of the country without 
stint, whenever their necessities compelled, etc. 
August 3d, he had orders from Washington "to 
live upon the country, on the resources of citizens 
hostile to the government so far as practicable." 



110 GRANT AS A SOLDIER. 

Badeau relates that, after the Holly Springs capture, 
the rebel women asked Grant civilly, but exultingly, 
how he would subsist his army. " But their exulta- 
tions and smiles were of short continuance when the 
quiet general informed them that his soldiers would 
find plenty in their barns and storehouses." Grant 
himself says that he told them immediately after the 
Holly Springs affair, " it could not be expected that 
men with arms in their hands would starve in the 
midst of plenty" Again he says : " On the 23d, I 
removed my headquarters back to Holly Springs. 
The troops were drawn back gradually, but without 
haste or confusion, finding supplies abundant." 
The truth is it will not do for Grant or any other 
man, officer or private, in his army, to deny that from 
the day the army reached Corinth under Halleck, 
until it left the State of Mississippi, it found sup- 
plies abundant. For the capture of Holly Springs, 
Grant is blameworthy in placing that post in com- 
mand of Murphy, who, at Iuka had shown himself 
unworthy of trust. But the capture was the result 
of a raid. The place was not held permanently. 
It was immediately re-occupied by Federal troops. 
In the extract above quoted Grant himself says that 
he occupied it with his headquarters three days 
afterward. It had in fact been captured only 
through the folly, perhaps cowardice, of Murphy, 
who had been placed there through the folly of 
Grant. Its capture then did not necessitate nor in 



ON TO VICKSBURG. Ill 

any sense justify an essential change in plan of cam- 
paign and to assert that it was the cause is an 
effrontery of mendacity. It was seized with avidity 
as a pretext for such a change, so that Grant might 
go to Memphis and supersede McClernand. 

Let us return to Sherman at Memphis. McCler- 
nand had not arrived. It was possible to give him 
the slip. It is true that, as his arrival was expected, 
decency required Sherman to await him. But Mc- 
Clernand must not be permitted to be the leader in 
opening the Mississippi. Sherman made hot haste, 
embarked at Memphis with 30,000 men, received 
12,000 more at Helena, and landed at Milliken's 
Bend on the west side of the Mississippi, twenty 
miles above Vicksburg, on the 24th . Committing an 
error that is amazing, he remained at Milliken's 
Bend two days. Sherman, Grant's favorite lieuten- 
ant, stops and stays two days within twenty miles 
of Vicksburg. This is West Point generalship ! 
Excuses are given, of course, but too worthless to 
deserve notice. There doubtless was a good excuse. 
It was probably this : In his indecent haste to set 
out on the expedition before McClernand' s arrival 
it is probable that he postponed some necessary 
arrangements with the purpose of stopping on the 
way to complete his preparatory work. At Milli- 
ken's Bend, in the enemy's country, the arrival of 
42,000 blue coats would forthwith be communicated 
by voluntary messengers to Pemberton, who would 



112 GRANT AS A SOLDIER. 

proceed to guard all possible points of attack. The 
lesson afforded by Grant's defeat at Shiloh was 
lost on Sherman. He did not learn the value of 
surprise. As a matter of certainty the delay at 
Milliken's Bend imperiled success; as a matter of 
possibility and perhaps probability it prevented 
success. On the 26th Sherman passed down to the 
mouth of the Yazoo, eight miles above Vicksbunr, 
on transports convoyed by gunboats under Flag 
Officer Porter, and on the 27th landed on the east or 
south side of the Yazoo, near the mouth of Chick- 
asaw Bayou. Luckily for the Confederates the 
Yazoo valley was flooded from a rise in the river, so 
that it was not easy for an attacking army to find 
a place of landing. The overflowed river bottom 
from the current of the Yazoo to the base of the 
hills averaged three miles wide. A narrow strip of 
dry land was found extending across this wide 
stretch of water. The approach which Sherman 
could occupy was so narrow that not more than a 
fourth of his army could be engaged. On the 
slope and crest of the hills the Confederates were 
fortified impregnably. Attack was hopeless. Sher- 
man blundered horribly. Massena, leading the 
French army in Portugal, when he found that 
Wellington's fortifications at Torres Vedras were 
impregnable, withdrew. It is not generalship to 
waste human life. Sherman assaulted and was re- 
pulsed with heavy slaughter. 



ON TO VICKSBURG. 113 

Grant's Second Attempt on Vicksburg was a 
Failure. 

REFLECTIONS. 

1. This Yazoo enterprise was wrong in its con- 
ception. If Grant had pushed on and attacked the 
enemy where Sherman did, but from the rear, he 
would have gained an easy victory, or rather, the 
enemy would not have awaited his attack. He could 
then have established his base of supplies. 

2. The enterprise was wrong in its motive. No 
general should abandon one enterprise rightly 
undertaken and in which success has been constant, 
to engage in another not necessary, of the facts 
involved in which he is necessarily ignorant and of 
whose resuit he must at the best be doubtful, merely 
from the motive of foiling a rival. 

3. Sherman erred amazingly in stopping two 
days at Milliken's Bend. 

4. He erred in making an attack at all. 

CAPTURE OF ARKANSAS POST. 

January 2d, on his return from his disastrous 
expedition, Sherman was met at the mouth of the 
Yazoo by McClernand who immediately assumed 
command. Grant had not foiled McClernand ; Grant 
had foiled himself. McClernand proceeded directly 
to Arkansas Post, a strong Confederate military 
s 



114 GRANT AS A SOLDIER. 

post on the Arkansas river about fifty miles above 
its mouth. After a severe engagement it was taken 
January 11th, and 5,000 prisoners and 17 pieces of 
cannon were captured. Here was one of the few cases 
in which Grant's good sense failed him. That an 
army just beaten while under command of his fav- 
orite, a West Pointer, should be marched straight 
to victory under his rival, and that rival a mere civ- 
ilian who necessarily was ignorant of war, was 
against all rule and was too much to be endured. 
Grant lost his temper. He censured McClernand 
and complained to Halleck. Shortly afterward, 
however, he got new light. Sherman claimed the 
credit of capturing the post. That changed the 
case and Grant made no further complaint. 

January 16th, Grant established headquarters at 
Memphis. Then began trouble between him and 
McClernand. It is probable that, lacking respect 
for Grant's intellect and appreciating the poverty of 
his attainments, McClernand did not treat him so 
submissively as Grant treated his own superior, Hal- 
leck. McClernand knew that Grant's service as a 
company officer when a young man gave him no more 
occasion than an army teamster had, to consider 
the important questions of war, that moreover he 
had been so long out of the army, farming, collect- 
ing rents, and selling leather that he had forgotten 
whatever he may have once known, that his own 
military knowledge was vastly superior to Grant's, 



ON TO YICKSBURG. 115 

and that in commanding large bodies and consider- 
ing and deciding important questions, in camp, on 
the march and on the field, his experience was greater 
than Grant's. Grant on the other hand knew 
"without an unbelieving doubt" that a civilian, 
whatever his military knowledge, military experience 
or military success and however strong and disci- 
plined his intellect, was incapable, merely because a 
civilian, of being a soldier. He knew and every 
West Pointer knew that the knowledge and skill 
necessary to capture Vicksburg could be got no- 
where but at West Point by a boy in his teens. 
Though his knowledge had utterly faded from his 
memory, yet it still gave him a mysterious and 
magical skill. Venturing to differ, McClernand, as 
he looked over that vast expanse of overflowed 
country and its network of rivers, bayous and 
swamps lying on each side of the Mississippi, saw 
that a problem was presented greater and more 
complicated than any academy in the world could 
teach the solution of and than any boy of eighteen, 
even though not of low class rank, could learn to 
solve, and that if by special study and reflection, 
with perhaps not inferior endowment of mind and 
capacity to investigate, he had wrought out a 
rational plan, he might indulge the vanity of be- 
lieving that he had a right to an opinion. 

On McClernand' s return from Arkansas Post, 
elated with victory, and Grant's return from his late 



116 GRANT AS A SOLDIER. 

expedition mortified at his failure, each was in a 
mood to quarrel. McClernand doubtless thought 
Grant ignorant and dull. Grant thought McCler- 
nand a civilian, a marplot and a rival. Grant opened 
the fight. He sent McClernand a dispatch censuring 
the capture of Arkansas Post. McClernand was 
nettled. He answered, " I take the responsibility 
of the expedition against Post Arkansas and had an- 
ticipated your approval of the complete and signal 
success which crowned it, rather than your condem- 
nation." Grant saw that McClernand was not sub- 
missive to be bullied and his hostility was intensified. 
The fight was now begun. A fortnight afterward it 
appears that one of McClernand's subordinate of- 
ficers, unable under McClernand to have his own 
way as to his camping place, applied, not through 
the channel prescribed by military law, but directly 
to Grant on appeal. Grant entertained the appeal. 
In doing so, he was wrong. He went further and 
granted the application, sending McClernand an or- 
der directing the solicited change to be made. Mc- 
Clernand replied suggesting that the officer, in 
doing what he had done, was guilty of irregularity. 
He proceeded to explain fully the fact complained 
of, namely, why the regiment was encamped where 
it was and why its removal, as sought, would be un- 
wise. He expressed the opinion that he could not 
properly be held responsible for the safety of the 
camp if, by unmilitary methods, his authority was 



ON TO VICKSBURG. 117 

interfered with, but concluded by a courteous sub- 
mission to Gen. Grant's order. If McClernand had 
been wrong, Grant's generosity would have been 
able to forget it. But as McClernand, a mere civ- 
ilian, was right, and Grant was wrong and saw that 
he was wrong, Grant was stung. Having disposed 
of that matter, McClernand, in his letter, proceeded 
further. He referred to the order of the Secretary 
of War giving to himself the immediate command 
of the river expedition and expressed the opinion 
that all orders from the department commander 
should pass through his headquarters. " Otherwise, 
I must lose a knowledge of current events and dan- 
gerous confusion ensue. If different views are en- 
tertained by you, then the question should be 
immediately referred to Washington and one or the 
other or both of us relieved. One thing is certain : 
two generals cannot command this army, issuing in- 
dependent and direct orders to subordinate officers 
and the public service be promoted." Here is a 
question for the administration to decide. What 
will be the decision? 

Throughout the war politics played an important 
part. Politics aided Grant. Lincoln was ambi- 
tious. He desired to be re-elected. It was to that 
end that he set afloat the crisp saying : " It is a bad 
time to swap horses while crossing a stream." Of 
course he was unwilling to produce a man who would 
dethrone himself. He accordingly determined not 



118 GRANT AS A SOLDIER. 

to be defeated by a gunpowder reputation . He took 
good care that he should not be and he succeeded. 
McClernand was known to be a sound lawyer. He 
had been respectable as a member of Congress. Hav- 
ing been a Democrat, but having resigned his seat in 
Congress to fight the rebellion, he would be apt to 
be held in favor by all parties in the North except 
the peace party. His military career had been sig- 
nally and uniformly successful. The Belmont 
blunder was not his and his own part as a 
subordinate had been brilliant. The success at 
Fort Donelson, if ever inquired into closely, would 
be found to be due to him and not to the man in 
the gunboat. No man displayed more valor or 
handled his troops with more skill at Shiloh. Lin- 
coln may have suspected McClernand (for " Abe " 
and "Jack," were jocularly familiar and . each 
knew the other to be ambitious) to have an eye on 
the Presidency and possibly the suspicion was 
not groundless. McClernand had conceived and with 
energy and judgment had organized the river expe- 
dition for the capture of Vicksburg. If, after two 
attempts and two failures by Grant, he should suc- 
ceed in taking what Davis called the Gibraltar of 
America and opening the Mississippi and cutting the 
Confederacy in twain, how would it be possible to 
prevent his nomination for the Presidency? No 
other general, so far as Lincoln knew, had conceived 
such a plan or perhaps had the capacity. Abe had 



ON TO VICKSBURG. 119 

seen that Jack had studied the problem profoundly 
and with a mind that knew how to study, that his 
plan was rational and coherent and his reasonings 
convincing. Prudence required that Jack be re- 
strained. 

Grant's mental caliber was such that Lincoln was 
not, at least for the present, afraid of him at all. 
In fact, Grant was holding his own as a military 
commander only by indulgence. But as for Jack, 
his career had been brilliant, he had incurred no 
censure except Grant's censure for a victory and 
any considerable increase of his gunpowder reputa- 
tion would make Jack dangerous. 

The question of dealing with the slaves or " con- 
trabands," as they were called, became trouble- 
some. Grant saw his chance. In his bitterness he 
determined to ply politics. Lincoln was a warm 
friend of the slave. Grant dispatched to Halleck : 
"At least three of my army corps commanders 
(meaning Sherman, McPherson and Hurlbut) take 
hold of the new policy of arming the negroes and 
using them against the enemy with a will." (Pre- 
haps Grant means "take hold with a will of the 
new policy," etc.) " They, at least, are so much of 
soldiers " (implying that the fourth, McClernand, is 
not " so much of a soldier " ) " as to feel themselves 
under obligations," etc. (without stating the number 
of " obligations" ). 

The dispute between Grant and McClernand was 



120 GRANT AS A SOLDIER. 

as simple as language can make it. The order of 
the Secretary of War, known to the President, be- 
cause having a statement written on its back in the 
President's handwriting, provided for an expedition 
" under Gen. McClernand' s command against Vick- 
burg and to clear the Mississippi river to New 
Orleans." It was no more to be under Grant's 
command than under Burnside's or Moltke's. But 
politics and West Point combined were omnipotent. 
It was decided that the expedition was not to be 
" under Gen. McClernand's command," and further 
that he had no more authority except as corps com- 
mander, than Burnside or Moltke. 

Grant has succeeded. It has cost him the aban- 
donment of one Vicksburg campaign and the bloody 
failure of another. How much it is to cost in the 
future in the actual capture of Vicksburg we shall 
see. But he has succeeded. Yet not wholly. 
McClernand still commands a corps. Encouraged 
by his success in wresting from McClernand the 
command of the river expedition, Grant determines 
to go further and strip McClernand of military au- 
thority completely. He adopts much the same trick 
that Halleck had played upon him (Grant) at Pitts- 
burg Landing. He issued order No. 13, by which 
he charges the 13th corps (McClernand's) with the 
duty of garrisoning the west bank of the Missis- 
sippi. The effect of this would have been to scat- 
ter the corps among the multitude of posts along 



ON TO VICKSBURG. 121 

the river established to guard navigation, and leave 
him without a command, that is, to shelve him. 
But Grant mistook his man. His subordinate was 
not of the same stuff as Halleck' s subordinate. 
McClernand was not a fool, nor was he destitute of 
manhood. McClernand replied promptly: " It is 
quite obvious that the whole or a large part of the 
13th army corps must be absorbed by these garri- 
sons if the purpose is to afford complete protection 
to all lawful vessels navigating the river; and thus, 
while having projected the Mississippi river expedi- 
tion, and having been by a series of orders assigned 
to the command of it, I may be entirely withdrawn 
from it." Again Grant had met his match and 
been balked. He became more bitter. But he 
bided his time. He had the ear of Halleck and the 
sympathy of Halleck. He had politics with him. 
He was destined to succeed. 



MAKING RIVERS. 



Grant took command in person of the troops on 
the Mississippi designed for the capture of Vicks- 
burg January 17, 1863. The entire armed force in 
his department was not less than 130,000. Be- 
tween him and Sherman the relations were intimate. 
They spent much time together discussing the happy 
hits and the mistakes of the immediate past, the in- 
cidents and duties of the current hour and the pros- 
pects and plans of the future. In fact, most of the 
general officers spent frequent evenings at Grant's 
headquarters All military topics were discussed 
freely. It is not exaggeration to say that in all the 
campaigns a council of war was held every night. 
But Grant's relations with McClernand were chilly. 
Few men were better fitted for carrying on one side 
of a quarrel than Grant. Whatever mind he had 
was of the good kind. If he never said wise things 
he rarely said foolish things. And he knew how to 
hold his tongue. Though this faculty does not con- 
stitute greatness, it is sometimes an important factor 
in usefulness. McClernand had been a successful 
lawyer and diligent student and knew himself to be 
(122) ' 



MAKING RIVERS. 123 

superior in intellect to Grant. He saw, too, that if 
Grant had ever, as an academy boy, understood the 
military art, he had forgotten it. Still further, he 
reflected that he had all of Grant's military experi- 
ence and more, that he had been in all the battles 
that Grant had been in and Arkansas Post besides, 
and that at Donelson and Shiloh his participation 
had been much greater than Grant's. Superior to 
Grant in intellect, in learning and in experience, 
though willing to yield a soldier's obedience, he 
was not prepared to flatter and would not submit 
quietly to wrong. 



THIRD ATTEMPT ON VICKSBURG. 

About five miles before reaching Vicksburg the 
Mississippi turns abruptly to the east, and after 
pursuing the course of a horseshoe comes back to a 
point only a mile from the first turn. In other 
words, the corks of the horseshoe are about a mile 
apart, and Vicksburg is near the toe. In 1862 Gen. 
Thomas Williams conceived the novel idea of digging 
a new bed for the river straight from one cork to 
the other. But the plan was abandoned. As soon 
as Grant took command he instantly ordered Mc- 
Clernand to resume the work. But by and by it 
became apparent that even if he succeeded in 
making a new bed for the river and then in getting 
the water to flow in it, the Confederates, though 



124 GRANT AS A SOLDIER. 

unable to transfer their town, might transfer their 
batteries. That is exactly what they did. They 
planted powerful batteries on the cliff overlooking 
the outlet of the proposed new channel and thus 
controlled it. For dreary weeks Federal troops 
were toiling in mud and water and malaria in making 
a river. Camp dysentery, diarrhea, measles, small- 
pox and other diseases prevailed. Thousands died. 
What was the result? March 8 the river broke the 
upper dam of the new channel and the flood swept 
madly down and over the surrounding country. 
The camps of the soldiers were flooded. Horses and 
mules were drowned, tents, tools, baggage, guns, 
provisions, everything wa s swept away by the rush- 
ing torrent. The disaster was immense. But what 
was worse, it was found that even if the channel 
were fully completed it would be ineffectual to divert 
the water from the old bed, and so the latter part of 
March the scheme was abandoned. 

Grant's Third Attempt upon Vicksburg was a 
Failure. 

FOURTH ATTEMPT. 

The Yazoo, a navigable stream, is formed by the 
confluence of the Tallahatchie and Yallabusha, and 
flowing in a southerly direction, empties into the 
Mississippi about five miles north of Vicksburg. If 
Grant could pass with his fleet from the Mississippi 
into the Tallahatchie and Yazoo, he could trans- 



MAKING RIVERS. 125 

port his army down the Yazoo, take Haines' Bluft' 
in the rear and sweep down upon Vicksburg by the 
M. C. R. R., the route he had previously abandoned. 
Between the Mississippi and the Yazoo are several 
navigable rivers and bayous, the Sunflower, Cold 
Water, Deer Creek, Steele's Bayou, etc. Many of 
these connect with one another, forming a network 
of bodies of water, in some places easily navigable, 
in other places obstructed by willows, cypress and 
other aquatic growths. Yazoo Pass, nearly a hun- 
dred feet wide, connects the Mississippi with Moon 
Lake, which in turn is connected by a like pass with 
Cold Water River, a tributary of the Tallahatchie. 
If boats could reach the Tallahatchie, it was sup- 
posed that they could pass down the Yazoo. Some 
years before the war the State of Mississippi, in 
order to rescue millions of acres of uncommonly fer- 
tile land from annual and destructive inundation, had 
constructed a broad levee across the mouth of Yazoo 
Pass. The first necessity was to destroy this levee. 
The engineers mined it. February 2d the mine 
was fired. At once two gunboats with twenty-five 
transports and about 5,000 troops pushed for Moon 
Lake and the Yazoo River. But Pemberton had 
not been asleep. The Confederates felled big trees 
into the pass and while the Federals were engaged 
in sawing up and removing the trees, Confederates 
plied their rifles. At last, however, March 2d, the 
flotilla reached the open stream of Cold Water. 



126 GRANT AS A SOLDIER. 

Grant was elated. He issued orders which contem- 
plated the immediate removal to the Tallahatchie of 
a considerable portion of his army, showing that he 
himself still regarded his original route by the M. 
C. R. R. as the proper one. He directed Quimby's 
command, one division of Hurlbut's corps and 
McPherson's entire corps to follow the expedition. 
But his rejoicing and his orders were premature. 
Only two or three miles below the junction of the 
Tallahatchie and Yallabusha, forming the Yazoo, is 
situated the little town of Greenwood, which on 
account of a horseshoe bend in the Yazoo, stands 
on a peninsula that at its narrowest point is less 
than five hundred* yards wide. At that point the 
Confederates had erected a fort called Fort Pem- 
berton. A rise in the river, timely for the Confed- 
erates, had overflowed this peninsula to such an 
extent as to leave the fort on an island. As a con- 
sequence the Federal infantry were quite valueless. 
The gunboats attacked March 11th, but were worsted 
badly. The Federal commander found the expedi- 
tion to be hopeless. He abandoned it. Grant coun- 
termanded his orders. 

Grant's Fourth Attempt was a Failure. 



FIFTH ATTEMPT. 

Grant organized a fleet composed of his most 
strongly built boats, and on March 14th, himself 



MAKING RIVERS. 127 

accompanying for some miles, it started through 
the network of navigable bodies of water lying 
near the mouth of the Yazoo. Porter was in com- 
mand of the fleet, and Grant sent Sherman to 
follow by land and support it. Porter's route was 
to ascend Steele's Bayou into Black Bayou, Black 
Bayou into Deer Creek, Deer Creek into Rolling 
Fork, Rolling Fork into Sunflower River, Sun- 
flower River into Yazoo. Grant is still making 
for his original M. C. R. R. route. The abandon- 
ment of that route to baffle McClernand — how 
tremendously it cost the country ! The passage 
was difficult to the last degree. Sometimes, 
with twenty-four hours of incessant toil, the fleet 
would sain but three or four miles. At last, on the 
19th, Porter found himself within half a mile of 
Rolling Fork, in which he would have comparatively 
good navigation. But next morning, while his men 
were pulling up aquatic trees that crowded the bed 
of Deer Creek, he was suddenly fired upon by a 
battery. The enemy was there in force and in des- 
perate mood. Some were felling trees into the 
creek in front to prevent advance ; some in felling 
trees in rear to block retreat. Though the face of 
the country is flat, the banks of the streams are so 
hio-h that the gunboat cannon could not, at so close 
a range, shoot above them. Meanwhile the enemy's 
cannon was pouring in a plunging fire. Porter saw 
destruction staring him in the face. He instantly 



128 GRANT AS A SOLDIER. 

ordered a retreat. The narrowness of the creek 
forbade his boats to turn around, and he had to 
retreat stern foremost. The woods abounded with 
Confederate sharpshooters who, secreted in th e 
bushes, picked off any Federal who exposed him- 
self an instant. In the course of the day Porter 
found that the enemy had sunk across the creek an 
old coal barge which obstructed his way entirely 
and made retreat impossible. Porter saw at once 
the grim necessity. A rhetorician would here grow 
eloquent and talk about flashes of genius. A plain 
man would only say that Porter showed himself a 
man of sense and of promptness. He was on the 
point of ordering an abandonment of his fleet, with 
the purpose to attempt to cut his way back by land, 
when fresh shots in the woods in his rear arrested 
his attention. It was Sherman. Sherman had been 
apprised of Porter's peril and had pushed forward, 
sometimes up to the waist in swamps, and reached 
the spot just in the nick of time. The expedition 
was abandoned. 

Grant's Fifth Attempt on Vicksburg was a Fail- 
ure. 

SIXTH ATTEMPT. 

Within a mile or two west of the Mississippi fat- 
north of Vicksburg lies a body of water called Lake 
Providence. Grant determined to make a river 
by which the Mississippi would run into that 



MAKING RIVERS. 129 

lake, which, if a succession of rivers should be 
made, would run into Bayou Baxter, which would 
run into Bayou Macon, which would run in- 
to Macon river, which would run into Tensas 
river, which would run into Washita river, which 
would run into Red river, which would run into the 
Mississippi river. The distance of the route from 
the point on the Mississippi nearest to Lake Provi- 
dence around by innumerable and intricate tortuo- 
sities to the mouth of the Red river, can only be 
vaguely conjectured, but would probably be six 
hundred to a thousand miles. The network of 
bayous is of varying width and depth and chiefly 
connected with one another by miles on miles of 
swamps filled with aquatic trees and millions of fallen 
trees. January 30th, Grant ordered McPherson to 
destroy the Mississippi levee at Lake Providence, 
and clear out the route. It would be tedious and 
probably uninteresting to detail the toil, the cost, 
the murmuring, the sickness, the death which these 
successive enterprises cost. The project was aban- 
doned. 

Infectious diseases prevailed and committed hor- 
rible ravages. The Mississippi levees were the 
only lands above water and they were filled with 
dead soldiers. The medical department seems to 
have become hopeless, disgusted, and worthless. 
Discontent and recklessness were universal. Grant, 
it is true, asserted to Halleck that the morale of the 

9 



130 GRANT AS A SOLDIER. 

army was good. He either knew better, or else he 
didn't. It is possible that he didn't know better. 
It was in grief and alarm at the state of affairs that 
Murat Halsteacl wrote to Mr. Secretary Chase the 
following letter : — 

" Cincinnati, Feb. 19, 1863. 

" My Dear Sir: I wrote you a somewhat fan- 
tastic letter the other day. But that I suppose is 
not now strange. I write you this morning to send 
}rou a copy of a private letter I have from our army 
in front of Vicksburg. It is from a close observer 
who endeavors to tell the truth : < There never was 
a more thoroughly disgusted, disheartened, demor- 
alized army than this is, and all because it is under 
such men as Grant and Sherman. Disease is deci- 
mating its ranks, and while hundreds of poor fel- 
lows are dying of small-pox and every other 
conceivable malady, the medical department is 
afflicted with delirium tremens. In Memphis 
small-pox patients are made to walk through the 
streets from camps to hospitals while drunken doc- 
tors ride from bar-rooms in government ambu- 
lances. * * * How is it that Grant, who was 
behind at Fort Henry, drunk at Donelson, surprised 
and whipped at Shiloh and driven back from Ox- 
ford, Miss., is still in command? ' 

" Governor Chase, these things are true. Our 
noble army of the Mississippi is being wasted by 



MAKING RIVERS. 



131 



the foolish, drunken, stupid Grant. He can't or- 
ganize or control or fight an army. I have no per- 
sonal feeling about it; but I know he is an ass. 
There is not among the whole list of retired Major 
Generals a man who is not Grant's superior. Mc- 
Clellan, Fremont, McDowell, Burnside, Franklin, 
even Pope or Sumner would be an improvement 
upon the present commander of the army of the 
Mississippi. * * * What is wanted : 1. A 
general for the army of the Mississippi. 

" M. Halstead." 

The worst feature of the demoralization was that 
the army had the same opinion of Grant that Hal- 
stead and his correspondent had. Among the sol- 
diers the remark was that "if you hit Rawlins on 
the head you'll knock Grant's brains out." Things 
<rrew worse daily. Drunkenness increased. Reck- 
lessness increased. Foolish plans were adopted and 
abandoned to be followed by foolisher plans. About 
the last of March McPherson was ordered to aban- 
don the Lake Providence folly. 

Grant's Sixth Attempt on Vicksburg was a Fail- 
ure. - 



MARCH TO VICKSBURG. 



April 4th, 1863, Grant wrote to Halleck, setting 
forth still a new plan. "There is a system of 
bayous running from Milliken's Bend, also from near 
the river at this point (Young's Point), that are 
navigable for large and small steamers, passing 
around by Richmond to New Carthage (a town on 
the west bank of the Mississippi). There is also a 
good wagon road from Milliken's Bend to New Car- 
thage. The dredges are now engaged in cutting a 
canal from here into these bayous. I am having all 
the empty coal boats and other barges prepared for 
carrying troops and artillery, and have written to 
Col. Allen for some more, and also for six tugs to 
tow them. With these it would be easy to carry 
supplies to New Carthage and any point south of 
that. My expectation is for some of the naval fleet 
to run the batteries of Vicksburg whilst the army 
marches through this new route. Once there, I will 
move to Warrenton or Grand Gulf, probably the 
latter." Orders had been issued a few days before 
for the concentration of all the forces at Milliken's 
Bend. In the march to New Carthage, McClernand 
(132) 



MARCH TO VICKSBURG. 133 

was assigned to take the advance, the post of peril, 
the post requiring mind, courage and military skill, 
requiring, in fact, high capacity for independent 
command. McPherson's corps was to follow at some 
interval of time and afterward Sherman. The 
road lay on the west side of Roundaway Bayou and 
from having been long submerged, was very bad. 
McClernand set out March 29th. April 6th, with 
one division and its artillery, he occupied New Car- 
thage. On account of a break in the levee and a con- 
sequent overflow of the surrounding country, this 
division, for some miles just before reaching New 
Carthage, had to be transported in skiffs, collected 
from neighboring bayous. Even by this route 2,000 
feet of bridge had to be built. McClernand saw 
that the transportation for some miles of as large an 
army as Grant's in skiffs would be interminable, 
to say nothing of artillery and trains. Besides, 
in a few days the water might be too low even for 
skiffs, yet too much for land transportation. He 
showed his fitness to command the advance. He 
was for the time in independent command, march- 
ing on a route unexplored, encountering obstacles 
unforeseen and unprecedented and braving perils 
unknown. He promptly made exploration and 
found a road leading down to an accessible landing 
at Perkins', about twelve miles below, to which 
point he transferred his corps. 

But if Grant's army was to land on the east bank 



134 GRANT AS A SOLDIER. 

of the Mississippi it must have means of crossing. 
On the night of April 16, nearly three weeks after 
McClernand had been started from Milliken's Bend, 
Admiral Porter, with seven iron-clads, three steam- 
boats and ten barges, appeared in front of Vicks- 
burg. For two hours and forty minutes the fleet 
was under tire from the batteries extendi ng from 
Vicksburg down to Warrenton. If in running this 
long gauntlet of batteries they had failed, what 
would have been McClernand's condition? The 
Henry Clay was burned. The rest of the fleet 
reached New Carthage, damaged but capable of 
speedy repair. Grant desired to attack Grand Gulf. 
But the boats that had passed Vicksburg were the 
only conveyance, and they were quite inadequate. 
There were so few, as compared with the size of the. 
army, and the distance from Perkins' to Grand Gulf 
by the tortuous course of the river was so great, 
that it would be madness to attempt to cross the 
army. The Confederates would want nothing better 
than to have a fleet load landed to be beaten and 
captured while the fleet was returning for another 
load. Accordingly, April 29, Grant moved McCler- 
nand by the west side of Lake Joseph down to Hard 
Times, twenty-two miles further south. 

One is embarrassed to discover why Grant did 
not find it proper to accompany McClernand in his 
march from Milliken's Bend. Nothing of the 
slightest importance required his presence there. 



MARCH TO VICKSBURG. 135 

Sherman, his favorite, was there. To him he could 
and did confide the management of affairs there — 
which, in truth, as Grant then thought, consisted only 
in following McClernand. As McClernand was 
marching into a terra incognita, possibly full of peril 
and containing obstacles against which, because un- 
known, no instructions could be given, and as 
McClernand's failure would determine the failure of 
the enterprise, it would seem that here was a time, 
if ever there was a time, when the general should have 
led his army. But Grant always showed diffidence in 
himself as a field commander. At any rate, if Mc- 
Clernand is sent alone and achieves success Grant 
will take care, not as a generous but as a just su- 
perior, that McClernand shall have the applause due 
to success. 

The river bottom on the east side of the river was 
overflowed, and it was no easy thing to find a land- 
ing. But it was still less easy to find a landing from 
which there was a road not submerged to the up- 
land. Grand Gulf was such a place. On the 12th 
Grant wrote to McClernand : " It is my desire that 
you get possession of Grand Gulf at the earliest 
practical moment." On the 13th, at Perkins' : 
" It is not desirable that you should move in any 
direction from Grand Gulf, but remain under the 
protection of the gunboats. The present plan, if 
not changed by the movements of the enemy, will 
be to hold Grand Gulf." As McClernand was many 



136 GRANT AS A SOLDIER. 

a mile from Grand Gulf the meaning of either of the 
above sentences is not obvious. On the 18th Grant, 
being now with McClernand for three or four days, 
wrote to him : "I would still repeat former instruc- 
tions, that possession be got of Grand Gulf at the 
earliest possible moment." Again: "I will be 
over here in a few days again, and hope it will be 
my good fortune to find you in possession of Grand 
Gulf." It is noticeable that, whether absent or 
even on the ground, Grant makes no order, but con- 
fines himself to expressions of wish. Now three 
questions : First, considering the great distance by 
the windings of the river from McClernand at Per- 
kins' Landing to Grand Gulf and the smallness of 
the fleet, would Grant have advised an attempt to 
cross the army, fleet-load by fleet-load, into the 
presence of an enemy of unknown strength? Sec- 
ondly, as some of these dispatches were written 
when Grant was actually on the ground at Perkins' 
Landing, why did he not give a distinct military 
order instead of indulging in mere expressions of 
desire? Thirdly, is it possible that by withholding 
a positive order, but . worrying McClernand with 
repetitions of a wish, it was Grant's purpose either 
to lay the ground for subsequent complaint for dis- 
obedience, or at least inefficiency, or else to lead 
McClernand, whom he had placed in advance, into 
some disaster by which he would be disgraced? 
Hard Times is almost opposite Grand Gulf. 



MARCH TO VICKSBURG. 137 

Grant directed that Grand Gulf be attacked by the 
gunboat fleet. The attack was begun in the morn- 
ing and continued till afternoon. It was repulsed. 
What then shall be said of Grant's repeated sug- 
gestion (but without an order) to attack Grand 
Gulf? Only this, that McClernand did not choose, 
unless under an order, to attack and be beaten, 
while Grant attacked and gave the enemy a victory. 
With whom, then, is the superior skill as a com- 
mander? Here is a place where that question can 
be asked and where it should be answered. Grant's 
eulogists assert by implication that when McCler- 
nand was first advised to attack, Grand Gulf was not 
defended. The implied assertion is false. When 
Grant gave the enemy the victory of Grand Gulf, 
it had been occupied one month. 

The night after the attack and repulse at Grand 
Gulf, the fleet ran the battery. The army was then 
marched still further south on the west bank to 
the De Shroons. Grant had learned that at a plan- 
tation called Bruinsburg, on the east bank, there 
was not only. a good landing but also a road leading 
to Port Gibson, on the upland, twelve miles distant. 
De Shroon and Bruinsburg were so near each other 
that the crossing was quick work. Immediately 
after crossing McClernand started for Port Gibson. 
Two miles before reaching that place he met a force 
of the enemy, under Gen. John S. Bowen, posted 
in a position unusually advantageous. This 



138 GRANT AS A SOLDIER. 

was on the night of April 30th, or rather after mid- 
night. Bowen's command had been the garrison of 
Grand Gulf and he saw that if Grant got into the 
rear of that place its evacuation became a neces- 
sity. At daylight on the morning of May 1st, 
McClernand delivered battle. It was fierce. About 
10 a. m., Grant reached the field and assumed 
command. Bo wen was largely inferior numeri- 
cally, and he was beaten. He ought not to 
have fought the battle at all. At the close of the 
battle, a common friend of Grant and McClernand 
went to Grant and represented that from the time 
McClernand left Milliken's Bend he had been acquit- 
ting himself handsomely, to Grant's credit, and that 
now would be a good hour for a reconciliation. 
Grant declined. He is now safe below Vicksburg 
and established on the east bank of the river. How 
much of this success he owes to McClernand is 
nothing to the purpose. To have the rest of his 
army follow McClernand is a trilling job. Vicks- 
burg is now within his grasp. He will soon be in 
high feather. Then he will easily find an occasion, 
or else make one, to destroy the civilian general. 
He declined. 

For long months Grant, with Halleck's sympathy 
and aid, had been trying to destroy McClernand 
whom they both hated. Grant omitted no oppor- 
tunity to cast a slur upon him. He took good care 
to charge no specific act, even an act indicating 



MARCH TO VICKSBURG. 139 

ignorance or weakness merely, but he indulged in 
vague statements and disparaging opinions. About 
his own headquarters he easily caused McClernand 
to be spoken of disparagingly, for the commander 
of an army holds despotic authority, and his satel- 
lites will reflect brightly whatever hue of light their 
central luminarv sheds. Having thus manufactured 
a headquarters public opinion he could report it to 
Washington without fear of being contradicted. 
Not much different was it that the wolf in the fable 
muddied the water of the branch and then killed 
the lamb drinking below because the water was 
muddy. Maj. Gen. Frank P. Blair, then a friend 
and supporter of Grant, as well as an able com- 
mander, yet a friend also of fair play, learned, not 
confidentially but from open and habitual talk at 
Grant's headquarters, at Young's Point, that 
McClernand' s fate was fixed. As a man of honor 
he thought it due to a fellow-soldier to put him on 
his guard, and accordingly took the pains to go up 
to Milliken's Bend, but failed to see McClernand. 
As early as January 20th Grant wrote to Halleck: 
" I regard it as my duty to state that there was not 
sufficient confidence felt in Gen. McClernand as a 
commander either by the army or navy (the wolf 
fable) to insure him success." All West Pointers 
would have supported this statement. February 1st 
Grant wrote to Halleck: "If Gen. Sherman had 
been left in command here, such is my confidence 



140 GRANT AS A SOLDIER. 

in him, that I would not have thought my presence 
necessary ! But whether I do injustice to Gen. 
McClernand or not I have not confidence in his abil- 
ity as a soldier to conduct an expedition of the mag- 
nitude of this successfully." All of which means 
that he had confidence in Sherman who had just lost 
a battle, and by a horrible blunder, and has no con- 
fidence in McClernand who hud just gained a battle, 
and that Grant is determined to command the river 
expedition. 

Two remarks are here pertinent. First, if such 
was Grant's opinion of McClernand, then in placing 
him in command of the advance and in independent 
command in the march to the south of Vicksburg, 
the whole enterprise depending absolutely on his 
success, Grant deliberately sacrificed public inter- 
ests. Second, if in assigning McClernand to that 
duty, Grant was faithful to public interests, then 
the above statements of his opinion were false. 

Grant had made First, Second, Third, Fourth, 
Fifth, Sixth successive attempts on Vicksburg, fol- 
lowed by First, Second, Third, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth 
successive failures. This was too much. The peo- 
ple of the North did not at all understand the full 
extent of Grant's mismanagement, as they do not 
now. But they murmured. Sickness was in the 
army. The mortality was frightful. At last Grant 
began to see that without speedy success he would 
not longer be tolerated. He had succeeded at least 



MARCH TO VICKSBURG. 



141 



in one thing, — he had robbed MeClernand of the 
command of the river expedition. He seems to 
have resolved that if he fell, the civilian should 
also fall. To be himself prostrated and the civilian 
afterward triumph, was a humiliation he would not 
endure. He plans this expedition and puts MeCler- 
nand in advance. If MeClernand succeeds he him- 
self will get the honor, will withhold credit from 
MeClernand, and can afterward ruin him. If, 
however, MeClernand fails, the failure will be 
McClernand's and MeClernand will be ruined. The 
project he conceived was conceived in desperation. 
It was a project hazardous to the last degree, un- 
military and was opposed stoutly by his corps 
commanders, even by his favorite, Sherman. It 
was a project that must meet with difficulties that 
could not be foreseen, and hence could not be pro- 
vided against, a project that, in order to succeed, 
must have an uninterrupted run of luck, a project 
depending on amazing weakness in the adversary, 
a project in which with moderate sagacity and en- 
terprise in the adversary, the Federal advance 
would almost infallibly be annihilated. Even Ba- 
deau admits "only the most complete and speedy 
victory could insure him against annihilation." It 
was a project in which he was unwilling to risk in 
advance his favorite Sherman or his own person, but 
in which he placed his enemy, MeClernand. Such 
a project no intelligent general will ever adopt except 



142 GRANT AS A SOLDIER. 

in desperation. The destruction of a corps may 
not have given him much concern. At no period 
of his career did he regard human life. His gener- 
alship was Falstaffian. " Tut, tut, good enough to 
toss; food for powder, food for powder; they'll 
fill a pit as well as better; tush, man, mortal men, 
mortal men." 

Let us consider the new plan. He orders his ad- 
vance to cut loose practically from the base of sup- 
plies and march into a region incapable, on account 
of overflow, of subsisting an army for a day, with 
his flank exposed to the enemy, the means of trans- 
porting the army from the west to the east bank 
totally problematical, with a probability of the fleet 
being destroyed while running batteries from VHcks- 
burg to Warrenton. It cannot be doubted that 
even Grant saw the desperateness of the move. 
But he saw too that it was that or nothing. 

11 This push 
Will chair me ever or disseat me now." 

With a refinement of malice he put McClernand in 
advance. Am I challenged to produce evidence that 
the assignment was unfriendly? I accept the 
challenge. Grant for months had been, then was, 
and till he finally drove McClernand from the army, 
continued to be, unfriendly to McClernand. He 
poisoned his own headquarters and Halleck against 
McClernand. He robbed McClernand of the com- 



MARCH TO VICKSBURG. 143 

mand of the expedition, even at the cost of abandon- 
ing his own M. C. R. R. expedition and of institut- 
ing Sherman's expedition. He tried to break up 
McClernand corps. After McClernand's brilliant 
and daring march in reaching Hard Times and 
making Grant's desperate undertaking successful, 
Grant, with a rankness and vulgarity of ingrati- 
tude never, I venture to assert, surpassed and 
rarely paralleled in military history, refused him 
one syllable of credit. After the victory at Port 
Gibson, when he was asked to be reconciled 
to McClernand, he flatly refused. Could the 
assignment have been friendly? Grant had stu- 
diously, at his own headquarters and at Halleck's 
headquarters, disparaged McClernand's military 
skill ;yet with Sherman and McPherson at his elbow 
and himself refusing to accompany, he assigns Mc- 
Clernand to the post of unknown difficulty and danger, 
a post requiring the highest military skill ? Finding 
that McClernand's luck and skill succeeded, Grant, 
resolved not to be cheated out of his prey, seizes 
upon a petty breach of propriety, scarcely deserv- 
ing more than a laughing reprimand, but converting 
even that into the basis of a false charge and drives 
him from the military profession. Is not all this 
evidence of unfriendliness? If it is not, there is an 
end of inquiry into the motives of human conduct. 
Merely to march down afterward as McPherson 
and Sherman did, was nothing. But to lead an army 



144 GRANT AS A SOLDIER. 

day after day into the enemy's country, encountering 
unknown difficulties, beset by unknown perils, to 
meet miles of field and forest overflowed and to be 
obliged to sweep the ponds and bayous for skiffs to 
transport an army, to find it impracticable to reach 
the point and to assume the responsibility of pro- 
ceeding a dozen miles below, to build bridging by 
the mile, to be ignorant in starting out each morn- 
ing whether the enemy in superior force might not 
strike his flank or fall in on his rear, and by hem- 
ming him in among bayous and swamps, de- 
stroy him, to reflect that a petty force on his rear 
could force starvation or surrender, to know that 
every step was a step in the dark, and that his com- 
mander was seeking his ruin, — to discharge such a 
duty was no light thing. " Such is my confidence 
in Gen. Sherman," that surely he and only he 
would have been thought able for this high trust. 
But Sherman remains quietly in camp. "I have 
not confidence in his (McClernand's) ability as a 
soldier " to let him lie in camp, and therefore he 
places him in command of the advance. Grant him- 
self sits at his desk and smokes his cigar. 

At this point another question is pertinent. Let us 
us for the moment forget low rank in the Academy 
class, and hence failure during school-boy life to com- 
prehend any study, some years passed as a company 
officer, some years in farming, some years in collecting 
rents, and some years in selling leather, awls and 



MARCH TO VICKSBURG. 145 

shoemaker's wax; let us suppose good scholarship 
and distinct recollection of all that was taught in 
the school to the schoolboys, the question is, of 
what avail could that possibly have been to the 
commander of the advance corps on this march 
through an expanse of overflowed country? What 
can West Point at its best do in such an enterprise? 
Reverting to Grant's temerity in adopting this 
flank mode of attack on Vicksburg, I can recall no 
march in military history equal to it in folly. The 
nearest approach is in Bliicher's march in eastern 
France in 1814. After Napoleon's defeat at La 
Rothiere, his prospects were gloomy. Bliicher and 
Schwartzenberg confronted him with overwhelming 
force. The Congress of the allies, then sitting at 
Chatillon, were rising in their demands. Napoleon 
had become despondent and had written to M. 
Caulaincourt, his agent at the Congress, authorizing 
him to sign a peace on any terms, in other words, 
o-ivino- him a carte blanche. Even such was Napo- 
leon's condition. As to mere intellect Bliicher 
was one of the weakest men that ever com- 
manded a large army. But at Katzbach, owing to 
a torrent of rain and flooding of creeks, he had 
destroyed McDonald and was in repute. He con- 
ceived the foolhardy purpose of pushing straight for 
Paris. Napoleon lay between him and Paris and a 
full day's march south of his route. Hence he 
would expose his flank to Napoleon exactly as Grant 
10 



146 GRANT AS A SOLDIER. 

exposed his to Pemberton. Blucher's strategy was 
contemptible ; but what did Blucher know of strat- 
egy? For convenience of march he separated his 
army as Grant did. Blucher was in the enemy's 
country as Grant was. Napoleon was among his own 
people as Pemberton was. Hence Napoleon was 
informed immediately of the enemy's movement, as 
doubtless, Pemberton was of Grant's. Napoleon 
took heart. He knew — he did not conjecture, he 
knew what would come of Blucher's stolid stupidity 
and ignorance of strategy. 

"I am on the eve," he wrote, " of beatino- 
Blucher. He is advancing on the road to Mont- 
mirail. I am about to set off . I will beat him to- 
morrow. I will beat him the day after to-morrow." 
Such was the absoluteness of Napoleon's confidence 
in the triumph of mind over ignorance and stupidity 
that he immediately directed his secretary to write 
another dispatch to M. Caulaincourt setting forth 
that he was about to destroy Blucher, and to with- 
draw the carte blanche. On taking the dispatch to 
sign it he added in his own handwriting: " Sio-n 
nothing; sign nothing." (iVe signez rien; ne 
signez rien.) Next day, February 10th, at Cham- 
paubert, he struck one of Blucher's corps under 
Olsouvieff and crushed it. On the 11th he struck 
Sacken's corps at Montmirail and crushed it. On 
the 12th he struck and drove back D'Yorck. On 
the 14th he beat Blucher himself unmercifully. In 



MARCH TO VICKSBURG. 147 

all these engagements he killed and captured 28,000 
men out of Bliicher's 60,000, and a few days after- 
ward Parisian hearts were gladdened by the speetar 
cle of 18,000 prisoners of war promenading on the 
boulevard. 

How does Bliicher's march differ from Grant's? 
It will be kept in mind that though all river bottoms 
in the region where Grant was operating were sub- 
ject to overflow, yet at irregular intervals these bot- 
toms are cut by transverse ridges, above high water, 
running back from the river to the hills. Sherman 
found such a ridge at Chickasaw Bayou. There is 
one at Congo Island, one at Grand Gulf, one at 
Bruinsburg. Pemberton had hundreds of men in 
his command who knew the road over which Mc- 
Clernand marched and every foot of land between 
that road and the river, and hence could guide troops 
from some point on the river to that road. The 
Vicksburg and Shreveport Railroad would of itself 
have sufficed to enable Pemberton to strike Mc- 
Clernand's flank or fall in on his rear and destroy 
him more effectually than Napoleon destroyed Olsou- 
vieff. There is not a military mind in Christendom 
that does not condemn Bliicher's march as un- 
militarv, as showing a disgraceful ignorance of 
strategy. Grant's success in flanking Vicksburg 
was due to interrupted luck and to the amazing 
weakness of his adversary, neither of which a 
capable general will rely upon. 



148 GRANT AS A SOLDIER. 

In one respect Grant's march was more unwise, 
infinitely more unwise, than Blucher's. Bliicher's 
march was in open country. If attacked and beaten 
there was room in all directions for retreat. 
Though Napoleon beat in every engagement he did 
not capture one army bodily. With McClernand 
the case was different. If even a petty force with 
even a petty supply of artillery had fallen in on his 
rear his numerical superiority, having a line of 
battle only across the width of the road, would not 
have availed. Besides, there would have been but 
one line of retreat, namely, further south; that is, 
further from supplies, further into an overflowed 
and destitute region, further toward starvation. 

Grant's strategy stands unique in military history 
in not being able to endure the adversary's inter- 
ference without fatality. 

Having reference not to Grant's wisdom in order- 
ing the march, but to McClernand's merit in making 
it, what shall be said? Such a march, as a military 
act, is to be estimated, not so much by what, through 
an adversary's weakness, is actually done, but chiefly 
for its possible contingencies, for the hazards dared. 
I know of not one march in military history com- 
parable with it. Its possible contingencies were 
innumerable. Its possible hazard was destruction. 
These two sentences sum up the case. Sherman's 
vaunted march to the sea was nothing compared with 
this. Sherman knew the Confederacy to be at that 



MARCH TO VICKSBURG. 149 

time "a hollow shell." He moved with an over- 
whelming force. He moved in the open country. 
He moved in the midst of supplies. He moved, not 
the prey to all possibilities, but superior to all possi- 
bilities. No enemy threatened him. No enemy 
dared threaten him. A regiment of women armed 
with broomsticks could have made the march. Yet 
the march to the sea was celebrated in eloquence 
and song. It brought Sherman fame and promo- 
tion. Praise of Sherman was on every tongue. For 
a successful march, so much superior that they can- 
not be compared, who commended McClernand? 
Obviously it was the duty of Grant, not merely in 
generosity but in justice, not merely in justice but 
in decency, to begin the applause. McClernand's 
success redeemed Grant's hitherto unsuccessful 
campaign against Vicksburg, saved Grant from 
threatened disgrace, gave Grant fame. What did 
Grant say? Not one word. There was no congrat- 
ulatory order commending McClernand. There was 
no conoratulatorv letter written to McClernand and 
handed to the press. There was no report to the 
President nor to Halleck praising McClernand. 
Nay, after McClernand had by a victory planted 
himself firmly on the hills of Port Gibson and Grant 
is asked to speak to him his answer is, No. One is 
reminded of Jim Fisk's homely characterization of 
Grant years afterward. 

The job is done. McClernand has gone over the 



150 GRANT AS A SOLDIER. 

route and made it, and has got secure military pos- 
session of Port Gibson. It is easy for McPherson 
and Sherman to follow. To capture Vicksburg is 
now a thing of course. 

Gen. N. P. Banks was in command of the Federal 
forces at New Orleans. With a fleet under Farra- 
gut he could ascend the river as far as Port Hudson. 
But that place was strongly fortified and garrisoned. 
It had been the plan of both Grant and Halleck to 
unite, as soon as possible, the forces of Grant and 
Banks in an attack on Port Hudson. After its cap- 
ture it would be easy, with New Orleans as a base, to 
take Vicksburg. Grant had not only this distinct 
understanding with Halleck, but he even corre- 
sponded on the subject, through Halleck's head- 
quarters, with Banks himself. April 11th, Grant, 
at Milliken's Bend, says to Halleck: " Grand Gulf 
is the point at which I expect to strike and send an 
army corps to Port Hudson to co-operate with 
Banks." April 12th, from Milliken's Bend: "There 
is nothing in the way now of my throwing troops 
into Grand Gulf and destroying the works there, and 
then sending them on to Port Hudson to co-operate 
with Gen. Banks in the reduction of that place but 
the danger of overflowing the road from here to 
New Carthage." April 14th, from Milliken's Bend 
to Banks: " I am concentrating ray forces at Grand 
Gulf. Will send an army corps to Bayou Sara by 
the 25th to co-operate with you on Port Hudson," 



MARCH TO VICKSBURG. 151 

But a significant fact springs into view. Banks 
was older in commission than Grant, and hence if 
Port Hudson had been captured, and Halleck had 
ordered, as it was certain he would, a union of the 
two armies, Banks would command. This must not 
be. The order of Halleck and the promise to both 
Halleck and Banks, must go for naught. Yet a re- 
fusal to co-operate with Banks would be, as to Hal- 
leck, insubordination, and since his bout after 
Donelsou, he had been fulsome in his professions 
of subordination. There was but one mode of 
procedure and that mode he adopted. He cut loose 
from communication with Washington. 

Havino- got his army concentrated on the east 
bank at Port Gibson, his course was so obvious that 
there was hardly room for anything that deserves to 
be called generalship ; though it ought to be added 
that Grant managed well. The Confederate force 
guarding Vicksburg was divided into two parts, one 
part at Vicksburg and one at Jackson, forty miles 
east. To interpose and then fight them in detail 
was obviously the proper course. Grant struck 
north. Gen. Joseph E. Johnston, just up from a 
sick bed at Tullahoma, had telegraphed that he 
would reach Jackson on the 13th. To gain time 
till Johnston's arrival was important. Hours were 
valuable. Gen. Gregg, with a small force, posted 
himself strongly at Raymond and checked and de- 
layed McPherson's corps for several hours. This 



152 GRANT AS A SOLDIER. 

affair has been foolishly reported as a battle. But 
the delay proved sufficient. On Johnston's arrival 
at Jackson he found his forces utterly inadequate 
for resistance. Grant, with Sherman and McPher- 
son, appeared before Jackson on the morning of the 
14th. Johnston was wily. The question was 
whether he could save his little army and materiel. 
He accordingly made a big show of battle and pa- 
raded his artillery while all hands were busy in ship- 
ping troops and supplies northward to Canton. A 
friendly rain aided him in gaining hours. He out- 
witted Grant and saved his army. If Grant had 
been as sagacious as his adversary, he would have 
thrown cavalry to the east and north of Jackson 
and bagged Johnston. Grant started for Vicks- 
burg, leaving Sherman to destroy railroads, burn 
bridges, factories, etc., a work in which Sherman 
had ability. Johnston had sent to Pemberton an 
order to join him with his command at Canton. If 
the latter had obeyed promptly he would have saved 
his army. But Pemberton was not a man for inde- 
pendent command. May 16th he fought Grant at 
Champion's Hill, handling his army feebly and was 
badly beaten. The battle of Champion's Hill and 
Chattanooga were the only two battles in which 
Grant was fully the commander and in which he 
was victorious. Pemberton's men began to lose 
confidence in their leadership, and loss of confidence 
demoralizes. He retreated to the Big Black and 



MARCH TO VICKSBURG. 153 

there took up a strong position. On the morning 
of the 17th, McClernand, Grant's advance, came 
upon the enemy. After reconnoitering and obser- 
vation, McClernand ordered a charge on what 
seemed to be a weak point. The attack was success- 
ful and the enemy fled. Grant had no further 
trouble in reaching Vicksburg and investing it. He 
at once cleared the bank of the Yazoo of its Confed- 
erate troops and fortifications and opened a base of 
supplies at its mouth. Two small battles had been 
fought, Port Gibson and Champion's Hill. Mc- 
Clernand chiefly commanded at the former. Grant 
at the latter. 

Grant invested Vicksburg on the 19th and ordered 
an assault. He was repulsed. On the morning of 
the 22d he ordered an assault at exactly 10 a. in. 
along the whole line, for Grant never sought weak 
points to be massed upon nor attempted maneuvers. 
This assault, too. was repulsed. An hour or so 
afterwards, McClernand reported that he occupied 
the enemy's works at one or more points and de- 
sired re-enforcements and attack on other parts of 
the enemy's line as diversion. It turns out that 
McClernand was not mistaken. The successes, it 
is true, were not important ones, nor did McCler- 
nand claim that they were. They may easily be 
belittled by little minds. But they were successes 
and nowhere else had there been successes. Grant 
says : " I occupied a position from which I believed 



154 GRANT AS A SOLDIER. 

I could see as well as he what took place, and I did 
not see the success he reported." He ordered 
another assault which was unsuccessful. The pro- 
priety of a general commanding ordering a general 
assault, when he himself sees that the subordinate 
requesting it is mistaken as to facts, is open to 
doubt. It looks like an abdication of authority. 
But it is certain that in such case it is not a very 
brave act in the superior, the renewed assault 
being unsuccessful, to shift the responsibility to the 
inferior. Some days afterward McClernand issued 
a congratulatory order to his corps, recounting 
their successes and commending their valor. The 
issuance of such orders is common. Napoleon did 
it often. But they are especially suited to the 
American character, North and South. The genuine 
American loves to be told how great his virtues 
are and what great things he has done. He 
expects too the language of exaggeration. There 
are sorts of literature in which exaggeration is usual, 
and in some sense is proper. Who believes a eulogy 
or a tombstone? In such literature it is under- 
stood that the best is stated, that it is stated a little 
strongly and that everything not the best is sup- 
pressed. To say that such was the fact in the case 
of McClernand 's order is simply to say that it was 
a congratulatory order. It was designed, as such 
orders and proclamations in all ages have been de- 
signed, to encourage and reanimate the troops. 



MARCH TO VICKSBURG. 155 

Grant had issued such an order after Donelson and 
another after Shiloh. But it appears that during the 
preceding year an order had been issued prohibiting 
the publication by subordinates of " official letters 
and reports." There was propriety in this. A sub- 
ordinate might through inadvertence or the inspira- 
tion of mint juleps publish facts that would aid the 
enemy. Besides, Grant might also object to a pub- 
lication of facts respecting his own behavior, such as 
occurred at Donelson and at Shiloh. But it is 
sufficient to say that McClernand's paper, whether 
foolish or not and whether untrue or not, was 
neither an official letter nor a report. Consider, 
moreover, the character of the order alleged to have 
been violated. An order for a prescribed move- 
ment or act the subordinate is bound to remember 
at his peril. But such an order refers to the imme- 
diate future with definiteness, is connected with 
events now in progress and needs instant action 
taken or plans formed or modified for its observance. 
But an order merely referring to etiquette and not 
of frequent application, and of which the question 
of observance is one lying in the indefinite future, 
and hence taking no hold on the mind, may well be 
forgotten by the best officer. Especially may such 
an order be forgotten in the rush of so perilous a 
campaign as McClernand had known since the 29th 
of March. To forget a substantive military order 
is bad, but is sometimes excused ; to forget an order 



156 GRANT AS A SOLDIER. 

of mere military etiquette is venial. To make much 
of its violation shows littleness of mind, if not 
malignity. Such an order is less apt to be remem- 
bered by a chief justice than by a dancing master, 
by an able military commander than by a military 
fop. Sherman remembered the order and made 
haste to point it out to Grant, but failed to show, 
as it was impossible to show, that McClernand had 
violated it. He declared that the order contained 
" an untruth " "of monstrous falsehood." 

Grant caught at the opportunity. He had bided 
his time. The hour had at last come. His rival 
shall be destroyed. There had been no offense, for 
the document was an order, not an " official letter 
or report." But even the offense alleged, if it had 
been an offense, might well have been overlooked 
or dismissed with a pleasant reprimand. But malice 
will now do its work. Not a more disgraceful act 
of arbitrary power can be found in military history 
than that by which Grant drove McClernand, with- 
out a hearing, from the military service. 

Grant had abundance of good engineers in his 
army, and Vicksburg was speedily in a state of 
siege. He would have occupied the same spot the 
preceding December if, forgetting McClernand, he 
had not abandoned his M. C. R. R. expedition. 
The siege was continued till July 4th, when Pem- 
berton surrendered on terms. Grant agreed as the 
terms of surrender to release Pemberton's command 



MARCH TO VICKSBURG. 157 

on parole. This was a grievous mistake. Pember- 
ton's army had been starving. Grant, of course, 
knew this. Pemberton's application for terms was 
a confession. Grant was wrong, grossly wrong, in 
giving terms at Vicksburg. 



AFTER VICKSBURG. 



After the capture of Vicksburg Grant showed 
himself to the best advantage. In the north his 
praise was on every tongue. All other generals, 
except Meade, were held to have failed, and 
because Meade did not pursue Lee from Gettysburg 
he received but moderate applause. It was then 
doubtful, it is even now doubtful, whether Meade 
ought to have pursued. On the other hand, by a 
strange popular caprice, — popular caprice knows 
no law, — the people refused to censure Grant for 
paroling his prisoners at Vicksburg. If that was 
not a case for refusing terms, then there never was 
a case. He refused terms rightly at Donelson. 
Banks refused terms rightly at Port Hudson. 
Grant's act in paroling the Vicksburg army was_a 
flagrant violation of military duty. It is strange, 
too, that the man who paroled all these men should 
afterwards have forbidden the release, by exchange, 
of the Federal prisoners confined at Andersonville. 
He expressed the opinion that the paroling was " a 
great advantage to us at this juncture." Often, as 
in this instance, Grant displays effrontery in his 
(158) 



AFTER VICKSBURG. 159 

statements. We see it when he asserts that he 
started from Cairo (to Belmont) without a purpose, 
when he denies that at Shiloh he was surprised, 
and in numerous statements respecting his Virginia 
campaign. He seems either to be careless whether 
he is believed, or else to think that public folly will 
believe any statement, however absurd, merely be- 
cause he makes it. It is hardly possible that he 
can have expected to be thought sincere by any 
one of intelligence when he professed to believe 
the paroling of the prisoners at Vicksburg " would 
be a great advantage to us at this juncture." 

Grant was the most popular man in the nation. 
People from the North poured into Vicksburg, 
some to visit brothers or sons in the army and some 
to dig up from the levees the mouldering bones of 
brothers or sons in order to reinter them "in the 
churchyard there on the green hill-side." All wished 
to see Gen. Grant and to admire him. Grant dressed 
with his usual simplicity and behaved with his usual 
simplicity. He assumed no lordly airs. He was 
affable to the private soldier and to the private 
soldier's gray-haired father and mother. Though 
not gifted in conversation, his manner was so unaf- 
fected, simple and kind as to be winning. 

The American people, though in some respects 
the shrewdest, are in some respects the stu- 
pidest people on the face of the terraqueous 
globe. They worship success and they worship it 



160 GRANT AS A SOLDIER. 

with a devotion that is blind. In estimating success 
they lose all discrimination, intellectual and moral. 
He who is successful in getting wealth receives equal 
honor whether he gets it by the virtues of industry, 
economy and far-sighted and wise plans, by mere 
blundering or by wholesale theft. He who is suc- 
cessful in gaining official rank is honored even if a 
known charlatan. Though he is conceded to be a 
blockhead, for " pigmies are pigmies still, though 
perched on Alps," yet rank, however got, makes 
him great. Grant's career, except from Port Gib- 
son, had been an unbroken succession of blunders. 
Belmont, Fort Henry, Fort Donelson, Shiloh, Iuka, 
Corinth, the abandonment of the M. C. R R. expe- 
dition against Vicksburg, Sherman's expedition 
to Chickasaw Bayou, the Vicksburg channel, the 
Yazoo Pass expedition, the Steele's Bayou expedi- 
tion, the Lake Providence affair, all had been fail- 
ures and the last, though successful, was in fact the 
greatest blunder of them all. These failures had 
filled the Mississippi levees with thousand of dead 
soldiers. Yet all was at once forgotten. He had 
succeeded. To have condemned at that time his 
movement flanking Vicksburg, to have compared it 
with Blticher's march toward Paris, the stupidest mil- 
itary march known to history, and to have declared 
Blticher's the wiser of the two, would have been 
treasonable. Grant had succeeded. To the Amer- 
ican mind success sanctifies. 



AFTER VICKSBURG. 161 

The truth is, the North was eager for a military 
hero. A number of others had been tried and had 
been found, in Lincoln's phrase, " augurs that 
wouldn't bore." At the capture of Vicksburg the 
people of the North were intoxicated with joy. 
They were determined to worship. An idol they 
must have. There was none so fit as Grant, and 
Grant was made idol. As already stated, he be- 
haved with moderation and good sense. His nature 
was phlegmatic. His mind was slow. He was 
incapable alike of enthusiasm and of despond- 
ency. This was imputed to him as a proof of 
genius, that genius which dwells above the clouds 
in serene and stoical repose. Though not refined in 
thought, feeling or manner, his behavior on the 
whole was such as pleases the masses. His prudent 
silence was also a proof of genius, and here his habit 
of smoking was of advantage. For a certain order 
of intellect there is no reply to a troublesome 
remark so wise as a puff of smoke. His admirers 
even found proof of genius in his style of writing. 
Half the commission merchants in the United States 
are capable of writing in plain and even grammatical 
English what they will do and what they will not do, 
what they want and what they don't want. Yet for 
such writing no commission merchant expects a 
nation's applause. In Grant's case we are asked to 
admire such profound observations as follows : ( To a 
corps commander) " The movements of an enemy 
11 



162 GRANT AS A SOLDIER. 

necessarily determine counter movements." (To 
another corps commander) " Should you discover a 
change of plans on his (the enemy's) part, counter- 
act it." Why any major-general, in writing even 
to a second lieutenant, should consume a penful of 
marketable ink, and a half sheet of military paper 
to write such an instruction, it is not easy to under- 
stand. Every grogshop loafer understands that tac- 
tics, and practices it in every drunken row. But it is 
when he prepares a document with elaborate care, 
when he attempts eloquence, that he becomes in- 
teresting. After Fort Donelson he issued to his 
army a congratulatory order, which began thus : — 



[General Orders, No. 2.] 

" The general commanding takes pleasure in con- 
gratulating the troops of his command for the 
triumph over rebellion gained by their valor on the 
13th, 14th and 15th inst. 

" For four successive nights, without shelter during 
the most inclement weather known in this latitude, 
they faced the enemy in large force in a position 
chosen by himself. Though strongly fortified by 
nature, all the safeguards suggested by science were 
added. Without a murmur this was borne, pre- 
pared at all times to receive an attack, and with con- 
tinuous skirmishing by day, resulting ultimately in 
forcing the enemy to surrender without conditions." 

Will some school girl, as an exercise in syntax, 



AFTEK VICKSBURG. 



163 



parse the words " this," " prepared" and " result- 
ing " in the last sentence? 

After Shiloh he again essayed military eloquence 
in the following congratulatory order: — 

[General Orders, No. 34.] 

"The general commanding congratulates the troops 
who so gallantly maintained their position, repulsed 
and routed a numerically superior force of the ene- 
my composed of the flower of the Southern army, 
commanded by their ablest generals and fought by 
them with the desperation of despair. In numbers 
eno-acred no such contest ever took place on this 
continent. In importance of result, but few such 
have taken place in the history of the world. Whilst 
congratulating the brave and gallant soldiers, it be- 
comes the duty of the general commanding to make 
special notice of the brave wounded and of those 
killed upon the field. Whilst they leave friends and 
relations to mourn their loss, they have won a na- 
tion's gratitude and undying laurels not to be for- 
gotten by future generations who will enjoy the 
blessings of the best government the sun ever shone 
upon, preserved by their valor." 

Now, it is certain that a man may be a good gene- 
ral or good commission merchant, and not be a good 
writer. Nor for either vocation does he need to be 
a good writer. But when his friends parade him as 
a writer, he becomes a fair subject for criticism. 



164 GRANT AS A SOLDIER. 

As proof of his literary skill it is boastfully asserted 
that many of his sentences have become popular. 
Nowadays the press, provided it favors popular 
prejudice and passion, can do almost anything. In 
the spring of 1862 the people of the North, with the 
usual wisdom of the people, were impatient ; they 
were clamoring for McClellan to push on and capture 
Richmond. While such was the popular mood, 
Donelson was fought. Buckner asked terms and 
Grant answered : "I propose to move immediately 
upon your works." The fort was surrendered and 
the national joy knew no bounds. The sentence, in 
the first place, expressed a purpose of immediate 
advance. This delighted the people. Then it was 
followed by success and thereupon the people did 
not doubt that if McClellan would advance, he 
would as readily take Richmond and end the rebel- 
lion. No wonder the sentence became popular. 
To say the truth it is ordinarily good business Eng- 
lish, but even if it were improved by putting the 
word "immediately" at the end, it would be 
only such a sentence as is daily uttered by every 
man, woman and child of average education. 

Again, on the question of the best mode of 
approaching Richmond, the administration had con- 
stantly favored what was called the overland line 
of operations while McClellan had favored the James 
river line. As the administration, through Pope, 
Burnside and Hooker had met only disaster by its 
choice, it became more decidedly in favor of its 



AFTER VICKSBURG. 165 

choice. To prefer the other line would be to in- 
dorse McClellan and condemn the administration. 
Mr. Secretary Stanton was glad when he had in- 
duced Grant to adopt the overland line. At Spott- 
sylvania Court House Grant wrote a dispatch to 
Washington containing the words : "I purpose to 
fio-ht it out on this line if it takes all summer." 
This purpose suited Stanton exactly. He cut out 
the sentence and telegraphed it over the country. 
The anti-McClellan press instantly saw its value. 
It was made the text for editorials, the zeal of 
patriotism and the rage of partisanship combined to 
give it currency, and it became more familiar and 
more admired than any phrase in the Lord's prayer. 
Yet the sentence itself, both in thought and expres- 
sion, is the merest commonplace. It may be 
added that at Cold Harbor Lee persuaded Grant to 
abandon "this line" and adopt McClellan's. 
Grant's utterances arrested attention, not because 
of intrinsic excellence, but of factitious aid. They 
exhibited neither weight of thought, nor nobility of 
sentiment, nor beauty of imagery, nor felicity of 
diction. But it is not through the frenzy of patriot- 
ism and the anger of partisanship, it is not because 
a nation is in convulsion and statecraft and editorial 
acuteness ply their arts to stimulate popular rage 
that the great thoughts of great minds, the thoughts 
of Shakespeare, of Sterne, of Burke, of Rousseau, 
find lodgment in the popular heart and live forever. 



166 GRANT AS A SOLDIER. 

Of such thoughts no man asserts that they are com- 
monplace. 

Though Halleck had no kind word for McCler- 
nand's success, without which Grant could not have 
had success (McClernand had not been at West 
Point), he praised Grant. His compliment deserves 
to be repeated. He compared Grant's capture of 
Vicksburg with Napoleon's capture of Ulm. This 
comparison, if inserted in a book of humor, would 
be good. There are in fact many respects in which 
the two campaigns bear a striking resemblance ; 
as, that in both campaigns the infantry went on 
foot, in both the cavalry rode horses, in both, as a 
rule, every soldier had two legs. If such resem- 
blances justify the comparison, Halleck' s comparison 
is just. I have not time to disprove the comparison 
just as I have not time to disprove that arsenic is 
good diet, or that water runs up hill. It is 
sufficient to say that except in those respects in 
which every modern campaign resembles every 
other modern campaign, there is scarcely a point 
of resemblance between the two campaigns. But 
Halleck held high military position and had written 
a book, few men were versed in military history, 
nobody was interested in contradicting the ab- 
surd statement and it was concluded, nemine 
contradicente, that Grant was the military peer of 
Napoleon. 

Conspicuously Grant was a man of luck. The 



AFTER VICKSBURG. 167 

early part of his military career was such as would 
not admit of being made the subject of interviews. 
Why should he consent to be interviewed on Belmont, 
on Fort Henry, on Fort Donelson, on Shiioh, on 
Iuka, on Corinth? He saw that on all these sub- 
jects the less said the better. But when he had 
finally brought up in the rear of Vicksburg, and the 
North made him its idol, taciturnity stood him in 
good stead. People refused to remember that his 
silence was a policy of prudence and almost of 
necessity and insisted on thinking it the taciturnity 
of genius. He was called a sphinx. Having once 
found that silence brought him credit, he cultivated 
being non-committal. While at Washington, during: 
Johnson's administration, nobody knew what party 
he belonged to and it was seriously said that either 
party could safely nominate him for the Presidency. 
When asked a political question he answered by 
inquiring, " Have you seen Marshall Brown's 
pups?" Thad. Stevens said that when Grant 
was interrogated on politics " he begins to talk 
horse." Grant's deficiencies found concealment in 
silence. But at Vicksburg he made one departure 
from his rule of silence and it proved to be the best 
hit of his life. Everybody saw how great a part 
politics played in the war. Grant saw how Mc- 
Clellan had been treated and how McClernand had 
been treated. He saw that he had become suffi- 
ciently conspicuous to be regarded with political 



168 GRANT AS A SOLDIER. 

apprehension. Accordingly he caused himself to 
be interviewed to the extent of saying that when 
the rebellion was suppressed, his only ambition 
for office was to be mayor of Galena so that 
he could build a sidewalk to his house. When 
we reflect that he steered clear of both parties 
during Johnson's term till he saw that the South 
was bound in military chains and that a Republican 
victory was assured and then announced himself a 
Republican and that after two Presidential terms 
his friends " strove with all their strength" to give 
him a third term, we are able to appreciate his 
sincerity. But his declaration served a present 
purpose admirably. 

On the 19th and 20th of September, Rosecrans 
fought the battle of Chickamauga, and was beaten 
badly. Bragg drove him back into Chattanooga and 
there cooped him. The administration determined 
to reorganize military affairs. Lincoln, thinking it 
safe to advance a general who wished only to build 
a sidewalk to his house, created the military divi- 
sion of the Mississippi and Grant was made its com- 
mander. October 10th he started to Chattanooga 
and reached there the 23d. Fearing that before his 
arrival Rosecrans might commit some additional 
folly he telegraphed from Louisville an order reliev- 
ing Rosecrans and placing Gen. George H. Thomas 
in command of the department of the Cumberland. 



CHATTANOOGA. 



The town of Chattanooga, lying on a navigable 
stream, nestled among mountains, the railroad cen- 
ter of that region, was a strategic point of value to 
either army. It lies on the south side of the Ten- 
nessee river, which by a circuitous route flows 
through a tangled mass of mountains. To the 
northeast, east and southeast, running north and 
south, lies Missionary Ridge, four hundred feet high 
and three miles distant at the nearest point. To the 
south, at about the same or a greater distance, lies 
Lookout Mountain, descending by a steep declivity 
to the river and more than 2,000 feet high. 

"Though round its breast the rolling clouds are spread, 
Eternal sunshine settles on its head." 

Between Lookout and Missionary Ridge flows 
Chattanooga creek, and at the western base of 
Lookout is Lookout creek, whose valley separates 
that mountain from Raccoon Mountain. South 
Chickamauga creek, running in a westerly direc- 
tion, washes the northern end of Missionary Ridge 
and empties into the Tennessee. Some five or six 

(169) 



170 GRANT AS A SOLDIER. 

miles to the southwest of Chattanooga the Chatta- 
nooga and Nashville Railroad, crossing Raccoon 
Mountain from the west, enters the valley of Look- 
out creek at the town of Wauhatchie, about two 
miles from the Tennessee, ascends that valley to the 
Tennessee, and passing up hugs the river at the 
base of Lookout Mountain till it reaches the broken 
plain in which Chattanooga stands. From this 
topography it follows that Lookout Mountain com- 
mands Lookout Valley, the railroad and the Ten- 
nessee. At Chattanooga the river runs due west. 
But a quarter of a mile or so west it takes a turn 
southward for about three miles to the base of Look- 
out, then turns and runs due north about three 
miles, so as to form a horseshoe called Moccasin 
Point, because resembling in shape an Indian moc- 
casin. From a ferry at Chattanooga a road crosses 
Moccasin Point to another ferry called Brown's 
ferry at a point due west. From Brown's ferry 
there are two roads leading west to another ferry 
called Kelly's ferry. The more direct one crosses 
Raccoon Mountain through a gap. The other runs 
south from Brown's ferry and parallel with the river 
to the neighborhood of Wauhatchie and thence 
westerly to Kelly's ferry. Now, between this sec- 
ond road and the river, as far down as Lookout 
creek, is a range of high, steep, rugged hills, which 
command the road and ferry. On the north side of 
the river, or rather between the river and its parallel 



CHATTANOOGA. 171 

tributary, the Sequatchie, on the west side, there 
runs north and south a range of hills almost reach- 
ing the dignity of mountains, called Walden's Ridge, 
across which the wagon roads were horrible. 

Immediately after Chickamauga Rosecrans gath- 
ered his shattered forces into Chattanooga, huddled 
them close and immediately began to fortify. h\ 
the tumult of his mind he did an act of even greater 
than his usual folly — he abandoned Lookout Moun- 
tain. The consequence was that Bragg, occupying 
it, commanded both the railroad and the river, and 
Rosecrans was in a state of siege. Supplies could 
come by railroad and river only as far as Bridge- 
port, thirty miles west. To reach that town a 
wagon train, leaving Chattanooga, had to cross 
the river, 20 northwest across Walden Rid^e and 
the Sequatchie to Anderson, thence south through 
Jasper to Bridgeport. To supply a large army for 
any considerable time by such a route, at a season 
when roads are bad and are daily growing worse, is 
impossible. Rosecrans was besieged. Here again 
is room for a question. How could a boy of nine- 
teen learn in a recitation room to meet such an 
emergency? Yet why should not two years of ac- 
tual experience educate a man of strong and mature 
mind? Is it not clear that there is little in the 
art of war that can be taught in the recitation 
room, and that most of that little is the trivial and 
unessential part? 



172 GRANT AS A SOLDIER. 

Rosecrans saw his error when it was too late. 
But in his distress he had good advisers. Gen. 
George H. Thomas and Gen. W. F. Smith were 
there. An examination of the topography enabled 
these officers, as it enabled perhaps all the officers 
in that army, to see the obvious thing to be done — 
for when an army is threatened with starvation 
everybody begins to reflect and to devise and dis- 
cuss a mode of relief. Officers and privates were 
put on half rations. Provender, too, became scarce. 
Horses and mules became poor and weak, and died 
by thousands. There was one mode, one obvious 
mode, of relief. Everybody, of whatever rank, 
saw and agreed upon that mode. Rosecrans gave 
the appropriate orders. But Rosecrans was greater 
in talk than in action. As soon as he was relieved 
by Grant's dispatch from Louisville and Thomas 
was put in command, Thomas adopted the same 
plan and gave additional orders in its furtherance. 
The orders were in process of being carried out when 
Grant arrived. 

The army was in a bad condition. The nation 
was anxious. It was precisely the imminence of 
peril that brought quick relief. In its alarm to save 
the Army of the Cumberland from destruction the 
administration had sent on from the Army of the 
Potomac two corps under Hooker, estimated by 
Draper, in his History of the Civil War, at 23,000. 
The desideratum was to establish direct communica- 



CHATTANOOGA. 



173 



tion between Chattanooga and Bridgeport. Thomas 
had ordered Hooker to concentrate the army under 
his command at Bridgeport, so as to move thence 
by wagon road through Whiteside to Wauhatchie. 
Gen. John M. Palmer, who lay opposite Chatta- 
nooga, was at the same time ordered to move his 
command down to a point on the river opposite 
Whiteside, cross over and occupy the road as 
Hooker should get control of it. These movements 
would be in full view of the enemy, and would en- 
o-ao-e his attention. But another movement, a secret 
movement, was meanwhile in progress, which 
Thomas had placed completely in the hands of W. 
F. Smith. Grant on his arrival continued it in his 
hands. The range of steep, rugged hills, beginning 
at the mouth of Lookout creek and running north 
along the river bank to Brown's ferry, has been men- 
tioned. It was occupied by Confederates. Smith's 
job was to get control of the ferry and the two roads. 
Everything worked well. At 3 o'clock in the morn- 
ing of the 27th, in a dense fog, 1,800 Federal 
troops in sixty small boats floated in stillness down 
the river on the side opposite the enemy, landed at 
Brown's ferry, surprised the enemy's pickets, and 
seized and occupied the range of hills. Meanwhile 
4,000 men were ready at the ferry to throw across 
a pontoon bridge, and before noon strong positions 
were fortified, and at their lower extremity near 
Lookout creek, where the hills were precipitous, 



174 GRANT AS A SOLDIER. 

craggy and heavily timbered, were made well nigh 
impregnable. Smith's enterprise was completely 
successful. 

Hooker overbore all opposition and reached 
Wauhatchie and the month of Lookout creek where 
he encamped. A little after midnight, Longstreet 
attempting surprise, attacked Hooker. He failed 
utterly. The ferry roads were opened and the ques- 
tion of supplies was settled. 

Whose was the credit? As to the plan the credit 
was everybody's. It was so obvious that the whole 
army, for every man in the army was personally 
interested, saw it. Rosecrans gave orders in execu- 
tion of the plan. Thomas, on succeeding Rosecrans 
pushed it, Hooker and Palmer being on the march 
when Grant arrived, and leaving entirely to Smith 
the seizure of the ferry and the capture and fortifi- 
cation of the hills. Grant, on his arrival, approved. 
Relief would not have come an hour later if Grant 
had never seen Chattanooga. 

It was not now imperative that a battle be fought 
at Chattanooga. The Federal army was behind 
the fortifications, Lookout Valley was held by 
Hooker, and supplies were secure. But Burnside at 
Knoxville in East Tennessee was threatened. The 
enemy was massing against him. His peril was 
imminent. Every hour it was growing more immi- 
nent. He was in Grant's military division and could 
look to none but Grant for aid. Sherman was 



CHATTANOOGA. 175 

ordered to march with his own corps and as much 
of Harlbut's as could be spared; but he was to 
march not to Burnside, where there was urgent need, 
but to Grant where there was no urgent need. 
Grant always believed in strong battalions. If 
Rosecrans, at Chickamauga, could venture to deliver 
battle, surely with the addition of a corps and more 
under Sherman and two corps under Hooker, Grant 
might hope for success. Burnside needed aid and 
might be destroyed, but Grant saw a chance for the 
glory of a victory and he determined to fight 
a victorious battle at Chattanooga. If Burnsides' 
army was destroyed, it would ruin Burnside as a 
military commander ; but if Grant fought and won 
a battle at Chattanooga, he would get glory. He 
sends no aid to Burnside. He continues to aid 
Grant. Days pass. Sherman is nearing Chatta- 
nooga. Burnside's peril increases. Halleck tele- 
graphs his painful uneasiness. Lincoln is anxious. 
Grant is resolved on a Grant victory. After that he 
will aid Burnside. Foolishest of all things in this 
contest, Bragg, more incapable than Pemberton, but 
with a patriotism stronger than his selfishness, think- 
ing himself safe on his mountain slopes and moun- 
tain peaks, sends Longstreet's corps, more than 
15,000 strong, and Wheeler's cavalry of 5,000 — 
Wheeler's cavalry, which might have done efficient 
work against Hooker while crossing the Chattanooga 
Valley to Rossville during the battle of Chatta- 



176 GRANT AS A SOLDIER. 

nooga, to re-enforce against Burnside. Grant knows 
of the departure against Burnside of Longstreet and 
Wheeler. Still no aid goes to Burnside. Burnside's 
peril is increased, but the chance for a Grant vic- 
tory is also increased. Burnside is persistently neg- 
lected. It seems as if he will be lost. Grant's army 
is re-enforced by two additional armies, one under 
Hooker and one under Sherman. He sends Burn- 
side not one man. On the 23d, 24th and 25th, the 
battle of Chattanooga was fought, and of course 
Grant gained a victory, at a cost of between five 
and six thousand killed and wounded. Fortune 
smiled upon Burnside. He maintained his position. 
The second day after the closing of the battle of 
Chattanooga, Grant sent him re-enforcements, but 
when they reached him they were not needed. 

Bragg' s management was surprisingly unwise. 
While Grant was receiving heavy re-enforcements, 
Bragg was weakening his force. He might well 
have doubted that Grant would make a front attack 
upon him in his mountain stronghold ; but he had 
no right to doubt that Grant would attempt to flank 
him. But a flank movement is a maneuver and 
Grant was averse from maneuvering. To weaken 
his force instead of strengthening it, though Bragg's 
chief, was not his only error. He had continued to 
occupy Lookout Mountain. By the success of 
Hooker and Smith, that position became valueless. 
But, at any rate, he should either have abandoned it 



CHATTANOOGA. 177 

or else kept troops enough there to defend it. He 
did neither. On the first day of the battle, Hooker 
easily scaled the mountain and drove back the hand- 
ful of men and next morning pioceeded by theRoss- 
ville road to the rear of Brass's main arm v. The 

SO » 

Confederate troops on Missionary Ridge could see 
the stars and stripes waving on the mountain top. 
Here was defeat ; here was incipient demoraliza- 
tion. Again, though his position on the heights of 
Missionary Ridge was well nigh impregnable, yet 
for some reason that we cannot imagine, he de- 
scended into the plain. There, with equal advan- 
tage of position, Grant's overwhelming numbers 
drove him back to the heights. By the mere fact of 
being driven back, his troops were partially demor- 
alized and began to expect defeat. In enumerating 
Bragg's mistakes, Grant himself says, " third, in 
placing so much of a force on the plain in front of 
his impregnable position." 

Again, in the progress of the battle, Bragg, to 
relieve his extreme right, then hard pressed by 
Sherman's immense superiority, so weakened his 
center on the crest of the Ridge as to leave little 
more than a picket guard. When this feeble line, 
already disheartened, saw the host of Federal 
troops advancing upon them in high hope, they 
deemed the contest hopeless and fled from their 
positions in rout. The victory was won. 

12 



178 GRANT AS A SOLDIER. 



REFLECTIONS. 



1. Grant committed a grievous error in not send- 
ing swift aid to Burnside. The fact that Burnside 
actually escaped, does not affect the character of 
Grant's conduct. 

2. For the relief of the Chattanooga army the 
credit is hardly to be assigned. In some slight sense 
it belongs to Thomas, but in no sense to Grant. 

3. The battle of Chattanooga should not have 
been fought at all. It was constantly Grant's pur- 
pose to fight. But if Bragg had retained Longstreet 
and Wheeler and had displayed even moderate skill 
in placing and handling his troops, it is possible 
that, owing to his almost impregnable position, he 
might have repulsed Grant's three armies. 

Again, where the enemy occupies a position of 
great strength, which he can be compelled by flank- 
ing to abandon, it is the duty of the advancing gen- 
eral to flank. Sherman drove Johnston back from 
one strong position to another by successive flank- 
ings, which compelled successive retreats. The one 
exception was Kenesaw Mountain, and Kenesaw 
Mountain should not have been fought. To sacri- 
fice thousands of lives needlessly is monstrous gen- 
eralship. 

4. Even flanking was not necessary. On the 20th 
Bragg sent Grant this note: " As there may still 



CHATTANOOGA. 179 

be some non-combatants in Chattanooga, I deem it 
proper to notify you that prudence would dictate 
their early withdrawal." The trick was too manifest. 
As a general is not apt to notify his adversary in 
advance of his purpose to attack, Grant saw that 
the note was to be read backward and was designed 
to keep Grant engaged in preparing for attack while 
Bragg should withdraw. Two days afterward a de- 
serter from Brass: was brought to Grant. From 
his statement it seemed certain that Bragg was pre- 
paring to withdraw. Grant hastened a battle which 
he ought to have sought to avoid. 

The battle of Lookout Mountain, if it is to be 
called a battle at all, ought strictly to be regarded 
as a separate engagement. Grant ordered the 
attack as, from City Point, Va., he ordered Thomas 
to attack at Nashville. But with the management 
of the battle he had no personal concern. 



Grant was in higher repute than before. Why 
should he not be? Three questions, — for the peo- 
ple allowed no answers to the questions, — deter- 
mined his ability as a commander. First, had not 
Rosecrans' army been relieved from siege and 
threatened starvation within a few days after 
Grant's arrival? Second, had he not gained a vic- 
tory where Rosecrans had suffered defeat? Third, 



180 GRANT AS A SOLDIER. 

had not Burnside remained safe? Who, then, 
could doubt Grant's greatness? 

Soon after the battle of Chattanooga Grant 
removed his headquarters to Nashville. While 
there he wrote Halleck his opinion of the best plan 
of campaign for the army of the Potomac. The 
reader would not pardon me if I failed to set forth 
the letter in extenso. It well deserves immortality 
as a curiosity in military literature. The letter, if 
read in connection with an account of Grant's sub- 
sequent North Anna exploit in Virginia, will afford 
to the military mind more sport than Mark Twain's 
best : — 

" Nashville, Tenn., Jan. 19, 1864, 

"Maj.-Gen. H. W. Halleck, Washington, D. C: 
" I would respectfully suggest whether an aban- 
donment of all previously attempted lines to Rich- 
mond is not advisable and in lieu of these, one to be 
taken further south. I would surest Raleigh, N. 
C, as the objective point, and Suffolk as the start- 
ing point. Raleigh once secured, I would make 
Newbern the base of supplies until Wilmington is 
secured. A moving force of sixty thousand men 
would probably be required to start on such an ex- 
pedition. This force would not have to be increased 
unless Lee should withdraw from his present posi- 
tion. In that case the necessity for so large a force 
on the Potomac would not exist. A force moving 



CHATTANOOGA . 181 

from Suffolk would destroy, first, all the roads 
about Weldon or even as far north as Hicksford. 
From Weldon they would scarcely meet with seri- 
ous opposition. Once there, the most interior line 
of railway still left to the enemy — in fact, the only 
one they would then have — would be so threatened 
as to force him to use a large portion of his army in 
guarding it. This would virtually force an evacua- 
tion of Virginia and indirectly of East Tennessee. 
It would throw our armies into new fields where 
they could partially live upon the country, and 
reduce the stores of the enemy. It would cause 
thousands of North Carolina troops to desert and 
return to their homes. It would give us possession 
of many negroes who are now indirectly aiding the 
rebellion. It would draw the enemy from campaigns 
of their own choosing, and for which they are pre- 
pared, to new lines of operations never expected to 
become necessary. It would effectually blockade 
Wilmington, the post now of more value to the 
enemy than all the balance of their sea coast. It 
would enable operations so commence at once by 
removing the war to a more southern climate, in- 
stead of months of inactivity in winter quarters. 
Other advantages might be cited which will be 
likely to grow out of this plan, but these are 
enough. From your better opportunity of studying 
the country and the armies that would be involved 



182 GRANT AS A SOLDIER. 

in this plan, you will be better able to judge of the 
practicability of it than I possibly can. 

" I have written this in accordance with what I un- 
derstood to be an invitation from you to express my 
views about military operations and not to insist 
that any plan of mine should be carried out. What- 
ever course is agreed upon I shall always believe is 
at least intended for the best, and until fully tested 
will hope to have it prove so. 

"U. S. Grant, Maj. Gen." 

The capture of Richmond was desirable chiefly 
because of the moral effect that would spring from 
the fall of the Confederate capital. But the moral 
effect of the capture of Raleigh would have been 
nothing, and its strategic value was hardly greater 
than that of a country store at a cross-roads. Hence 
'* the abandonment of all previously attempted lines 
to Richmond," and the substitution of Raleigh as 
objective point has at least the merit of originality. 
Though Grant gives reasons as plenty as blackberries, 
yet a further argument in favor of his proposed substi- 
tution is that he could have occupied the new objec- 
tive point without opposition. Lee would have had 
no manner of objection to Grant's spending time 
and means in roving through North Carolina and 
lying idle in Raleigh as long as he pleased. Mean- 
while, the Federal army being out of the way, Lee 
might have made a pleasant foraging excursion into 
Pennsylvania and circumjacent regions. After all, 



CHATTANOOGA. 183 

this strategy was superior to the strategy of his 
march past Vicksburg and to Blticher's march past 
Napoleon. This strategy was safe; while the strategy 
of the two marches of Grant and Blueher exposed 
armies to destruction. 

The office of lieutenant-general was created, giv- 
ing its incumbent command of all the armies of the 
United States. Grant was appointed March 1, 
1864. 



AT THE HEAD. 



In 1808, while waging his war against Spain, 
Napoleon's affairs went badly. An army had been 
lost at Baylen. He saw toward the close of the 
year that he must increase his force against that 
country. But his ambitious eye saw also that there 
was a splendid opportunity to increase his own 
fame as a military commander. He accordingly 
ordered down into Spain eight additional corps 
d'armee and himself early in November established 
headquarters at Bayonne in southeastern France. 
Soon afterward, when all was ready and northern 
Spain was deluged with his legions, he took the field. 
He marched triumphantly to Madrid. Fools 
applauded. Napoleon was declared to be invinci- 
ble. Europe wondered as it compared the brilliant 
success of French armies when led by the genius of 
Napoleon with the previous disasters. It is only in 
late years that the world has come to understand that 
with the French forces in Spain prior to November, 
too feeble for the unexpected uprising and spirit that 
opposed them, Napoleon himself would have met 
defeat; while at the head of the immense host 
(184) 



AT THE HEAD. 185 

which he poured upon that hapless country, any one 
of five hundred officers in his command could have 
marched to victory. 

In the battle of Chattanooga, in which to the army 
under Rosecrans he added the army under Sherman 
and the army under Hooker and with these three 
armies he fought under the army Bragg reduced 
heavily, Grant had an advantage like that of Napo- 
leon in Spain. In the campaign of the Potomac he 
had that same advantage. He had, too, every other 
advantage that a military commander could have. 

No reason was lacking for his success in Vir- 
ginia. The south was getting exhausted. But 
especially it was getting tired. The first burst of 
southern patriotism had spent its force. The South 
had ceased to be gushing. War had lost its attrac- 
tiveness. It had acquired repulsiveness. Mourning 
was in every house. Industries languished. Pros- 
perity there was none. Luxury was a thing only 
remembered. In many a family once affluent the 
struggle was to keep the wolf from the door. 
Wherever the Federal arms had gone, rapine and the 
torch had gone. When the Southern man, alive like 
other men to his personal interests, lost a mule, a 
negro, or a smokehouse of bacon, he repined, and 
in Shylock's language said: " The curse ne'er 
fell upon our nation until now. I never felt it un- 
til now." When he found his cribs and granaries 
emptied or burned, his cattle driven away, and his 



186 GRANT AS A SOLDIER. 

house rifled or burned, he regretted war. Besides, 
the Southern people were a people of politicians and 
their public men had been their pride and glory. 
But their Congress had become filled with pigmies 
and in a sense contemptible and ceased to challenge 
admiration or even respect. Even Davis was 
charged with favoritism, with obstinacy, with unwis- 
dom. The war spirit of the South burned low. 

The North too had changed. The change was 
partly for the worse, but partly also for the bet- 
ter. The people had been educated for war. 
That was a big fact. There was no longer, as in 
McClellan's day, the insane cry of " On to Rich- 
mond." In McClellan's time the people did not al- 
low the general to command. In Grant's time they 
did. In McClellan's time the administration, obe- 
dient to popular clamor, perpetually restrained and 
interfered. In Grant's time it was otherwise. 

In McClellan's time, if Stanton, in his exalted 
wisdom and unpatriotic partisan selfishness, decided 
that McDowell's army, at a critical hour should be 
withheld from McClelian, it was withheld. In 
Grant's time the general could order forward as re- 
enforcements " all the infantry you can rake and 
scrape" " from the defenses of Washington and 
from Wallace's military department." In McClel- 
lan's time if the administration wished, against Mc- 
Clellan's desire, to divide the army into corps and 
select corps commanders from its own favorites and 



AT THE HEAD. 187 

without consulting McClellan, the administration 
did it, making selections so unfit that Hooker, not 
friendly to McClellan, said that it would have been 
impossible for McClellan to succeed with such corps 
commanders. In Grant's time, the commander 
ruled not only that army but all the armies with an 
absolute rule. In McClellan' s time the subordinate 
commanders were without experience, without the 
confidence of their troops, and to a large extent, 
without desert of confidence. In Grant's time there 
were Hancock and Warren and Meade and W. F. 
Smith and hundreds of officers of inferior rank who 
on the field had won the admiration of their troops 
by demonstrated skill and intrepidity. Not only 
by the law creating the office of lieutenant-gen- 
eral but by popular approval, Grant's power was 
despotic. He was invested with Napoleonic au- 
thority to remove in his caprice an officer of what- 
ever o-rade and to promote on the battlefield. 
Probably no military commander, unless uniting, 
like Frederick the Great, or Napoleon, military and 
civil supremacy, ever had military authority so ab- 
solute. 

When Grant assumed personal command of the 
Army of the Potomac on the north bank of the 
Rapidan, it embraced, including Burnside's corps, 
about one hundred and forty thousand men of all 
arms. He was confronted by Lee on the south 
bank with a force present for duty, according to the 



188 GRANT AS A SOLDIER. 

rolls, of fifty-two thousand six hundred and twenty- 
six men of all arms. Grant's army had been 
created by McClellan. It is no part of my duty to 
vindicated McClellan's military character. But it 
will not be denied that in capacity to organize, dis- 
cipline and appoint an army, his skill was good. 
Grant's army had campaigned and fought. Hooker, 
with his usual flatulency, had declared it to be " the 
finest army on the planet." It was commanded, as 
army commander, by Maj.-Gen. George G. 
Meade, undoubtedly skillful and accomplished, but 
nervous and irascible. It was divided into four 
corps. The 2d corps was commanded by Maj.- 
Gen. Winfielcl S. Hancock, born to command on the 
field of battle, of rare military ability and hence, 
like McClernand, selected for a duty of special 
peril or requiring capacity for independent com- 
mand. The 5th corps was commanded by Maj.- 
Gen. Gouverneur K. Warren, an engineer of 
superior skill, and as a military commander only 
inferior to Hancock. It was Warren, who in the 
last previous campaign, commanded at the battle of 
Bristoe Station and with adroitness and intrepidity 
gained a brilliant victory. The 6th corps was com- 
manded by Maj.-Gen. John Sedgwick, intelligent, 
faithful and capable. The 9th corps was under 
Maj.-Gen. Ambrose E. Burnside of whom it is kind 
to say nothing. Such was the army, perfect in 
organization, perfect in discipline, perfect in ap- 



AT THE HEAD. 189 

pointment, perfect in fervor of patriotism and in 
eagerness for action and for victory, that was now 
placed in Grant's hands. His former successes, 
whether due to accident, to the incompetency of 
adversaries, or to overwhelming numbers, or to all 
three together, had won him the confidence of the 
country and of the army. No general in the 
world's history ever had a better opportunity for 
great achievement. What were his achievements? 
In the matter of approaching the Confederate 
capital two lines of operation had been considered 
from the very beginning of the war. One was the 
James river line. It had been preferred and at- 
tempted by McClellan. The causes which led to its 
failure it is not my province to discuss. But the 
administration, and especially Secretary Stanton, 
strongly condemned McClellan, and hence con- 
demned all that he had done. It is certain that of 
the two lines the James river gave by odds the 
cheaper and readier access to Richmond. The 
overland line was obnoxious to three objections: 
First, it was much the longer; secondly, from the 
character of the country over which it passed, partly 
rugged and partly swampy, it abounded in strong 
positions for defense ; thirdly, it was intersected by 
many streams. Indeed it is now safe to say that 
the James river line was so manifestly and immeas- 
urably superior that no military man would now 
hesitate in adopting it. But as Stanton, in his 



190 GRANT AS A SOLDIER. 

hatred of McClellan, had driven the army to horri- 
ble slaughter and defeat under Pope, Burnside and 
Hooker, to have the James river line adopted, and 
its adoption followed by success, would involve not 
only a vindication of McClellan but, still worse, a 
condemnation of the administration. Stanton, 
though of good intellect, was a man of imperious 
temper and of such moral nature that he scrupled 
at nothing. He resolved upon the overland line at 
all hazards- There was one man who warmly con- 
curred in Stanton's preference. His name was 
Robert E. Lee. If Lee could not order, he could 
entice. He enticed as successfully if not as osten- 
tatiously as Stanton ordered. Pope, Burnside, 
Hooker and Meade, none of them with reputation 
sufficient to withstand Stanton, had attempted the 
overland route and failed. But Grant is invested 
with the legal authority of lieutenant-general and 
with moral authority that is boundless. Which line 
will he choose? 

With such vast numerical superiority over Lee, 
nearly three to one, Grant felt able for anything. 
The language he employed in dispatches to Butler 
to Meade and Sherman, show boundless confidence. 
In his Nashville letter he had impliedly condemned 
the overland line as also the other. But Stanton 
preferred the overland line and Grant preferred to 
please Stanton — for Grant was never careful of human 
life. To sacrifice eighty thousand men was not much ; 



AT THE HEAD. 191 

to please Stanton was much. Yet in fact he adopted 
both routes. This was one of his greatest blunders. 
In adopting the overland route his strategy would 
have been bad. In adopting both routes it was 
wretchedly bad. One consistent plan is better than 
two inconsistent ones. This is what he did. By 
written instructions he ordered Maj.-Gen. B. F. But- 
ler, in command of about forty thousand men, to fol- 
low the James river. He was first to occupy a 
peninsula formed by a sinuosity of the James river on 
the south side and there fortify. In a certain con- 
tingency he was to move to a point on the south of 
that river opposite toRichmond, Grant, at the head 
of the Meade army, investing Richmond at the same 
time on the north side. The contingency never arose. 
Butler moved to Burmuda Hundred as ordered, but 
was soon, as Grant said, " bottled up as with a 
cork," and effected nothing. His campaign was an 
utter failure. It was a failure not merely because of 
Butler's military incapacity, but because the plan 
was essentially bad. The failure was Grant's more 
than Butler's. Forty thousand men were as little 
available there as four thousand would have been. 
Thus, by blundering strategy, forty thousand were 
rendered valueless. Butler's command is to be con- 
sidered as the left wing of Grant's army in the 
advance upon Richmond. What service did it 
render? None. Then, in opening the Virginia 
campaign, Grant's strategy was bad in adopting 



192 GRANT AS A SOLDIER. 

the overland line, and it was bad in adopting both 
lines, by placing his left wing so remote from the 
main army as to be useless. Never did military 
leader commit two greater strategic bluuders in one 
campaign. They cost eighty thousand men. 

In his written instructions to Butler Grant says, 
" Kichmond to be your objective point." In his 
written instructions to Meade too, he indicated his 
purpose to advance to Kichmond. Yet he made a 
distinction. While he said to Butler, " Richmond to 
be your objective," to Meade, he said, " Lee's army 
will be your objective point." " Wherever he goes, 
there you will go." To Butler April, 18th, he said, 
" I shall aim to fight Lee between here and Kich- 
mond if he will standi To Sherman, April 4th, 
he declares his purpose to operate against " Lee's 
army wherever it may be found." It is certain that 
Grant's confidence was exuberant. " The lady doth 
protest too much, methinks." " O, but she'll keep 
her word." The reader now wonders whether he 
was ever able to find his " objective point," Lee's 
army, and whether he was ever able to induce Lee 
to ''stand." Can it be that Lee's army ceased to 
be Grant's " objective " and that Grant became Lee's 
objective? Can it be that instead of the question 
being whether Lee would " stand," Lee made race 
upon race against Grant, that Grant made noctur- 
nal escapes, but that Lee always did meet him? 

Grant established his headquarters with Meade's 



AT THE HEAD. 



193 



army March 26, 1864, and May 3d, he issued an 
order for the army to march at midnight and cross 
the Rapidan to the east of Lee's line in two columns, 
by Ely's ford and Germanna ford. On the night 
of the 4th more than one hundred thousand Federal 
troops were encamped south of the Rapidan in the 
Wilderness. Orders were then issued to march the 
next morning in a westerly or rather southwesterly 
direction, just in the rear of Lee to Gordonsville. 
Hancock was to march on the 5th to Shady Grove 
Church, a point about due west from Spottsylvania 
court, and distant some fifteen miles. His advance 
got within three miles of the church when it was 
halted. 

When, on the evening of the 4th, Grant found the 
body of his army safely encamped in the wilderness 
he was elated. To cross a river in presence of an 
enemy is sometimes impossible. He had appre- 
hended that Lee would resist his crossing and he 
concluded that he had surprised Lee. Seated on 
the opposite bank of the river, daily expecting a 
movement and watching eagerly, and having so 
vigilant and enterprising a cavalry commander as 
Gen. Jeb. Stuart, it would have been strange if Lee 
had been surprised. Yet speaking of the fact that 
he had crossed successfully, Grant says, " This I 
regarded as a great success, and it removed from my 
mind the most serious apprehension I had enter- 
tained, that of crossing the river in the face of an 
13 



194 GRANT AS A SOLDIER. 

active, large, well-appointed and ably commanded 
army." Why did not Lee, vigilant, wary and 
prompt, attempt to prevent the crossing? Surely not 
for lack of confidence, for his confidence was such that 
after the crossing he attacked Grant on even terms. 
Lee's motive in allowing Grant to cross it is not 
difficult to conjecture. Grant, in his Nashville letter, 
had impliedly condemned the overland line, as also 
the James river line. Lee knew that if a capable gen- 
eral he must condemn the former. Yet he was willing 
" to build a bridge of gold," to have him adopt it. 
He probably reasoned that Grant had in appearance 
yielded to Stanton's urgency, but that if resisted 
successfully in crossing, his purpose might be to 
assert the fact as a sufficient justification for adopt- 
ing the route favored by McClellan. This last is 
exactly what Lee desired by all means to prevent. 
If, however, Lee should allow him to cross, Grant 
would then, for very shame, be unwilling, even after 
defeat, to turn back. To do so would be to demor- 
alize his army and to ruin himself. In short, if 
Grant once crossed, Lee would be indifferent whether 
he turned back overwhelmed by defeat and humilia- 
tion, or through successive disasters and mortifica- 
tions, pushed on by that route toward Richmond. 
Lee was hence as eager as Grant to have the Fed- 
eral army crossed successfully and interference 
would have been bad generalship. 

Ewell commanded Lee's right or eastern wing 



AT THE HEAD. 195 

(his army facing northward) and Hill his left, Long- 
street lying a few miles to the southwest of Hill. 
Lee's headquarters were at Orange Court-house, 
about equi-distant between E well's right and Hill's 
left. From Orange Court-house there run two 
roads to Fredericksburg, one a turnpike two 
or three miles south of the Rapidan at the point 
where Grant crossed, and the other a plank road, 
chiefly parallel with the pike and two or three miles 
south. Another road, the Catharpin road, runs 
south of the plank road and in a southwesterly di- 
rection. Old Wilderness Tavern, near which Grant 
had his headquarters during the battle, was about 
three miles a little west of south from Ely's ford on 
the pike. On the night of the 4th EwelPs com- 
mand bivouacked about three miles from the tav- 
ern. By the middle of the forenoon of the 5th, 
Warren, marching by the plank road, had reached 
Parker's store, nearly three miles from the tavern 
as the crow flies, but by road perhaps six, when he 
was struck by Ewell. At first Grant thought it a 
mere skirmishing force of the enemy. He soon, 
however, found his mistake, and forwarded to Han- 
cock, who marched on the Catharpin road, an order 
to halt. Two hours afterward Hancock was 
directed to return and push for Parker's store. 
Burnside, who had not crossed on the 4th was or- 
dered forward. Warren was assailed fiercely, but 
resisted subbornly. That afternoon the battle was 



196 GRANT AS A SOLDIER. 

hot. A part of Sedgwick's corps and a part of 
Hancock's corps were engaged, The conflict was 
ended by darkness. Three thousand of Warren's 
men were stretched on the field. 

That night Grant crave orders for a general en- 
gagement, to begin at five o'clock next morning. 
He has found his "objective." He has found that 
Lee will " stand." Sedgwick was placed on the 
extreme right, north of the pike. Warren adjoined 
Sedgwick's left, his right occupying and reaching 
a little north of the pike. Burnside was ordered to 
take position on Warren's left, his own left to reach 
down nearly to the plank road. Hancock was to 
join Burnside and hold the extreme left of the line 
of battle, crossing the plank road and reaching nearly 
two miles below. Grant knew that Longstreet had 
been -cantoned near Gordonsville and hence antici- 
pated from that enterprising and daring leader a 
blow upon his left flank which was perhaps four 
miles distant from his own headquarters. He there- 
fore took the precaution to place his most skillful 
corps commander on that flank. Again, it seemed 
not unlikely that the two roads would be most heavily 
assailed. Hence, he placed Hancock on the plank 
road and Warren on the pike. Grant had notified 
Hancock that Burnside would connect with his 
right and Hancock made his dispositions accordingly. 
All were ordered to open battle at 5 in the morn- 
ing. But Lee was quicker and opened fire before 



AT THE HEAD. 197 

5. Hancock's troops advanced handsomely and 
during some hours drove the enemy before them 
for more than a mile. After about two hours of 
terrific fighting, hearing no sound of battle from 
beyond his right, he sent word of the fact to Meade 
and asked that Burnside be directed to attack as his 
right was getting fatigued and shattered. But re- 
peated orders to that officer from headquarters 
failed to bring him forward. He behaved under 
Grant exactly as he had behaved under McClellan 
at Antietam. About 11 o'clock firing in Hancock's 
front slackened, but at that hour Burnside' s corps 
had not been engaged. Grant sent an aid-de-camp 
to conduct Burnside to the field. (One whole divis- 
ion of Burnside' s corps had been ordered to the rear 
to guard trains and was not again heard of in battle 
for weeks.) About 2 p. m. Brig. -Gen. Kobert B. 
Potter, of Burnside' s corps, attacked the enemy with 
some advantage. About 5 :30 p. m. Brig. -Gen. 
Orlando B. Willcox, of Burnside's corps, attacked 
and was at first successful, but was soon repulsed in 
disorder. 

Lee's plan had been to mass his forces on Grant's 
left (Hancock), and drive him back to the Eapidan. 
To that end Longstreet was directed to strike Han- 
cock's flank. On account of Burnside's failure to 
appear until afternoon instead of 5 a. m., Hancock's 
command, though successful in driving Lee back, 
had a terribly severe time of it. About noon Long- 



198 GRANT AS A SOLDIER. 

street struck his left flank and rear and with effect. 
Hancock was driven back until he had lost all the 
ground he had previously gained. To make things 
worse, during the afternoon a tire broke out in the 
woods in his front which caught in and burned a 
part of his improvised log breastworks and gave the 
enemy some advantage. A multitude of the 
wounded, who lay in the woods perished, either suf- 
focated by smoke or consumed by flames. Long- 
street massed heavily against Hancock's flank. His 
onset was made in great force and with impetuosity 
and for a time he brushed away opposition. Han- 
cock's left fell back in utter disorder. Longstreet 
had also taken the precaution to send a body of 
troops by a detour to occupy the Brock road, a 
road running north and south and some distance 
in Hancock's rear. No troops will stand with an 
enemy in front and rear. If this maneuver had 
been carried on a little longer, it is impossible to 
conjecture what disaster would have befallen Grant's 
army. By a maneuver exactly similar, Stonewall 
Jackson struck Hooker's right flank at Chancellors- 
ville, not three miles distant, and inflicted a terrible 
defeat. Longstreet's success had been complete and 
he was sanguine. But, luckily for Grant, while 
riding with his staff at his front, Longstreet came 
also in front of a part of his flanking force. The 
view through the thick woods was so indistinct that, 
exactly as in Stonewall Jackson's case, the flanking 



AT THE HEAD. 199 

force mistook Longstreet' s party for Federals and 
fired upon them. Longstreet was severely wounded. 
This accident checked the movement. Lee took per- 
sonal command, but it was nearly an hour before he 
could get the movement fully in hand so as to renew 
the assault with safety. Meanwhile Hancock had 
rallied his troops and the opportunity was gone. 
But for Longstreet' s disabling wound the disorder 
in Hancock's line might have spread and Grant 
shared the fate of Hooker. Lee had employed 
mind and maneuvered. Grant always showed a 
strange aversion from maneuvering. Swinton re- 
lates that one day before crossing the Rapidau, 
Meade, in conversation with Grant, said something 
about maneuvering and Grant instantly interrupted 
with the remark, " I never maneuver," — an asser- 
tion he could easily have proved. 

Lee's plan, as above stated, was, by massing on 
Grant's left and pushing Longstreet upon his flank 
(Lee was fertile in maneuvers), to drive Grant 
back upon the Rapidan. Hence he had no need for 
aggressive action by his own left. He accordingly, 
on the 5th, had ordered his left to intrench, using 
artillery in the few places where artillery could be 
used and selecting his defensive line with that view. 
At 5 a. m. Sedgwick and Warren opened fire, but 
were repulsed. There was little more fighting done 
by either of these corps until evening, when Lee 
made another maneuver. He ordered Early to 



200 GRANT AS A SOLDIER. 

attack Sedgwick's right flank. The attack was suc- 
cessful. Sedgwick's right was driven back or 
rather was rolled up, thrown into disorder and a 
large number of prisoners taken, including two 
brigadiers. Darkness put an end to the attack. 
Thus ended the fighting of the 6th, for the slight 
cavalry conflicts were merely incidental. Grant's 
loss during the two days in killed, wounded and 
missing was about 15,000. 

The morning of the 7th the armies stood facing 
each other. Neither attacked. But the " objec- 
tive " is at hand. Lee "stands." The coolness 
with which Grant in his report, notes the fact, is 
amusing. "From this it was evident to my mind 
that the two days' fighting had satisfied him (Lee) 
of his inability to further maintain the contest in 
the open field, notwithstanding his advantage of 
position." It is to be regretted that Gen. Grant 
did not proceed to show in what respect Lee had an 
advantage of position or how, on that peculiar battle 
ground, either general could possibly have an advan- 
tage of position. Again, to a plain man, it would 
seem that instead of being " satisfied of his inability 
to further maintain the contest in the open field," 
his attitude, grim and defiant, showed the opposite. 
And such, as soon as darkness came on, was Grant's 
practical interpretation. 

Whose was the victory? Technically, it was Lee's. 
The first decisive fact is that immediately after the 



AT THE HEAD. 201 

battle, Grant withdrew from the battlefield, turned 
his back upon the enemy and left Lee in possession. 
The second fact is that instead of resuming his march 
to the west by the pike and plank road and the Ca- 
tharpine road he abandoned that route and the plan of 
reaching Gordonsville, leaving Lee in armed occu- 
pancy of those roads, and under cover of night took a 
route east of south. The total change in his plan of 
campaign must have been humiliating. Grant must 
have been in the mood of Sir Andrew Aguecheek, 
"Plague on't, an I thought he had been valiant and so 
cunning in fence, I'd have seen him damned ere I'd 
have challenged him. Let him let the matter slip 
and I'll give him my horse, gray Capulet." 

In the narrative in his Personal Memoirs of the 
battle of the Wilderness, Grant turns aside to make a 
personal assault upon Mr. William Swinton, author 
the History of the Army of the Potomac. That 
book gives an account of that army. Mr. 
Swinton 's work discovers a wide and accurate ac 
quaintance with the military art, an exact knowl- 
edge of the strategic and tactical movements of that 
army with the military significance and propriety of 
each movement, an intimate familiarity with mili- 
tary literature and superior acumen as a military 
critic, together with a clear, concise and, for the most 
part, scholarly style. Like Jomini, he was a stu- 
dent of the art of war and like Jomini he knew that 
actual observation on the march and in the field 



202 GRANT AS A SOLDIER. 

must be coupled with study of the books. Like 
Jomini, too, by his constant presence with the army 
and his constant study of the books, he became more 
capable in the military art than the generals of his 
day. His book is a masterly piece of military his- 
tory, probably second only to Napier's Peninsular 
War. With whatever campaign he deals he moves 
straightforward, exhaustive in essential facts, vera- 
cious in narrative and intelligent and just in criticism. 
It is thus that he deals with Grant's campaign in 
Virginia. Hinc illoe lachrymce. Grant's anger and 
personal assaults are explained. He steps aside from 
his military story to berate Swinton personally. He 
even states that at one time Burnside ordered Swin- 
ton to be shot, — for Burnside, as a military com- 
mander, merits this praise that with a chivalric gen- 
erosity toward a hostile army on the battlefield he 
united, when armed with military power, a heroic 
severity toward an individual foe. In this matter 
Grant made a mistake. He should have remembered 
that the public care not a straw for the personal 
character and conduct of Mr. Swinton, and if he had 
added that Swinton was a horse thief, a pirate and 
an ex-couvict the public, to save the trouble 
of a dispute, would "for the sake of the argu- 
ment," admit it. But the public may be pardoned 
for thinking that Gen. Grant, sparing personal 
abuse or not according to his taste, might profitably 
have taken pains to show that Swinton's statements 



AT THE HEAD. 203 

of fact are untrue, his criticisms unsound or his 
citations of military authorities inapposite. But 
since in personal controversy every man does the 
best he can, it must be concluded that Grant an- 
swered Swinton with personal abuse because he 
could make no better answer. 



REFLECTIONS. 

1. In this battle Lee was the attacking party. 
Hence it is nothing to the purpose to say in vindi- 
cation of Grant that the battlefield, covered with a 
dense growth of stunted pines and shubbery, was 
favorable for defense. The fact is against Grant. 
The two chief features of the engagement were 
Longstreet's attack on Grant's left and Early's at- 
tack on his right, both offensive. With nearly three 
to one Grant in defensive action was beaten. 

2. Nor is it true to say that the Confederates 
knew the battle ground and the Federals did not. 
That same Federal army under Hooker had crossed 
the Rapidan by the same fords to be beaten at Chan- 
cellorsville. It had again gone through the Wilder- 
ness under Meade in the movement against Mine 
Run, where his army passed into this identical re- 
gion. The truth is in a country so monotonous in 
its configuration and aspects and in which, as a rule, 
a man cannot see, in the season of foliage, five rods 



204 GRANT AS A SOLDIER. 

in any direction, there is no such thing as knowing 
the country. 

3. In the management of the battle Grant dis- 
played simply no mind. 

4. With his overwhelming superiority it was in his 
power to maneuver to destroy Lee. He should 
have placed sixty thousand men (to be entirely safe) 
behind improvised breastworks in front of Lee. 
Then with eighty thousand he could have wheeled 
upon Lee's right flank and rear and driven him into 
the Eapidan. There have been a few cases, but only a 
few, in the world's history in which with such super- 
iority there has been an outcome so discreditable. 

5. If, in this fight, Grant had only 52,626 
men, ? 



SPOTTSYLVANIA COURT HOUSE. 



Grant's purpose on crossing the Rapiclan was to 
proceed to Gordonsville, and cut Lee's communica- 
tion with Richmond. Hence he ordered the march 
of his army in direction nearly west, and Hancock's 
first halt was to be at Shady Grove Church, about 
due west of Spottsylvania Court House. He not 
only changed his plan in regard to Lee's army as his 
objective (for Lee, cut off from his supplies, would 
have been compelled to fight), but he also changed 
his plan to cut off Lee from his communications, as 
h^ would have done by taking position at Gordons- 
ville. Instead of marching nearly west he marched 
a little east of south. As steathily as possible, keep- 
ing Hancock in position till the last, he began at 
dark on the 7th a movement to Spottsylvania Court 
House, distant from his then left flank about fifteen 
miles. Aided by accident Lee was at that point be- 
fore Grant. The objective that Grant had professed 
to be seeking sought Grant. In his »« Personal 
Memoirs" (by whomsoever they were written, 
Grant adopted them), Grant says that Lee's posi- 
tion at the Wilderness was nearer than his to 

(205) 



20(5 GRANT AS A SOLDIER. 

Spottsylvania, that being the reason why Lee was 
able to intercept him. In this he was mistaken. 
Grant's left was two or three miles nearer than 
Lee's right by any route they could have taken. 
Though Grant's march to Spottsylvania met oppo- 
sition, he thought, as when Warren was struck in 
the Wilderness, that it was a mere skirmish, and 
accordingly prepared an order for an immediate 
march of the army to the North Anna river, a part 
to march by roads a mile or so west of Spottsyl- 
vania, a part by roads a mile or so east, and Burn- 
side, always allowed to keep out of danger, still 
further east. Lee made movements which induced 
Grant not to hasten. During the afternoon of the 
9th Lee fixed his lines, intrenched and placed artil- 
lery. There was no fighting on that day except that 
the sharpshooters kept busy. It was in the morn- 
ing ot the 9th, while standing near where entrench- 
ments were being constructed, that Gen. Sedgwick 
was struck by a sharpshooter's bullet and killed 
instantly. He was succeeded in command of the 
6th corps by Brig.-Gen. Horatio G. Wright. Gen. 
Andrew A. Humphreys, at that time chief of staff 
of the Army of the Potomac, and subsequently com- 
mander of the 2d army corps, says of the position 
of Spottsylvania Court House, that " it had no spe- 
cial military strength," that " roads radiated from 
it in all directions, including a good wagon road to 
Richmond," that " sufficiently good roads south- 



SPOTTSYLVANIA COUKT HOUSE. 207 

ward lay open to us on either side of us by which if 
we did not attack in front we could have moved to 
turn either flank." All the ground inclosed in 
Lee's lines and surrounding them was farms ordi- 
narily level, part wooded and part cultivated fields. 
Lee entrenched on the north, the east and the west 
of the Court House, his remotest points on the east 
and west lines being, perhaps, two miles apart. 

On the evening of the 9th Grant issued orders for 
an attack on the morning of the 10th. The 2d 
corps, Hancock, the 5th, Wright, and the 6th, 
Warren, were on the 10th hotly engaged. At that 
time Col. Emory Upton commanded the 2d brigade 
of the 1st division of Wright's corps. A little after 
6 p. m., with his own brigade, the 3d brigade, and 
the brigade of Gen. Thomas H. Neill, he stormed a 
part of the enemy's works. He succeeded in gain- 
ing it and held it till dark, when he withdrew, 
having lost 1,000 men in killed, wounded and miss- 
ing. On the morning of the 10th Bnrnside was 
ordered up. He reached a position near the enemy's 
works and intrenched, but did no fighting. The 
total Federal loss in killed, wounded and missing on 
the 10th was probably 5,000. On the evening of 
the 9th Hancock had been ordered to move against 
Lee's left. On the 10th, while this movement was 
in progress, the plan was changed, and it was de- 
termined to attack heavily on Lee's north line and 
Hancock was ordered to withdraw. Before the 



208 GRANT AS A SOLDIER. 

withdrawal was completed Lee pushed out and at- 
tacked. Hancock repulsed him, inflicting much 
loss. Meanwhile the woods in Hancock's rear, that 
is, immediately to the west, took fire and many 
wounded perished in the flames. At no point had 
there been success. There was no fighting on the 
11th. At 9:30 of the 10th Grant dispatched to 
Halleck as follows: ''Send to Belle Plain (a mgw 
base of supplies) all the infantry you can rake and 
scrape. With the present position of the armies 
10,000 men can be spared from the defenses of 
Washington, besides all the troops that have reached 
there since Burnside's departure. Some may also 
be brought from Wallace's department." 

At 3 p. m. of the 11th Grant sent Meade a dis- 
patch as follows : — 

" Move three divisions of the 2d corps by the rear 
of the 5th and 6th corps, under cover of night, so as 
to join the 9th (Burnside's) corps in a vigorous 
assault on the enemy at 4 a. m. to-morrow. ' I will 
send one or two staff officers over to-night to stay 
with Burnside and impress him with the importance 
of a prompt and vigorous attack. Warren and 
Wright should hold their corps as close to the enemy 
as possible, to take advantage of any diversion 
caused by this attack and to break in if opportunity 
presents itself. There is but little doubt in my 
mind that the assault last evening would have proved 
entirely successful if it had commenced an hour 



SPOTTSYLVANIA COURT HOUSE. 209 

earlier and had been heartily entered into by Mott's 
division and by the 9th (Burnside's) corps." To 
send " one or two staff officers over to-night to stay 
with " a corps commander is certainly a special com- 
pliment. The phrase, " impress him with the im- 
portance of a prompt and vigorous attack/' is an 
ingenious military euphemism. 

At no point on Lee's line had the Federal army 
gained success on the 10th. Not one inch of 
Lee's line was held by Grant an hour after dark- 
ness of that day of blood. Yet, on the 11th, at 
8:30 a. m., Grant dispatched to Halleck. « * * * 
The result up to this time is much in our favor. " 
Such is military veracity ! Observe, too, that here 
is no room for opinion. When, the day after a 
battle, a general extravagantly estimates the num- 
ber of the enemy's killed and wounded, or when, as 
in Grant's dispatch on the first day of Shiloh, he 
placed Johnston's force at 100,000, there is room 
for honest error in opinion. But in the case before 
us there was no room for opinion. Grant knew 
the facts exactly. He knew that he had sacrificed 
about 5,000 men, and had not gained one inch. 
Yet he deliberately asserts on paper, " The result 
up to this time is much in our favor. " Such is 
military veracity. 

Further on in the dispatch he says : "lam now 
sending back to Belle Plain for a fresh supply of 
provisions and ammunition, and purpose to fight it 
u 



210 GRANT AS A SOLDIER. 

out on this line if it takes all summer. The arrival 
of re-enforcements will be very encouraging to the 
men, and I hope they will be sent as fast as possi- 
ble and in as great numbers." Crossing the Rapidan 
with 140,000 against Lee's 52,000, Grant has 
marched fifteen miles and, two days in succession, 
calls frantically for re-enforcements. The demand, 
too, is not limited. " All you can rake and 
scrape." " I hope they will be sent as fast as possi- 
ble and in as great numbers." He who can get 
for the asking, can afford to be lavish. *< Tush, 
man, mortal men, mortal men. Will fill a pit 
as well as better." 

But the dispatch brought joy to Stanton's heart, 
for he interpreted one of its clauses as a condemna- 
tion of McClellan, and Stanton would willingly 
afford 20,000 men a week for that noble object. 
He accordingly cut out the sentence '.' I * * * 
purpose to fight it out on this line (the overland 
line) if it takes all summer." It was flashed over 
the United States, the administration papers took it 
up and it soon became a patriotic duty, a test of loy- 
alty, to regard it as unequaled in rhetorical excel- 
lence. Grant himself seems to have embraced 
that idea, for he takes pains to incorporate the dis- 
patch in his Personal Memoirs. 

There was no fighting on the 11th. Why? If 
Grant did not know that he was writing an untruth 
when he dispatched " the results are much in our 



SPOTTSYLVANIA COURT HOUSE. 211 

favor," why not push much into more? On the 
10th the attack had been made chiefly on Lee's left. 
Having failed, Grant on the 11th determined to at- 
tack his right, or rather his northern line. Han- 
cock was selected. To conceal the movement the 
corps was not moved till after dark. The night was 
rainy and the ground muddy. The march was dif- 
ficult. But Hancock executed his order and dis- 
posed his lines. On the 12th, at 4 : 35 a m., day 
just dawning, Hancock assaulted. He succeeded. 
The enemy in his front gave way. Hancock pur- 
sued. A half mile to the rear, there was another line 
of intrenchments. The enemy rallied. Then be- 
gan a conflict that was horrible. In front of Han- 
cock's right Lee's line of breastworks formed 
a salient angle in shape of a V, its apex point- 
ing northward. This salient angle came to be 
called the "bloody angle." It was vitally import- 
ant to Grant to capture, and to Lee to retain, this 
angle. Wright's corps on Hancock's right was 
pushed up to its west side. At 8 a. m. Warren on 
Wright's right and Burnsideon Hancock's left were 
ordered forward to make the greatest possible di- 
version in favor of Hancock and Wright. It was 
soon found that Warren was opposed by Long- 
street's full corp and could effect nothing and he was 
accordingly ordered to support Wright. Burnside 
had no substantial success. The fighting from Han- 
cock's left to Wright's right continued incessantly. 



212 GRANT AS A SOLDIER. 

At the bloody angle it was murderous. Never did 
war with all its horrors furnish a more awful exhi- 
bition of carnage. It was not battle; it was mas- 
sacre. Swinton, the historian, says: "The enemy's 
(Lee's), most savage sallies were directed to retake 
the famous salient which was now become an angle 
of death, and presented a spectacle ghastly and terri- 
ble. On the Confederate side of the works lay 
many corpses of those who had been bayoneted by 
Hancock's men when they first leaped the intrench- 
ments. To these were constantly added the bravest 
of those who, in the assaults to recapture the pos- 
ition, fell at the margin of the works till the ground 
was literally covered with piles of dead and the 
woods in front of the salient were one hideous 
Golgotha.'' In a foot-note the same author says : 
" I am aware that the language above used may re- 
semble exaggeration ; but I speak of that which I 
personally saw. In the vicious phraseology com- 
monly employed by those who undertake to describe 
military operations, and especially by those who never 
witnessed a battlefield, ' piles of dead,' figure much 
more frequently than they exist in the reality. The 
phrase is here no figure of speech, as can be attested 
by thousands who witnessed the ghastly scene. It 
may be stated that the musketry fire has had the 
effect to kill the whole forest within its range, and 
there is at Washinoton the trunk of a tree eighteen 
inches in diameter which was actually cut in two by 



SPOTTSYLVANIA COURT HOUSE. 213 

the bullets." Brig. -Gen. Lewis A. Grant, of the 
6th corps, who participated in this conflict, says : 
"It was not only a desperate struggle, but it was 
literally a hand-to-hand fight. Nothing but the 
piled up logs or breastworks separated the combat- 
ants. Our men would reach over the logs and fire 
into the face of the enemy, would stab over with their 
bayonets ; many were shot and stabbed through the 
crevices and holes between the logs ; men mounted 
the works and with muskets rapidly handed them, 
kept up a continuous fire till they were shot down, 
when others would take their place and continue the 
deadly work. * * * Several times during the 
day the rebels would show a white flag above the 
works, and when our fire slackened, jump over and 
surrender, and others were crowded down to fill 
their places. * * * It was there that the some- 
what celebrated tree was cut off by bullets, there 
that the brush and logs were cut to pieces and 
whipped into basket-stuff. * * * There that the 
rebel ditches and cross sections were filled with dead 
men several deep. * * * I was at the angle 
next day. The sight was terrible and sickening, 
much worse than at Bloody Lane ( Antietam ) . There 
a great many dead men were lying in the road, and 
across the rails of the torn-down fences, and out in the 
cornfield; but they were not piled up several deep, 
and their flesh was not so torn and mangled as at 
the angle." Gen. Humphreys, chief of staff of the 



214 GRANT AS A SOLDIER. 

Army of the Potomac, says: "At the west angle 
the fighting was literally murderous. * * * As 
an indication of the sanguinary character of the con- 
flict of the 10th and 12th, Col. Upton remarks that 
Capt. Lamont, of the 5th Maine, the only one of seven 
captains who escaped in the assault of the 10th, was 
among the killed on the 12th." Gen. McGowan, 
Confederate, says: "The trenches on the right in 
the bloody angle had to be cleared of the dead 
more than once. An oak tree twenty-two inches in 
diameter in rear of the brigade was cut down by 
musket balls and fell about 12 o'clock, Thursday 
night, injuring several men in the 1st South Caro- 
lina regiment." The fighting continued till after 
midnight. But enough of the horrible narrative. 
Federal loss on the 12th, 8,000. 

As day succeeded day experiment after experiment 
was made to find some weak point in Lee's line that 
could be broken. But Grant, with nearly three men 
to one against Lee, could find none. To conceal 
movements from the enemy the marching was done 
in the night to be followed by fighting in the day. 
There was a long spell of rainy weather and the 
roads became frightful. Until May 20th Hansock, 
Warren and Wright led their corps either in march 
or in battle almost constantly. " In this contest, 
unparelleled in its fury, and swelling to the propor- 
tions of a campaign, language is inadequate to con- 
vey an impression of the labors, fatigues and 



SPOTTSYLVANIA COURT HOUSE. 215 

sufferings of the troops who fought by day only to 
march by night, from point to point of the long line 
and renew the fight on the morrow. About 40,000 
men had already fallen in the bloody encounters of 
the Wilderness and Spottsylvania and the exhausted 
army began to lose its spirit. It was with joy, 
therefore, that it at length turned its back upon the 
lines of Spottsylvania." Yes, as at the Wilderness, 
the Federal army, balked, defeated, exhausted, dis- 
heartened, again withdrew and again turned its back 
on the enemy. The army, Hancock taking the lead, 
started soon after dark on the 20th for the North 
Anna river. 

REFLECTIONS. 

1. The mind is unwilling to dwell on recitals so 
repulsive long enough to make reflections. But if 
the truth must be told, Grant should immediately 
have been sent before a court-martial. After the 
Wilderness he had changed his plan to the extent of 
not longer regarding Lee's army as his objective 
point. Partisan bigotry cannot deny this, for he 
did turn away from Lee's army. That fact is de- 
cisive. But Richmond becomes his objective, and 
by the overland line. Now, why did he not move for 
his objective? Humphrey shows that it was easy, 
by more than one road, to flank Lee. The truth is 
he did in fact flank on the night of the 20th. Here, 
then, we have a general, in violation of his plan, 



216 GRANT AS A SOLDIER. 

and unnecessarily, giving battle in which he sends 
thousands of men to useless slaughter. Can this 
wanton and terrible and ghastly crime be paralleled 
in history? It is time that such monstrosity of 
conduct were held up in plain terms to public ab- 
horrence. Civilization, humanity itself, horror- 
stricken, shouts aloud execration at such butchery. 
Grant should not have been allowed to command an 
army another day. 



MILITARY MERRIMENT. 



The North Anna is at places fordable, though 
barely so. About half of Grant's army, Warren 
being present, crossed at one ford, the other half, 
Hancock being present, at a ford about four miles 
lower down again. Grant found his " objective ' : 
without seeking him, nay, while seeking to avoid 
him. It is a queer " objective point " that has to 
be escaped from, avoided, dreaded. But in spite of 
Grant's planning, his plans being concealed in his 
own mind, and in spite of his marching under the. 
veil of darkness, when he reached the North Anna 
he found Lee there. This may look like romance, 
but it is not. It is history. Was Frederick the 
Great, was Marlborough, was Napoleon ever so out- 
witted, ever so balked? Was any of them ever so 
baffled and punished in battle and after a stealthy 
march of escape again encountered, and after being 
again baffled and punished in battle, and after an- 
other stealthy escape, again encountered and all this 
by an army that was itself the " objective point " 
and would be fought if it would " stand? " 

At the North Anna Grant committed a blunder 

(217) 



218 GRANT AS A SOLDIER .- 

that was ludicrous. From his experience at the 
Wilderness and afterward at Spottsylvania he ought 
to have known that instead of Lee being his objec- 
tive, the tables were turned. Lee had negatively 
coaxed him to cross the Rapidan and adopt the over- 
land line, and now he was Lee's objective. He ought 
to have known that instead of his pursuing Lee, Lee 
was pursuing him and in his front. Hence he ought 
to have known that to divide his army in presence of 
an antagonist, so enterprising, so daring and so 
addicted to maneuvering, was hardly good tactics. 
Yet Grant crossed the Rapidan by two fords and thus 
divided his army into halves. Lee saw the blunder 
instantly. After some trifling combats he succeeded 
in placing his force. Being on the south side of 
the North Anna he disposed it in the form of the 
letter V, its apex resting on the river between 
Grant's two halves, his left wing extending in a 
southwesterly direction and flanked by Little river, 
the right wing extending in a southeasterly direction 
and flanked by the Hanover marshes, so that 
neither flank could be turned. Thus in a battle Lee 
could shift troops rapidly from either wing to any 
point hard pressed in the other wing. On the other 
hand, if Grant should wish to re-enforce one wing 
from the other, the re-enforcing detachment would 
have to cross to the north bank of the North Anna, 
barely fordable, march four miles to the other ford, 
recross to the south side and then march to the 



MILITARY MERRIMENT. 219 

point where it was needed. Grant had been taught 
at the Wilderness and at Spottsylvania that he 
was not now dealing with a Floyd, a Pember- 
ton or a Bragg. He spent two days in peeping and 
doubting and querying. He saw that Lee had 
employed mind and had checkmated him. He 
confessed himself beaten and in the darkness of the 
night of May 26th he again turned his back upon 
the enemy, stealthily recrossed the North Anna and 
struck out for the Pamunkey. So long as military 
history is read this adventure will be welcome to 
the student for the merriment it will excite. Yet 
Grant's nature, if sensitive, must have smarted. 



COLD HARBOR. 



On the morning of the 28th, the army was on the 
south side of the Pamunkey. But there again was 
Lee, and in Grant's front. In order to command 
as many roads as possible and thus bar Grant's 
march, Lee had taken position at a cross-roads 
called Polly Huntley's Corners. It was not more 
than three or four miles from Cold Harbor or 
Gaines' Mill, the point at which Gen. Fitz John 
Porter had fought like a tiger under McClellan. On 
the 29th, Grant and Lee had some sharp fighting 
near Polly Huntley's, and Grant concluded not to 
press further there. Meanwhile Grant's terrific 
losses had made it necessary for him to " rake and 
scrape" for more re-enforcements. ^He accordingly 
ordered one corps of Butler's command, under Gen. 
W. F. Smith, containing 16,000 men, to take boats, 
pass down the James and up the Pamunkey, and 
debark at the White House. Smith reached Cold 
Harbor during the afternoon of June 1st, and imme- 
diately, in conjunction with Wright's corps, had a 
sharp encounter with the enemy without marked 
success, but with a loss to the two corps of 2,000 
(220) 



COLD HARBOR. 221 

men. There were other combats, one of them of con- 
siderable magnitude, but all indecisive. Grant de- 
termined to cross the Chickahominy. He ordered 
Hancock, then lying near Polly Huntley's, to march 
by night nearly to Alexander's bridge across the 
Chickahominy, his line to extend northward. 
Wright was placed next to Hancock, then came 
Smith with the 18th corps, then Warren, then Burn- 
side. Lee's little army facing east, confronted 
Grant. Burnside's strong corps was, in military 
language, en potence, — that is, Burnside's extreme 
left joined Warren's extreme right, but Burnside's 
line bent backward, forming an obtuse angle, almost 
a right angle, with the general line of battle. The 
reason for this disposition of Burnside it is not easy 
to see. Where a commanding general has reason to 
fear specially for the safety of an extremity of his 
line, he accumulates troops there (hence the phrase 
en potence, in power) and finds it convenient to 
place them in that position. Thus at Waterloo, ap- 
prehensive that Napoleon might mass upon his right 
or attempt to turn it, Wellington placed a consider- 
able force en potence. But Grant with the re-enforce- 
ments he had received from Washington and the 
strong corps under Smith, so largely outnumbered 
Lee that it would seem that instead of retiring 
Burnside's big corps he might have planned, on the 
contrary, to throw Burnside forward and upon Lee's 
flank and rear. As Grant planned to be the attack- 



222 GRANT AS A SOLDIER. 

ing party, a strange and almost unaccountable fact 
is that there was no reconnoitering, no attempt of 
any sort to ascertain Lee's exact position or even 
the lay of the land between the armies and the dif- 
ficulties of approach. The region was dotted with 
impassable swamps. Were there any swamps that 
Grant's troops would have to avoid? Alas, there 
were ! Yet their location or even their existence, 
Grant did not attempt to ascertain. Were there in 
Lee's line any specially strong positions which could 
be avoided or any specially weak position upon 
which Federal troops could be massed and Lee's line 
cut in two? The soldiers of Grant's army were 
ready to die for their country, but not one was ready 
to die needlessly. They had a right to expect of 
their commander proper vigilance, proper energy, 
proper exercise of intellect. The authority to com- 
mand carries with it the duty to command with in- 
telligence. It is a crime, it is a crime against God 
and against humanity, ignorantly to order brave men 
to fruitless death. But no weak point was sought, 
no strong point was avoided, no difficulty of ap- 
proach was ascertained and prepared against, no 
maneuver was attempted, but the tactics, or lack of 
tactics, that at the Wilderness had brought a loss of 
15,000 men and defeat, and at Spottsylvania per- 
haps 20,000 men and defeat, was here repeated. A 
simultaneous attack along the line was ordered for 
4:30 nex_t morning. 



COLD HARBOR. 



223 



The attack was made. " Next morning with the 
first gray light of dawn struggling through the 
clouds, the preparation began; from behind the 
rude parapets there was an upstarting, a springing 
to arms, the muffled command of officers forming 
the line. The attack was ordered at half past four 
and it may have been five minutes after that or it 
may been ten minutes, but it certainly was not later 
than forty-five minutes past four, when the 
whole line was in motion and the dark hollows 
between the armies were lit up with the fires of 
death. It took hardly more than ten minutes of 
the fio-ment men call time to decide the battle. 
There was along the whole line a rush — then a spec- 
tacle of impregnable works, a bloody loss — then 
a sullen falling back and the battle was decided." 
There were slight exceptions to the above account, 
but as a general and brief statement it is terribly 
true. During those " ten minutes of the figment 
men call time," more than 13,000 Federal soldiers 
were stretched upon the field. And this is general- 
ship! "Tut, tut, good enough to toss. Food, 
food for powder, food for powder." 

What will Grant now do? Richmond is his objec- 
tive point. Thither he must go. But Lee forbado 
him to go by Polly Huntley's. It is now clear that 
he cannot cross the Chickakominy as a consequence 
of an ordinary battle. What shall he do? Prob- 
ably Grant was never before in so deep distress. 



224 GRANT AS A SOLDIER. 

Shall he abandon the overland line? Never. Had 
he not promised Stanton to whip Lee and capture 
Richmond by that line? Had he not in his Spott- 
sylvania dispatch of May 11th declared his purpose 
" to fight it out on this line if it takes all summer?" 
Had not this great sentence been published in every 
administration paper in the country and with exul- 
tant applause? Had he not got from it boundless 
popularity and a reputation for " bull-dog tenacity ?' ' 
Should he now forfeit that reputation, destroy that 
popularity, belie that pledge and displease Stanton. 
Above all, should he by abandoning the overland line 
and condemning his strategy and adopting the James 
river line, vindicate McClelhin? No. More troops 
can be got, and what are 13,000 men in ten minutes 
compared with vindicating McClellan and displeas- 
ing Stanton? His mind is made up. Bull-dog 
tenacity prevails. He will " fight it out on this 
line." He orders his army to intrench. Next day 
he orders siege operations to be begun. He resolves 
by a system of regular approaches to get command 
of that bridge. But time brings reflection. Ques- 
tions arise. Consultations are held. Even if 
by a siege he gets command of the bridge, what 
then? What will Lee be doing? May he not in- 
trench on the opposite side? In short, it becomes 
apparent at last that a siege is a sheer absurdity. 
These were bitter days for Grant. He knew that 
his uninterrupted and amazing bad success from the 



COLD HARBOR. 225 

day he crossed the Rapidan would have damned any 
other general in the world, that though the frenzy 
of red-hot patriotism was unable to see his errors, 
blindness might not last always, that when 13,000 
men fell in ten minutes and without result, a time 
of counting cost might come. And now to abandon 
his chosen line, to condemn his own strategy and so 
to declare that the awful sacrifice of blood at the 
Wilderness, Spottsylvania and Cold Harbor was pure 
waste and through his ignorance — this was bitter. 
The anguish of his humiliated spirit engages pity. 
But necessity is inexorable. He determines to 
abandon the overland line and prepares to move to 
James river. 

To make the transfer without damage from Lee 
was no easy task. It would require one corps to 
occupy the roads leading from Richmond south- 
ward between the Chickahominy and the James, 
for the double purpose of feigning a threat upon 
Richmond and of screening from Lee the march 
across the country of the main army. For such a 
purpose the most skillful corps commander was 
needed. But Hancock was next the Chickahominy 
and so placed that any movement of troops there 
would be apt to challenge the enemy's notice. It 
was necessary, then, to take Warren. Warren's 
corps was skillfully withdrawn to a point two or 
three miles to the rear, and Burnside, always good 
to fill up space, took its place. There was water 

15 



226 GRANT AS A SOLDIER. 

transportation for one corps. An order was issued 
for each corps to march at dark June 12th. Smith 
went to the White House on the Pamunkey, took 
boats and returned to Bermuda Hundred. Warren 
in advance crossed the Chickahominy on a bridge a 
few miles below the Alexander bridge, and judi- 
ciously occupied the roads with a threatening aspect. 
The remaining corps marched to the James river, 
fifty-five miles, without molestation. Of course 
Lee discovered in the morning of June 13th that 
Grant had again turned his back upon him. But 
with such splendid skill did Warren execute his 
task that it can hardly be doubted that for a time 
Lee was uncertain whether Grant had not descended 
and crossed the Chickahominy and was making for 
Richmond. 

Hancock crossed the James at Windmill Point on 
a pontoon bridge. A better place for building a 
bridge, and nearly a day's march nearer to Cold 
Harbor, was Malvern Hill. But Malvern Hill was 
the point at which McClellan had won a brilliant 
victory, and Grant, having just been driven to vin- 
dicate McClellan, must be pardoned if, in this hour 
of bitterness, he is willing to sacrifice public inter- 
ests rather than give prominence to a scene of 
McClellan's glory. 



ASSAULT ON PETERSBURG. 



Whether by his late distress Grant's mind had 
become confused and in some sense disabled, or 
whether he had become soured and less communi- 
cative, at any rate at the opening of his Petersburg 
campaign he committed a disastrous blunder. 
Smith, going by water, landed at Bermuda Hundred 
two days before the rest of the army crossed the 
James. He was immediately dispatched to capture 
Petersburg, which, at the time, had but a feeble 
garrison. Early in the morning of the 15th, Han- 
cock, then being just crossed, received at Wind- 
mill Point an order to await rations. He was also 
ordered to proceed to a certain named point near 
Petersburg, the order containing no intimation that 
there was a battle in progress, and hence leaving 
Hancock to infer that it was simply the place where 
he was to halt for the night. He was at the same 
time furnished with a map for his guidance. Now, 
first, the rations failed to reach him but having 
waited till 10 a. m. he determined to push on. 
Secondly, the order for marching contained a mis- 
take in the fact of naming an impossible place. 

(227) 



228 GRANT AS A SOLDIER. 

Thirdly, the map furnished him was untrue and 
misleading. It led him miles out of the proper 
route. About 5:30 p. m. he received an order from 
Grant, then being at City Point only six or seven 
miles from the point Hancock had then reached, 
directing him to push on to the relief of Smith who 
was then attacking Petersburg. A few minutes 
later he received a note from Smith informing him 
exactly where he, Smith, was. Hancock made haste, 
but it was dark when his command reached Smith. 
He proffered the use of his troops and a waiving of 
his own rank, as the job was Smith's. Smith 
thought it imprudent to attempt more in the dark- 
ness. During: the night Lee filled Petersburg with 
troops and artillery and as a consequence, a siege 
lasting nearly a year and costing thousands of lives 
became necessary. If Hancock had been informed by 
the order in the morning that a battle was in progress, 
he would have disregarded his rations and hastened 
on. If the order had not contained a false direction, 
if instead of containing a false and misleading particu- 
larity, it had simply ordered him to Petersburg, a 
small town, where he would have had not a mo- 
ment's difficulty in finding a corps of Federal troops, 
he would have taken the nearest route. He might 
have reached Petersburg by noon or soon after, and 
Petersburg would have fallen ; but he knew nothing 
of any attack till 5: 30. Meade, too, was kept in 
ignorance of the attack. Swinton asserts: " There 



ASSAULT ON PETERSBURG. 229 

is on file in the archives of the army a paper bear- 
in <* this indorsement from Gen. Meade: ' Had Gen. 
Hancock or myself known that Petersburg was to 
be attacked, Petersburg would have fallen.' ' 

On the 16th, Petersburg was assaulted without 
success. On the 18th, another assault was made 
which was also fruitless. On the 21st, the 2d 
corps, under command of Maj.-Gen. D. B. Birney 
(Hancock was disabled for duty by the breaking out 
afresh of his Gettysburg wound), and the 6th corps, 
Wright, were sent to the left to occupy the Jerusa- 
lem Plank Koad, running southward out of Peters- 
burg and to cut the Weldon railroad. They were 
badly beaten, losing 2,500 prisoners, many stand- 
ards and a battery. Kautz's and Wilson's cavalry 
were sent out to destroy the Weldon and Southside 
railroad. For a time they had good success, but 
on his return, Wilson fell in with the enemy, was 
beaten and lost, besides killed and wounded, 1,000 
prisoners, 13 pieces of artillery and 30 wagons and 
ambulances. During the first days of July the chief 
of artillery and the chief of engineers made an ex- 
amination of the enemy's defenses. They reported 
to Grant that capture of the city by assault was im- 
practicable. Grant's blunder in concealing his de- 
sign on Petersburg from Meade and Hancock was 
inexcusable. Sies;e was ordered. 



230 GRANT AS A SOLDIER. 

SUMMARY. 

Let us summarize. When Grant crossed the 
Rapidan he had under his personal command 140,- 
000 men. He also placed under Butler about 40,- 
000 as his left wing, making a total of the army 
marching against Richmond of 180,000 men. His 
own " objective," stated with emphasis, was Lee's 
army. To Butler, "Richmond is to be your ob- 
jective point." To Meade, "Lee's army is to be 
your objective point. Wherever he goes you will 
go also." With these two objectives what did the 
180,000 men effect? Did Butler effect anything? 
Could even a capable general, with so inadequate a 
force, have effected anything? His 40,000 men 
were simply shelved. This is strategy ! He adopts 
the overland line. Lee, rejoiced, throws not a straw 
in his way in crossing. But as soon as he has 
crossed, " Lee's army," his " objective," is before 
him. He is compelled to abandon his chosen route 
and, under cover of night, turns his back on the 
" objective." Within fifteen miles by a longer route 
Lee again confronts him. The lesson taught him 
at the Wilderness had been wasted. He could have 
flanked Lee (as at last he did), but, blind, fool- 
hardy and reckless, he gives battle. With a state- 
ment of success that was flatly false, he calls for 
re-enforcements. Day after day he continues the 
murderous work. Again he turns his back stealth- 



ASSAULT ON PETERSBURG. 231 

ily on his foe, and in darkness escapes by a flank 
movement. At the North Anna Lee again confronts 
him and again he is compelled, under darkness, to 
turn his back on the enemy, recross the river and 
seek another route. Before he reaches the Chicka- 
hominy, Lee is before him, occupying Polly Hunt- 
ley's." He attempts to drive Lee, but in vain. Mov- 
ing a few miles southward, he determines to cross 
the Chickahominy further down. Lee confronts 
him at Cold Harbor. In ten minutes the ghastly 
work is done. And this is generalship ! The au- 
thor of this campaign is a skillful commander ! 

It is impossible to know with exactness the total 
number of killed, wounded and missing in the over- 
land campaign, in the campaign of Butler as Grant's 
left wing, and in the fighting at and about Petersburg 
prior to July 10th, when the siege began, but the 
number was about 80,000. The day Grant estab- 
lished his headquarters at Culpeper Court-house, he 
could, by adopting the James river line, have occu- 
pied Petersburg without firing a shot. Here then 
was a useless sacrifice of 80,000 men. But that 
statement fails to convey the whole truth. After 
having wasted 80,000 meu he is compelled to begin 
a siege lasting for months and requiring a further 
awful sacrifice This is generalship ! 



DESOLATION AND DEATH. 



It is not alone by his acts on the march or in 
battle that a commanding general is to be judged. 
All exercises of the despotic authority which he 
holds are to be considered. The murder of the 
bookseller Palm and the poisoning of the prisoners 
of war at Jaffa by Napoleon, the devastation of the 
Palatinate by Wallenstein, the burning of Atlanta 
and Columbia by Sherman, are illustrations. 
Grant's character as a soldier cannot be fully un- 
derstood without turning for a moment from his 
camp and battlefield. Lee differed from Grant in 
more ways than one. He differed from him in the 
fact that he maneuvered on the field. He also 
differed from him in fertility and ingenuity in 
strategy. He had repeatedly disturbed Grant's 
plans by sending troops through the Shenandoah 
valley to threaten Washington. At last Grant, in 
"the desperation of despair," resolved that if Lee 
weakened him by stretching 13,000 of his troops on 
the field in a quarter of an hour, he would weaken 
Lee in a mode, if not as military, at least as 
effective. As his cannon failed, he would try the 
(232) 



DESOLATION AND DEATH. 233 

torch. Sheridan was one of his favorites. He 
directed him to march through the Shenandoah 
Valley, and gave him appropriate orders. Sheridan 
did his work well. This is what he reports: " In 
moving back to this point, the whole country from 
the Blue Kidge to the North Mountain has been 
made entirely untenable for a rebel army. I have 
destroyed over two thousand barns filled with wheat 
and hay and farming implements ; over seventy 
mills filled with flour and wheat ; have driven in 
front of the army over four thousand head of stock, 
and have killed and issued to the troops not less 
than three thousand sheep. This destruction em- 
braces the Luray valley and the Little Fort valley 
as well as the main valley." After this terrible 
report of efficiency Sheridan was still more a 
favorite. Faciunt solitudinem, appellant pacem. 
Another question, even more serious than the 
laying waste a country and impoverishing non- 
combatants by rapine and the torch, Grant had to 
meet. At the beginning of the war, when the 
country was uninformed as to the laws and the 
usages of civilized warfare, there were many ques- 
tions concerning the treatment of Confederate armies 
and Confederates taken in arms that puzzled the 
public mind. At last it came to be understood 
that a recognition of Confederate belligerency was 
purely military and without any political signifi- 
cance. Then came interchange of messages under 



234 GRANT AS A SOLDIER. 

flags of truce, care of the wounded, burial of the 
dead, and other amenities of war. July 22, 1862, 
a cartel for the exchange of prisoners of war was 
executed by the belligerent parties, and exchange 
began at once. Afterward the exchange was inter- 
rupted. Each side had immense throngs of such 
prisoners. In the South the Libby prison, the 
Raleigh prison and the Andersonville prison were 
crowded. Shocking accounts were published of the 
horrors of Andersonville. The Confederate gov- 
ernment was ea^er for exchange. Judge Ould was 
the Confederate commissioner for exchange of pris- 
oners. Near the close of March, 1864, he visited 
Gen. Butler, Federal agent at Fortress Monroe, and 
had several conferences with him, and reached a 
basis pretty satisfactory to both. In negotiation 
few men were so cunning as Butler, and hence he 
doubtless got the advantage. Tens of thousands 
of aching hearts in the North, mothers, sisters, gray- 
haired fathers, were ready to rejoice. But Grant 
reached Fortress Monroe the day after Ould left. 
He had here the opportunity to do a great act in 
the interest of humanity. To end the horrors of 
Andersonville would mollify by so much the suffer- 
ings of war. Grant could do it. What was his 
action? He instructed Butler not to take another 
step in the matter without further orders from him. 
April 30th he telegraphed Butler to send no more 
prisoners in exchange. Such an act deserves a 
place in history. 



SIEGE OF PETERSBURG IN 1864. 



As in the case of Vicksburg it is not my purpose 
to give a detailed account of this siege. I shall 
confine myself to its important features. Burn- 
side's mine first demands attention. June 18th 
Warren, in the assault of that day, succeed in push- 
ing his force up to within a hundred and fifty yards 
of the enemy's line. Afterward, as Warren was 
needed for fighting, he was withdrawn and Burnside 
put in his place. A portion of Burnside' s command 
was composed of Pennsylvania miners and one of 
his officers had had large experience in superintend- 
ing that sort of business. From him came the idea 
of the mine. The work was pushed on. July 30th 
was fixed for the explosion, which was to be fol- 
lowed by immediate assault. The plan was as fol- 
lows: As the explosion would be expected by the 
Federal troops it would cause among them no con- 
fusion ; but to the Confederate troops a sudden and 
immense uprising of the earth, unexpected, would 
produce terror. So it turned out. But to be suc- 
cessful, advantage should be taken of the confusion 
instantly; for, among brave men, terror is short- 

(235) 



236 GRANT AS A SOLDIER. 

lived. The duty of making the assault ought in 
such case to be assigned to the ablest officer com- 
manding the best troops. But Burnside was the 
least able of corps commanders and his corps was 
the least efficient corps. Besides, the space would 
allow not more than a division of troops for the 
first work of assault. Hence the best division com- 
.mander should have been selected, leading the most 
daring troops. Burnside's corps had four divisions 
of which one was composed of blacks. Such was 
the morale of the corps that the black division was 
considered the best. 

The black division was, in fact, selected for the 
duty, but Grant flatly forbade. Then Burnside, who 
had an admirable facility for blundering, selected by 
lot, or, as Grant said, pulled straws or tossed cop 
pers for the choice. The very poorest division, 
commanded by the very poorest division com- 
mander, Brig. -Gen. Ledlie, was selected. Meade 
seems to have taken great pains in this matter. He 
prepared written orders, making them unusually 
explicit. The mine was exploded. A large mass of 
earth, the powder blazing through it as if it were a 
volcano, burst and rose two hundred feet in the air. 
Not understood, it was enough to appall the stoutest 
heart. Instantly the Federal artillery opened. 
Then was the moment for a fierce assault. But 
everything was in confusion. Troops rushed pell- 
mell, officers behaved with cowardice. The crater 



SIEGE OF PETERSBURG IN 1864. 237 

became filled with a confused crowd. Burnside, in- 
stead of trying to do something with the troops in 
the crater, ordered the black division to pass around 
it and assault the enemy's line. But by this time 
the enemy had come to understand the cause and 
the black troops were repulsed. Then came a mas- 
sacre that was cruel and sickening. The mine was 
an ignoble failure. To show the state of feeling in 
the North, and especially the depth of Congres- 
sional learning, it is worth while to say that a Con- 
gressional committee examined into the cause of this 
failure, and found, as " the first and great cause of 
disaster," the fact that the colored troops were notr 
selected to lead the assault ! As the mine was a 
failure, such is public justice, poor Burnside suf- 
fered ; but if it had produced the capture of Peters- 
burg the glory would have been Grant's. 

Grant determined to have possession of the Wel- 
don railroad, a road entering Petersburg from the 
south. On the 18th of August he sent out Warren 
who in the afternoon seized the road. The enemy 
attacked him but he held his ground. Lee, bent on 
retaining the road pushed on heavy re-enforcements, 
and in the afternoon of the 19th Warren was again 
attacked fiercely. For a time the battle was doubtful, 
but Warren remained firm. On the morning of the 
21st the enemy made a furious assault but was re- 
pulsed and then abandoned the effort. Warren's loss 



238 GKANT AS A SOLDIER. 

during the 18th, 19th and 21st in killed, wounded 
and missing aggregated 4,455. 

About the same time Hancock was sent to Ream's 
Station, a few miles below Warren, on the Weldon 
railroad. He was attacked by Gen. A. P. Hill, 
and had a sharp engagement. Hancock had only 
about 8,000 men and a portion of them showed 
cowardice. At night Hancock withdrew, but it aft- 
erward appeared that Hill also withdrew. Both 
sides lost heavily. Grant ordered at considerable 
intervals two turning movements, that is, move- 
ments further west than Lee's line of fortifications 
(which extended miles west and south of Peters- 
burg) and then, in the rear of the fortifications, 
upon Petersburg. Both movements were failures. 
Warren was sent out further south upon the Weldon 
railroad to destroy it. He succeeded in tearing up 
about twenty miles and returned in safet}^ The 
approach of winter made roads impassable and 
caused a suspension of military operations. 

It is to be observed that every one of the move- 
ments, except the two executed by Warren, were 
failures. It may well be doubted whether the idea 
of besieging Petersburg was not a wrong one. 
Vicksburg commanded the Mississippi and hence 
had to be taken in order to hold that great river. 
But Petersburg commanded nothing. Its strategic 
value was trifling. True, the Weldon and Southside 
railroads passed through Petersburg and they were 



SIEGE OF PETERSBURG IN 1864. 239 

necessary to feed Richmond. But as Grant held 
the Wei do n railroad, Lee could not allow him to 
hold the Southside railroad. If Grant had moved 
out his whole army a few miles to the west, then 
Lee would have been compelled to quit his intrench- 
ments and give battle in the field. This might have 
been done in June. But the art of flanking as an 
aggressive maneuver, the art of flanking, except in 
the night, and as a result of defeat, Grant never 
understood. 



SIEGE OF PETERSBURG, 1865. 



The strength of the South was about exhausted. 
Whatever our opinion of the righteousness of its 
cause, it had displayed unsurpassed valor and 
heroism. But it had become miserably poor. The 
people were suffering. Women had cut up their 
carpets into clothing. The table was scantily spread 
with only the plainest fare. Farming implements 
were wearing out. Horses and mules were growing 
scarce. Slaves, their masters being, in many cases, 
absent and themselves infected with notions of free- 
dom, were becoming unreliable. Husbands and 
sons in the army began to wonder whether another 
crop would be raised. Soldiers were badly clothed. 
Some were without shoes. Their rations were 
wretched. The coarsest meat had got to be a luxury. 
Sometimes they had only corn in the ear. Their 
artillery was drawn by ropes. Cannon shot was of 
all shapes. The powder was weak in explosive 
power. Everything looked discouraging. This 
state of things could not last. Endurance has its 
limit. It is doubtless safe to say that if after Hood's 
destruction at Nashville, Grant had not fired another 
(240) 



SIEGE OF PETERSBURG, 1865. 241 

shot, but had merely prevented Confederate armies 
from passing into the North, the war would have 
ceased within a few months. 

Sherman on his march from Savannah northward 
was in North Carolina. Johnston, in command of a 
Confederate force was near Sherman. Lee saw that 
he could not hold Petersburg much longer. He 
formed the purpose to push west to Amelia Court 
House, on the south side of the Appomattox by 
the Cox road. But as Grant had heavy forces threat- 
ening that road, such a move would be perilous. 
He accordingly determined to attack Grant's extreme 
right, hoping thereby to cause Grant to withdraw 
the forces on his left and thus give the Confederate 
army safe way of escape. Lee attacked Grant's 
right at dawn of March 25th. At the outset the 
success was brilliant, but it ended in failure. It 
was now Grant's time for aggressive action. He de- 

DO 

termined upon another turning movement. The 
Southside railroad runs on the south side of the 
Appomattox and between that river and Lee's line 
of fortifications. A successful turning movement 
would, in the first place, bring Grant's force in the 
rear of Lee's line ; but in the second place, it would 
give Grant possession of the railroad. To retain 
the railroad was of vital importance to Lee, inas- 
much as he depended on it for daily supplies. 

On the morning of March 29th, Sheridan, War- 
ren, and Humphreys (now commanding the 2d 

16 



242 GRANT AS A SOLDIER. 

corps) set out on the turning movement. There 
was varying success. Lee opposed with all the 
troops he could raise. Weather favored him. The 
uight of the 29th and all day of the 30th rain fell 
heavily so that that low swampy country became 
almost impassable and retarded aggressive action. 
At last, April 1st, the enemy took position at Five 
Forks, a point about five miles west of Lee's 
westerly line of fortifications and where several 
roads converge. The enemy faced southward. 
Sheridan wished to cut him off from Lee's main 
army and drive him westward. Hence he deter- 
mined to attack most heavily on his left. That 
duty he assigned to Warren, who moved around and 
came in on his flank and rear. The enemy fought 
splendidly. He had thrown up temporary breast- 
works. At one time Warren charged these 
breastworks, himself leading the van and having a 
horse shot dead under him. Sheridan's victory was 
complete and brilliant, more than five thousand 
prisoners were captured, of whom Warren took more 
than three-fifths. The enemy was pursued westward 
till after dark. After the engagement was ended, 
Sheridan, for a reason which nobody can understand, 
relieved Warren from command. In his Personal 
Memoirs Grant says that Warren was relieved 
before the battle. Grant had expressly authorized 
Sheridan to relieve Warren. 

To save Southside Railroad, Lee had so thinned his 



SIEGE OF PETERSBURG, 1865. 243 

line that it was hardly more than a picket line, and 
now the army, formed at such cost to his line, to 
hold that road, is not only beaten but is driven away 
from him and lost. Southside Railroad too, is lost. 
Immediately on news of the Five Forks victory 
Grant orders a bombardment all along the line and 
an assault to be made next morning Sunday, April 
2d. The assault was successful. But there was an 
inner line of defenses close around the town to which 
Lee's forces retired, — for Lee was now fighting for 
time, for hours, for darkness. About 11 a. m. he 
telegraphed to Davis that he would abandon Peters- 
burg that night. During the night the Confederate 
forces marched seventeen miles westward on the 
north side of the Appomattox. Next morning the 
Federal skirmishers found Petersburg vacant. 
About thirty miles west of Petersburg Lee crossed 
Appomattox to Amelia Court House where he had 
made arrangements to have provisions awaiting him. 
Through an unlucky misunderstanding he found 
none. The disappointment was terrible. Forag- 
ing then became a necessity. Lee was compelled to 
remain two days, the 4th and 5th, at Amelia Court 
House. From that time on the sufferings of the 
men from hunger was great. The horses, too, could 
get little food. To obtain brief relief from Federal 
annoyance, Lee recrossed the Appomattox near 
Farmville and fired the bridge. But Humphrey's 
advance came up and extinguished the flames before 



244 GRANT AS A SOLDIER. 

much damage had been done. On the evening of 
the 8th Sheridan with cavalry reached Appomattox 
station on the Lynchburg Railroad five miles south of 
Appomattox Court House. Four trains of cars 
loaded with provisions had just arrived for Lee. 
Sheridan captured them and then drove back such 
of Lee's troops as were there to Appomattox Court 
House. At last Lee is caught. He has one way of 
escape and only one, namely by cutting his way 
through. He gives the order. Fighting begins. 
A man steps forward from his line with a flag of 
truce. 



THE SURRENDER. 



All could see that the end was at hand. Though 
Grant was generous in any matter in which gen- 
erosity was not at his expense, yet he lacked re- 
finement, and whenever his selfishness assumed 
mastery, its manifestations were liable to be coarse. 
For example, when McClernand by his daring and 
skill, had made the flank movement by Vicksburg 
successful and had thus given Grant fame, his 
selfishness was so coarse that he uttered no sylla- 
ble of applause or personal thanks, and even re- 
fused to speak with him after the victory of Port 
Gibson. In his excuse it may be urged that he 
regarded McClernand as a rival and enemy. But 
in the case now before us that excuse cannot be 
made. Meade was neither. Externally their rela- 
tions were friendly. But in his treatment of Meade 
his selfishness betrays the same coarseness. On the 
7th, Grant sent Lee the following communication : — 

April 7th, 1865. 

General: The lesult of the last week must con- 
vince you of the hopelessness of further resistance 

(245) 



246 GRANT AS A SOLDIER. 

on the part of the Army of Northern Virginia in this 
struggle. I feel that it is so and regard it as my 
duty to shift from myself the responsibility of any 
further effusion of blood by asking of you the sur- 
render of that portion of the Confederate States 
Army, known as the Army of Northern Virginia. 

U. S. Grant, 
Lieutenant-General . 
General R. E. Lee. 

Grant as lieutenant-general commanded all the 
armies. Legally Meade was commander of the 
Army of the Potomac exactly as before Grant 
reached the Culpeper Court House, exactly as 
Sherman and Thomas commanded their respective 
armies. Grant as their common superior could order 
either one, as he did in fact. His personal presence 
with Meade did not change their official relations, 
did not make Meade the less commander of the 
Army of the Potomac, subject to Grant's superior 
authority. Lee was, in like manner, commander of 
all the Southern armies. Now, if Grant as com- 
mander of all Federal armies, had desired to com- 
municate with Lee as commander of all Confederate 
armies, the foregoing note would have been proper. 
But if Lee is to be addressed in his capacity as com- 
mander of the Army of Northern Virginia, the mes- 
sage should come from Meade. But Grant's letter 
asks not the surrender of all Confederate armies, 



THE SURRENDER. 247 

but " of that portion of the Confederate States 
army known as the Army of Northern Virginia." 
The truth is Grant saw that whatever correspond- 
ence there might be respecting the surrender would 
become historic and without caring for the propri- 
eties, he determined just to take that business to 
himself because he had the power. 

Not to speak of prior correspondence, the flag of 
truce caused a suspension of battle, and a meeting 
between Grant and Lee. After some friendly con- 
versation they agreed orally on terms. Grant then 
wrote the following note incorporating the terms: — 

Appomattox Court House, Va., > 
April 6th, 1865. J 
General: In accordance with the substance of 
my letter to you of the 8th inst. I propose to re- 
ceive the surrender of the Army of Northern Vir- 
ginia on the following terms, to wit: Rolls of all 
the officers and men to be made in duplicate, one 
copy to be given to an officer to be designated by 
me, the other to be retained by such officer or offi- 
cers as you may designate. The officers to give 
their individual paroles not to take up arms against 
the United States unless properly exchanged ; and 
each company or regimental commander to sign a 
like parole for the men of their commands. The 
army, artillery and public property to be parked 
and stacked and turned over to the officials ap- 



248 GRANT AS A SOLDIER. 

pointed by me to receive them. This will not em- 
brace the side arms of the officers nor their private 
horses, or baggage. This done each officer and 
man will be allowed to return to his home, not to 
be disturbed by United States authority so long as 
they observe their paroles and the laws in force 
where they may reside. 

U. S. Grant, 
Lieutenant-General . 
General R. E. Lee. 

Lee accepted the terms. 

Grant has received much praise for the gener- 
osity of his terms. The truth is only generous 
terms would at that time have been, in military pol- 
icy, proper. It was certain that the end of the 
rebellion by organized armies was at hand. While 
war was waging without prospect of an immediate 
surrender, unconditional surrender was the right 
thing. Hence Grant was right at Fort Donelson 
and hence he was wrong at Vicksburg. But now all 
is changed. Military wisdom invites surrender. 
Other Confederate armies, seeing that Lee's army 
on surrender is immediately released, are encouraged 
to follow the example. Severity would have been 
wanton and would have done no good. It might 
have done much harm. 

When Grant had finished the note above set forth, 
he handed it to his military secretary for correction 



THE SURRENDER. 249 

and corrections were made. Grant has been in- 
duced to believe that the note contains rare merit. 
It is amusing to observe the simple earnestness with 
which in his "Personal Memoirs," he relates with 
particularity the facts connected with its composi- 
tion, assuring us that " when I put my pen to paper, 
I did not know the first word that I should make use 
of in writing the terms." It must be conceded that 
the note is well written. The average commission 
merchant, having no salaried critic at his elbow, 
could not write a better business note though he 
might make fewer errors in syntax. 



